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Béatrice Knerr and Fan Jieping
(eds.)

Chinese Diasporas in Europe

History, Challenges, and Prospects

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Preface

The early 21st century has witnessed a dramatic change in the international migration of Chinese people, regarding their number, their major destinations and their activities abroad. Europe, for more than a century a traditional destination of out-bound Chinese, but with comparatively low numbers and a largely stable profile of the diaspora, within a short time became a hot-spot, displaying a high dynamic in size and composition.

To focus on this under-researched area, in May 2012, the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of Zhejiang University organized a bi-locational symposium in Hangzhou and Yueqing, as a kick-off event for its comprehensive research project on the situation of Chinese communities in different European countries, inviting an international scientific community for presentations and discussions. This symposium turned out to be highly productive in terms of new insights and fresh ideas. Hence, we developed the vision to share the results with the international scientific community, with policy makers, and the global public. Over the following time, workshop participants further elaborated the presented topics, complementing them with additional information, new primary data and inclusion of theoretical considerations. The present volume is the outcome of these efforts; we are sure it will become a most valuable resource to all those interested in this timely subject and / or having to deal with it in their professional life. It is certain that in the future global economic development will further encourage the movement of Chinese seeking economic, social and cultural opportunities in new places which makes the presented research results highly timely.

The book is subdivided into four parts: an introductory chapter which provides an overview of the history of Chinese migration to Europe with a broader focus on the late 20th and early 21st century; a comprehensive section on the career context of expatriate Chinese, a short focus on the role of language, and a wide-ranging part on cultural identity.

After the introductory chapter 1 providing background information about the history and the recent dynamics of Chinese migration to Europe compiled in by Beatrice Knerr, Xu Liwang and Yang Taoyu in chapter 2 focus on migrants from Qingtian City,

Zhejiang Province who form an overwhelming majority of the Chinese immigrants in Europe which breaks the traditional pattern. At the same time Qingtian emigrants have exhibited a development pattern that demonstrates an individual uniqueness. Qingtian migrants' fundamental driving force and basis of their development has been the reform and opening-up policy implemented in Mainland China since in the late 1970s. In Europe, over the subsequent decades, Qingtian immigrants exhibited several archetypal shifts in their economic activities, starting with small-scale commodity vending, followed by the establishment of Chinese restaurants, the vending of Chinese daily consumables and finally returning to China to make investments. Xu Liwang and Yang Taoyu's article demonstrates how each of these developmental phases and their respective business patterns have been inextricably linked to the situation in China.

In their paper on the migration of highly qualified Chinese to Germany in the early 21st century, Kaikai Zhang and Beatrice Knerr, focusing on Germany, explain the role which Chinese immigrants play in an economy where highly qualified staff has become increasingly scarce as the domestic supply of professionals continues to fall short of the demand in many areas. Many Chinese have taken advantage of the favorable opportunities offered by Germany which target the immigration of high-potentials. Many were issued a "European Union Blue Card", and since the early 21st century, Chinese have formed the largest group among Germany's international students. Also, with the number of Chinese companies in Germany on the rise and the strengthening of trade relations between China and Germany, the number of Chinese entrepreneurs and white-collar workers has soared up. These tendencies indicate that highly qualified Chinese play and will continue to play a significant role in Germany's economy and society. In this context, based on primary and secondary data, Zhang and Knerr investigate professional and social situation of different groups of highly qualified Chinese in Germany in the early 21st century; the potential benefits which the migration of highly qualified Chinese bring to the migrants, the host country, their country of origin, and to third countries; and the challenges the immigrants are facing. Further deepening the consideration of Chinese immigrants' role in Germany's economic development, Xi Zhao and Beatrice Knerr show how Chinese self-employed have contributed to the entrepreneurial activities in the country, specifically by exploring the ethnic

business characteristics of the self-employed Chinese based on a survey among 20 self-employed Chinese in Germany by semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014. Applying the disadvantage theory and the culture theory in ethnic entrepreneurship, they found that the Chinese self-employed in Germany are segmented and characterized by certain cultural features which equip them with certain advantages of entering into business and running their enterprises.

Addressing the phenomenon of the “Unbreakable Glass Ceiling” which describes the factors that prevent a person from achieving his/her career goals due to gender differences or ethnic discrimination, Zhao and Li investigate the living situation of first generation Overseas Chinese in Denmark thirty years after the first wave of emigration to understand the challenges they have faced which have prevented them from successfully integrating into the host society. The research presented concentrates on the daily activities of the Diaspora members. Zhao and Li conducted ten in-depth narrative interviews with Chinese migrants in Denmark, and present three representative biographies to demonstrate the core elements of “glass ceiling” outcomes, demonstrating how migrants navigate between two cultural realities in the various domains of their lives, including family roles and responsibilities, parenting, work, work ethic, and relationships with authorities, and focusing on the second generation immigrants, their point of view towards their parents and towards China, and the understanding of their parents’ way of thinking and behavior. The article regards Danish and Chinese language proficiency as a critical study point. Processes for the acquisition of a new language were analyzed prior to addressing questions about individual strategies for coping with cultural and language differences; the significance of retaining one’s language of origin; the circumstances under which cultural boundaries are actively maintained or indeed transformed; and how language affects migrants’ ability to negotiate multiple identities and form hybrid or transnational identities.

The language context referring to second/third generation Chinese immigrants is picked up in detail by Eline Joosten in her article on the participants in Chinese language classes at Zhejiang University. As a result of the growing attention given to China within the globalized world and its ongoing economic upsurge, the Mandarin language is attracting an increasing number of students. Among this group people of Chinese origin living abroad who come to China to study Chinese.

Joosten's study analyzes the links between the aforementioned trends in international education through the use of a case study of overseas Chinese studying at Zhejiang University. The study involves a highly diverse group of young people from different countries in order to explore the challenges they and their teachers face in Chinese classrooms. The results show that among the respondents similar observations can be made regarding their language learning as have been found in prior studies on heritage language learning. Joosten, therefore, suggests that research on Chinese heritage language learning within China should receive more attention to target the specific language learning group, for the benefit of the students, their home countries and China as well.

Yue Liu investigates the *c*ultural identity of emigrants from mainland who - settled on every continent of the world - have revealed numerous peculiarities, including differences between regions of origin, phases of their arrival and other historical backgrounds related to their emigration. Considering that China's international migration has kept growing in scale from pre-modern times to the 21st century, with a particular leap after the beginning of Chinese government's reform and opening-up policy in 1978, she sheds light on the evolution of changing characteristics of international migration from China. Referring to the current context she specifically discusses why in the early 21st century cultural identity of the second generation of Chinese emigrants has become a new core area of research in the field of Chinese international migration.

Fan Jieping and *Sun Ju* investigate the cultural memory Chinese migrants in Europe, exploring the individual and further the "We" memory by focusing on the written communications between Chinese who were living in Italy and their friends and relatives in China in the period between the 1950s and the late 1980s. Since the communication between those family members who had gone abroad and those who had remained behind mainly depended on letters as the predominant medium for long-distance communication, family letters are essential records of the common past or communicative memory. Fan Jieping and Sun Yu's study of the family letter collection confirms that Chinese Confucian values are influential for the cultural memory of families, for their wealth and happiness, as well as for the behavior of emigrated family members towards other members, their countrymen, and people in the host country. These values are present within communicative and

collective memory, although Chinese emigrants had no explicit background knowledge of Confucian philosophy, demonstrating that even though from the 1950s to the 1980s Confucianism was largely repelled in China due to the communist ideology, it has remained in the cultural memory of the people. The letter analysis shows that the Confucian-inspired lifestyles and its intrinsic values are deeply rooted in Chinese families - in this case exemplified by a family of the lowest social class.

In their paper on Guanxi and the organization of Chinese New Year festivals in England *Yi Fu, Philip Long & Rhodri Thomas* explore how Chinese diaspora communities use *guanxi,* a uniquely Chinese interpretation of personal relationships, in the organization of Chinese New Year (CNY) festivals in England. They used a case-study approach that incorporated mixed qualitative methods to investigate the interactions and interrelationships between the ethnic Chinese communities involved in the organization of CNY festivals in five English cities. The paper argues that Chinese diaspora communities use their *guanxi* to establish collaboration at CNY festivals. However, the process of organizing CNY festivals has also exposed divisions among Chinese communities. The paper proposes that *guanxi* has important implications for the relationships among Chinese diaspora communities in the context of CNY festivals. Although it facilitates collaboration and promotes solidarity among Chinese communities, it may also intensify competition for power. This paper is the first to study the organization of Chinese New Year festivals in detail.

Finally, *Hong Zhang* and *Qianqian Zhong*'s paper analyzes the reception of Mainland China TV series among Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia based on cultural proximity theory. Although not directly related to migration of Chinese to Europe, this paper is still highly relevant for the present context because reaching the diaspora by modern means of communication and thus interconnecting it on a global scale is important for the development of the civil society as well as for policy makers. Through a survey and focus group discussions among Chinese migrants mostly from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, this paper discovers that the presentation of Chinese culture is the main appeal of television dramas from Mainland China. However, it was also found that most Chinese migrants rarely watch Mainland China TV series because of their awkward dubbing and subtitles,

monotonous content and weak marketing. The paper suggest that television series from Mainland China should make their content more culturally adapted to the target audiences, and cooperate with overseas organizations including n marketing in order to established their brand and enhance their competitiveness in Southeast Asian countries.

Beatrice Knerr and Jieping Fan

Contents

PART I: INTRODUCTION

Chinese in Europe: from the early 17th century to present day. An overview

Beatrice Knerr

1 Introduction

In the 21st century, Chinese immigrants are omnipresent in almost all European countries. While this group of migrants historically engaged in catering, petty trade and the production of leatherwear and textiles, today their professional activities extend to high-skilled employment in private companies and government institutions. Also, an increasing number of young Chinese are studying at all levels in high-ranked European universities and contribute their share to the creation of knowledge through their work in a broad spectrum of research institutions. Yet, the foundations for this present-day outcome were laid by historical developments which will continue to shape the path of this group of migrants into the future. Without taking the history of the Chinese diaspora into account, it is not possible to assess their forthcoming potential and the associated benefits for the migrants and their descendants, the host countries, and their forefathers' country of origin. In China, policymakers and private companies are increasingly getting aware of the opportunities created by the diaspora and, in particular, the returnees.

While pre-20th century emigration from China to other parts of the world has mainly been the result of distress in the home country, an analysis of China-to-Europe movements from the mid-20th century onwards demonstrates that modern migrations can largely be explained by Shultz's theory of human capital (Schultz 1971). However, common to movements of all centuries is the tendency for chain migration, which has played an essential role for international migration from China.

Migration from China to Europe proceeded in several waves, each with their own specific characteristics which were distinguished from each other by drastic political events. This article provides an overview of the history of Chinese migration to Europe throughout the following historically significant periods: the beginnings of migration in the 17th century (section 2); the period of global political changes in the mid-20th century (section 3); the period following the enactment of China's open-door policy in the late 20th century (section 4); and finally, constituting a major part of the paper, China's rapid expansion and structural change in the early 21st century, with a focus on the migrants' distribution among countries, personal characteristics, immigrant status and professions (section 5). This final section also takes a special look at how returnees have played a role in China's economic development. From this historical analysis, an attempt to forecast future developments will be made. The investigation is based on an extensive literature review and an exploration of various sources of secondary statistical data.

2 The migration of Chinese to Europe in the 17th to the mid-20th century[1]: A period of unrest

The first Chinese immigrants reached Europe in the 17th century. At that time, they mostly arrived via Portugal which governed the South Chinese Province of Macao since the 16th century. From the beginning a primary driver of Chinese emigration was the prospect of escaping poverty and the pursuit of higher living standards - although during certain periods and for some subgroups, political and social motivations might have taken priority. Traditionally, the overwhelming share of the Overseas[2] Chinese in Europe have originated from the Provinces of Hubei, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Fujian. Each group has followed quite distinct earning strategies according to their regional customs.

Large-scale Chinese migration to Europe can be traced back to the Opium War of 1839-1841 when China was forced to open its economy to the Western World. This initiated a process of recruitment of contract workers to European countries, for

1 For details about the history of Chinese emigration see Latham and Wu (2012), Gütinger (2004), and Pieke (2004).
2 The term "Overseas Chinese" generally refers to the ethnic Chinese living outside China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau. While short episodes of Chinese emigration occurred throughout history, the phenomenon of large-scale emigration generally referred to as the "Chinese Diaspora," only dates back to the mid-19th century (Liu & Van Dongen, 2013).

example through the Coolies Trade System. Many unskilled workers were hired as seamen on ships to Northern European coastal areas, and many of them eventually settled there, particularly in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany. Under the reign of Emperor Guanxu (1871 to 1908) of the Qing Dynasty, a large number of emigrants from the Provinces of Hubei and Zhejiang settled in Italy. While the first group made business mainly by selling paper flowers, the second specialized in selling statues carved from Qingtian stone. Still, the vast majority of China's emigrants over that period settled in Southeast Asia. Between 1850 and the 1950s, large numbers of Chinese workers - mostly male peasants from coastal provinces - left their homeland to seek employment opportunities there.

During World War I, i.e. in the 1910s, an estimated 2,000 Chinese from Qingtian were sent to Europe as laborers. Many of them stayed after the end of the war in 1918, with about half of them settling in France. At that time, manual laborers constituted the majority of Chinese immigrants in Europe. This group set in motion the next round of large-scale chain migration from China to Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly from the southeastern coastal regions, among which Zhejiang Province was the most common place of origin. Most of these new migrants chose to make a living in the service sector, opening restaurants, shops and launderettes. However, following the onset of World War II, immigration to war-stricken Europe ceased and many left the continent.

From the 1950s onwards, an increasing number of Chinese migrants headed for industrialized regions, mainly North America, Europe, Japan and Australia. They left for economic as well as political reasons during a time when their home countries[3] and neighboring countries were being subjected to widespread violence and instability. Prior to the 1970s, most migrants were unskilled workers, drawn by the increasing demand for cheap manual labor in Western countries. Still, the two decades following the establishment of the People's Republic (PRC) in 1949 saw relatively little emigration from Mainland China due to disallowance and strict travel controls. At that time, i.e. from the 1950s to the 1970s, thousands of Chinese, particularly those from the then-British Hong Kong, moved to GB, "for the most part to open Chinese restaurants and later on take-away food outlets" (Latham and Wu,

[3] In addition to the People's Republic of China, this included other East and Southeast Asian countries with significant Chinese minorities like Vietnam.

2013:16). This was followed by a wave of ethnic Chinese who arrived from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as refugees from the Indochina War. Their main destination was France, the former colonial power of the Indochinese countries.

3 The 1980s until 2000: expansion and diversification

The 1980s marked a drastic turning point for China-to-Europe migration. This was to a large extent due to China's economic reform and opening up policy which started during the late 1970´s and brought major changes for the country's economy and society. As a result, the labor force became more mobile and the upgrading of human capital through education and professional experiences became a high priority of the state as well as the private sector. Also, legal restrictions on emigration were reduced and the Chinese government began to actively encourage its young people to study in other countries. The PRC's decision in 1980 to allow Chinese citizens to migrate abroad initiated a huge expansion of Chinese migration to Europe, whereby Southern European countries became the favorite destinations. Between 1980 and 2000, the number of Overseas Chinese in Europe more than doubled from an estimated 0.622 million to 1.454 million[4], part of a new wave of emigration out of China which, according to Qu et al., reached a total of 2.2 million during that period (Qu et al, cit. from Latham and Wu 2013)[5]. During the same period, Chinese migrants have developed an increasingly multi-class and multi-skilled profile, in line with the requirements of a globalized and technologically advanced world economy (Ding 2010).

Since the 1990s, the Chinese arriving in Europe have mainly originated from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, a fact which has transformed many Chinese communities in Europe in terms of their size, geographical distribution, economic activities, language and culture (Latham and Wu, 2013). Migration in the 1990s was marked by a number of characteristics: the arrival of migrants from a wider

[4] Extrapolation by Latham and Wu (2013) based on data from Gui (2011).

[5] Of the total of the "new migrants" who left for Europe between 1980 and 2007, according to Qu et al. (2011), 1.1 million came from Fujian, 1.45 million from Zhejiang, 1.0 million from Guangdong, 500,000 from Shanghai, 300,000 from Beijing, 300,000 from Tianjin, and 400,000 from northeastern China. This does not include illegal migrants who mainly came from the coastal regions like Zhejiang and Fujian; in fact in the early 2000s, an estimated 40 to 50% of the migrants who went abroad from Fujian went through illegal channels (Yu et al. 2011).

range of source regions in China; a rapid increase in Chinese migration, especially to southern and central European countries; the growth in the importance of new channels of migration, especially student migration; and the increase in different forms of irregular migration (Laczko, 2003). During this time, an increasing number came from northeastern China from the so-called “Dongbei,” which has been called China's "rust belt" due to the high prevalence of factory and mine shutdowns that drove up the number of unemployed (Laczko, 2003).

Student migration during that period gained momentum as a result of a publicly supported system for foreign studies launched in 1978 and which, from 1985 onwards, was paralleled by a growing number of self-supported students (Zhang 2003). China’s policy of internationalizing the formation of its students was further clarified in 1992 by the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and *de facto* China’s leader Deng Xiaoping who stated that China aimed to “support study abroad, encourage return home, go abroad, and come back unrestrictedly” (Deng Xiaoping, address in Spring 1992, cit. from Zhang, 2003). From the late 1990s, Germany became a new favorite destination country for Chinese students and professionals.

The economic activities of Overseas Chinese in Europe center on four broad areas: catering, production and trade (especially of leather products and textiles), and - increasingly since the late 1990s - high-tech (IT, communication technology) and services (travel agencies, consulting services for legal issues, tax consultancies).

4 The early 21st century

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in the early 21st century around 40 million Overseas Chinese migrants find themselves scattered across 130 countries (IOM, cit. from Gómez Díaz, 2012). Most of them are living in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia (Table 1).

From 2000 onwards, migration from China to Europe further accelerated to reach its highest level in history. Between 2000 and 2007 alone, it increased from 1.454 million to 2.150 million[6], or nearly 5% of the total number of Overseas Chinese

6 There is a great variation in the available data about the number of Overseas Chinese, which is partly due to the varying quality of statistical records, and partly to “the challenge of trying to keep track of such a fast growing situation” (Brown, 2012:8) , in addition to the already-mentioned

worldwide (Qu et al. 2011). While this appears to be a small portion, the dynamics of the migration flows offer a contrasting perspective: almost 80% of the Overseas Chinese population in Europe are “new immigrants” (i.e. they arrived after 1980), while this share is just 11% in Asia and 22.7% on the global average (Qu et al., 2011).

The expanding migration from China to Europe is fueled by several developments: an intensifying exchange of commodities, capital and knowledge; the reform of the state-owned enterprise sector which resulted in the laying off of tens of millions of workers, especially in the country’s northeast; the soaring of China’s per capita income, which has enabled the middle-class to send their children abroad to study (Knerr 2015); the development of extensive transnational migration networks which have streamlined migratory movements partly self-accelerating by reducing the transaction costs (Collier, 2015); the relaxation of immigration rules in some European countries, and in particular East European states like Hungary; and the establishment of illegal migration channels.

differences in the definitions which include the delineation of “diaspora” on the one hand and “holders of Chinese nationality” on the other hand, as well as the region of origin, whereby some include only citizens of the People’s Republic of China while others include also those from Hong Kong, Macao and/or Taiwan. Also, definitions of “diaspora” are not equal to each other, as they may comprise different generations (second, third or more). Also it is impossible to really keep track of illegal migrants whose number has soared up in Europe since the 1990s. In 2014, for example, G. Jackson in Financial Times Data wrote: “No one knows how many Chinese people live in Europe. The United Nations estimated Europe’s China-born population at 886,882 in 2010, its most recent count, while Chinese-based social scientists put it somewhere between 2m and 3m.” emphasizing that the EU data are more reliable than the Chinese ones.

Table 1: Countries with the largest number of Overseas Chinese		
Country	**millions**	**% of total**
Indonesia	7,0	17.7
Thailand	7,0	17.7
Malaysia	6,4	16.2
USA	3,8	9.6
Singapore	3,6	9.1
Peru	1,3	3.3
Canada	1,3	3.3
Vietnam	1,3	3.3
Philippines	1,2	3.0
Burma	1,1	2.8
Russia	1,0	2.5
Cambodia	0,8	2.0
Japan	0,7	1.8
Australia	0,7	1.8
South Korea	0,7	1.8
Great Britain2	0,5	1.3
South Africa	0,4	1.0
Brazil	0,2	0.5
Italy	0,2	0.5
France	0,2	0.5
Spain	0,1	0.3
Germany	0,1	0.3
Total	40	100.0
Source: Statista, 2015		

The composition of Chinese migration to Europe deserves particular attention. In this context, a sharp increase in highly-skilled migration, especially student migration (including academic exchange), has been observed. Also, while the United States is still the major foreign destination for most professionals, it has been rapidly losing its shares of this human capital market to EU countries since the early '00s. The major reasons for this turn are the intensifying economic relations between European countries and China; the desire of the Chinese government to import technical knowledge embodied in human capital and the willingness to invest in it; and the soaring financial capacity of the Chinese population (especially of the growing middle-class) and their desire to enhance the qualifications of their children through studies and work experiences abroad. The trend to fulfill these desires in Europe is based on "the gaps between China and Europe at the scientific, technological, and educational levels and the research and marketing environment" (Zhang, 2003: 74) which were still prevalent in the early 21st century. Another striking development is the extension of new channels of migration and in that context, the rise of different forms of irregular migration (Gui, 2011).

The main communities of Chinese in Europe are located in the United Kingdom, followed by France, and The Netherlands (Table 2). At around 250,000, the Chinese diaspora in the UK is the largest in Europe (Eurostat 2015). The main communities are Chinatown in London; the Chinese Quarter of Birmingham; the Chinatown in Manchester, and the Chinatown in Liverpool, which is said to be home to the oldest Chinese community in Europe (Latham and Wu 2013). In particular, large cities such as London, Paris and Madrid have witnessed large increases in Chinese citizens since the 1990s.

The Chinese population in France is estimated to be around 200,000, and Chinese communities in France are among the oldest in Europe. Half of the Chinese residing in France live in Paris which has three Chinatown districts: the 13th Arrondissement of Paris, the Belleville area and the Temple and Arts-et-Meriers area (Latham, 2011). The number of Chinese residing in Italy has grown particularly rapidly in recent years, from about 70,000 in 2008 to 330,000 in 2011. The most important community in Italy, which is home to 13,500 regular residents,

is found in Milan Chinatown; other important communities are found in Rome and in Prato (Latham and Wu, 2013).

Nevertheless, when we consider migrant flows – as opposed to stocks of migrants – a different picture emerges. In the early 21st century, the most popular destination for Chinese migrants in Europe – aside from the UK – has been Spain. Spain's economic progress during the 1990's and early 2000's has been the major attraction for Chinese immigrants. In addition, the Chinese diaspora in Spain of around 150,000 in the later 1990s has supported chain migration. Similarly, the cities of Manchester and London in the UK continue to receive substantial numbers of Chinese migrants. However, the rate of growth is slowing due to the worsening economic environment and the consequential lack of economic opportunities in the region (Latham & Wu 2013). The financial crisis which started in Europe in 2007 brought about considerable changes in China-Europe migration patterns. While migration to the most hard-hit countries in southern Europe - Spain and Italy - significantly slowed, Germany, which maintained a stable economic environment, experienced an increase in migrants.

Table 2: Chinese population in EU countries, sorted by total number		
Country	**Number**	**% of total population**
Great Britain	250,000	0.42
France	225,000	0.38
Netherlands	127,500	0.82
Germany	100,000	0.12
Italy	70,000	0.12
Austria	41,000	0.51
Spain	35,000	0.09
Belgium	23,000	0.23
Sweden	12,800	0.14
Czech Republic	12,000	0.12
Hungary	10,000	0.10
Ireland	10,000	0.27
Denmark	7,257	0.14
Norway	5,000	0.11
Romania	3,000	0.01
Portugal	2,700	0.03
Finland	1,500	0.03
Poland	1,500	0.03
Luxembourg	1,300	0.31
Greece	600	0.01
Source: EUROSTAT, 2015		

Overall, the Netherlands have the highest percentage of Chinese among their population with 0.82%, followed by Austria with 0.51% and the UK with 0.42% (Table 3). Generally, with some exceptions, a clear positive relationship between the share of Chinese and the level of per-capita income can be observed.

Table 3: Chinese population in EU countries, sorted by percentage of total population			
Country	**Number**	**%**	**Per capita income**
Netherlands	127,500	0.82	48,223
Austria	41,000	0.51	51,306
Great Britain	250,000	0.42	35,334
France	225,000	0.38	44,747
Luxembourg	1,300	0.31	111,716
Ireland	10,000	0.27	51,356
Belgium	23,000	0.23	45,383
Denmark	7,257	0.14	56,147
Sweden	12,800	0.14	43,986
Czech Republic	12,000	0.12	27,344
Germany	100,000	0.12	47,589
Italy	70,000	0.12	35,823
Norway	5,000	0.11	97,013
Hungary	10,000	0.10	13,881
Spain	35,000	0.09	31,945
Finland	1,500	0.03	43,492
Poland	1,500	0.03	23,275
Portugal	2,700	0.03	21,408
Greece	600	0.01	29,635
Romania	3,000	0.01	10,034
Source: Based on data from EUROSTAT, 2015			

The rise in student migration is reflected in the statistics: 60% of all staying permits granted to Chinese in the European Union in 2013 were given for educational purposes, whereas 21% were granted for family reasons and 14% for employment purposes (Eurostat, 2015). GB issued the most residence permits to Chinese in 2013 (44%), followed distantly by Italy (12%), France (10%), and Germany (8%) (see Table 4). The other 24 EU countries altogether issued just one quarter of the EU permits granted to Chinese.

The basis for which the permits were issued differed significantly between host countries: while Italy and Spain issued 46% and at least 50%[7] of the permits for

[7] This estimate is calculated from the fact that less than 13,654 permits were issued by Spain, as to be concluded from Table 4.

family reasons, this share was just 5% in GB and marginal in Germany. A contrasting picture emerges with regard to permits issued for educational reasons. The overwhelming share of permits issued in GB (87%) were granted to persons seeking education; this was similarly the most common permit granted in France (64%) and Germany (58%), though it accounted for less than one-quarter in Italy. In all the major EU immigration countries, permits for employment reasons played only a minor role, with a share of 28% in Italy (where this type of permit was most common), 20% in Germany, 14% in Spain and a marginal 2% in GB.

What is striking – especially with regard to the implications for the future relationship between China and Europe – is the enormous (and growing) proportion of permits being granted to Chinese students in European countries (Table 5). As mentioned above, GB is their favorite destination with 53.6% of the total, followed by France with 16.5% and Germany with 12.7%. All other European countries, including non-EU states, attract less than 5% of Chinese students, and in most cases less than 1%.

Table 4: Residence permits issued to Chinese within the EU-28, by reason, 2013				
Rank	**Country**	**Number**	**% of permits among the EU-28**	**% of country's permits issued to Chinese**
	Residence permits			
1	United Kingdom	72,949	44.06	100.0
2	Italy	19,967	12.06	100.0
3	France	16,409	9.91	100.0
4	Germany	13,654	8.25	100.0
	Others	42,590	25.72	100.0
	Total	165,569	100.00	100.0
	Family reasons			
1	Italy	9,114	26.52	45.6
2	Spain	6,887	20.04	>50
3	United Kingdom	3,550	10.33	4.9
4	France	3,020	8.79	18.4
	Others	11,800	34.33	27.7
	Total	34,371	100.00	
	Educational reasons			
1	United Kingdom	63,550	64.07	87.1
2	France	10,454	10.54	63.7
3	Germany	7,945	8.01	58.2
4	Italy	4,636	4.67	23.2
	Others	12,603	12.71	29.6
	Total	99,188	100.00	
	Employment reasons			
1	Italy	5,530	24.02	27.7
2	United Kingdom	3,062	13.30	4.2
3	Germany	2,761	11.99	20.2
4	Spain	1,902	8.26	>14.0
	Others	9,772	42.44	22.9
	Total	23,027	100.00	
Source: based on data from EUROSTAT, 2015				

Still, Europe is a less important host region for international students when compared to the United States. While 225,474 Chinese studied in the US in 2013, only about half that number (132,011) studied in Europe the same year, the overwhelming share of them in EU countries (UNESCO 2015).

With regard to the length of time migrants choose to stay in a host country, language barriers are a decisive criterion. Chinese is quite an uncommon language in Europe. In no EU country can more than 1% of the population speak Chinese, and more people have learned Chinese as a foreign language than are native Chinese speakers (Table 6). However, in most EU countries, knowledge of the Chinese language is more common among the younger generation than among the older generation. This fact might imply that young people anticipate needing the Chinese language in their future since the learning or retention of a language is often motivated by the expectation that it will be useful in one's future.

In a survey launched by the European Commission in 2012 in all EU countries, 6% of the respondents on average answered that Chinese would be an important foreign language to learn for their personal development (European Commission, 2012). The percent that made this statement varied between countries and largely correlated with the number of Chinese residing in the country: in Spain the share was 13%, in GB 11%, in Ireland 9%, in France 8%, in Italy 7% and in the Netherlands 7%. The remaining EU countries displayed below average shares. In all countries, however, the shares were higher than they were in a survey from 2005. Interestingly, when asked which language (aside from their mother tongue) would be most important for their children to learn for their future, an average of 14% answered "Chinese" though country differences were wide-ranging: 28% in France, 24% in Spain, 23% in GB, 20% in Ireland, 19% in Sweden, 16% in the Netherlands and 12% in Italy.

Table 5: Destination countries of Chinese students in Europe		
Country	**Number**	**(%)**
United Kingdom	81,775	53.6
France	25,243	16.5
Germany	19,441	12.7
Italy	7,645	5.0
Netherlands	4,638	3.0
Ukraine	3,180	0.2
Sweden	2,547	1.7
Finland	2,134	1.4
Belarus	1,532	1.0
Switzerland	1,227	0.8
Denmark	1,204	0.8
Kazakhstan	821	0.5
Austria	765	0.5
Norway	733	0.5
Poland	608	0.4
Belgium	511	0.3
Cyprus	362	0.2
Turkey	300	0.2
Portugal	247	0.2
Czech Republic	137	0.1
Romania	73	<0.1
Estonia	63	<0.1
Luxembourg	51	<0.1
Bulgaria	43	<0.1
Greece	40	<0.1
Iceland	34	<0.1
Slovakia	25	<0.1
Slovenia	20	<0.1
Lithuania	13	<0.1
Latvia	9	<0.1
Non-EU countries Source: UNESCO (2015)		

Table 6: Knowledge of the Chinese language in Europe												
	Total (%)				Native (%)				Learned (%)			
Country	All	Older[1]	Middle[2]	Younger[3]	All	Older	Middle	Younger	All	Older	Middle	Younger
Austria	0.36	0.0	0.26	0.89	0.09	0.0	0.26	0.0	0.27	0.0	0.0	0.89
Belgium	0.35	0.0	0.19	0.94	0.21	0.0	0.19	0.48	0.14	0.0	0.0	0.46
Estonia	0.11	0.0	0.35	0.0	0.11	0.0	0.35	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
France	0.26	0.0	0.0	0.88	0.14	0.0	0.0	0.47	0.12	0.0	0.0	0.41
Germany	0.32	0.09	0.0	1.1	0.21	0.09	0.0	0.67	0.11	0.0	0.0	0.43
Greece	0.13	0.0	0.0	0.38	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.13	0.0	0.0	0.38
Ireland	0.22	0.0	0.59	0.0	0.14	0.0	0.37	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.22	0.0
Italy	0.11	0.0	0.0	0.43	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.11	0.0	0.0	0.43
Latvia	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.24	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.24	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Luxembourg	0.14	0.0	0.34	0.0	0.14	0.0	0.34	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Malta	0.38	0.0	0.0	1.22	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.38	0.0	0.0	1.22
Netherlands	0.2	0.22	0.0	0.45	0.07	0.22	0.0	0.0	0.13	0.0	0.0	0.45
Portugal	0.2	0.0	0.25	0.36	0.2	0.0	0.25	0.36	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Spain	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.34	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sweden	0.08	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0
GB	0.52	0.2	0.58	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.58	0.0	0.32	0.2	0.0	0.8

1) aged 15-34 years; 2) aged 35-54 years; 3) aged 55 years and older

Source: Based on Van Parys 2015

5 Returnees in China's economy

In the era of the international race for talents, the Chinese diaspora is an essential asset supporting China's economic development. With China's unprecedented economic growth, return migrations have become increasingly of interest to both individuals living abroad as well as to the nation itself. For this reason, special attention should be devoted to understanding the influence returnees can have on China's development and the Chinese government's strategies concerning the diaspora. At present, no studies are available which specifically address returnees from Europe.

As a means of luring its high-potentials back to China, the Chinese government has initiated a number of programs over the years such as these: the Thousand Talents Program (in 2008) which attracted more than 3,300 highly-qualified professionals

from abroad; the Thousand Young Talents Program (in 2010); the Thousand Foreign Experts Program (in 2011); the Special Talent Zone (in 2011); and the Ten Thousand Talent Plan (in 2012). These programs which were backed up at the provincial and municipality level by nearly 2,700 local talent schemes in 2012 allowed for the recruitment of more than 20,000 high-level overseas talents were, according to Wang (2013). Also, in 2012, about 272,900 students returned from other countries, representing an increase of 46.6% as compared to 2011 (Chinese Ministry of Education, cit. from Wang, 2013).

This strategy has placed returnees in positions that significantly contribute to the nation's development, particularly in education, science, culture and health. Returnees occupy leading positions in China's core scientific and technological areas. Statistics from the Ministry of Education show that returnees account for 78% of all university presidents, 63% of PhD advisers in universities directly administered by the Ministry of Education, and 72% of the directors of key laboratories at the national and provincial levels. Similarly, 81% of graduates from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 54% of graduates from the Chinese Academy of Engineering and the majority of the heads of medical schools and hospitals of Grade 3A[8] have studied overseas (Chinese Ministry of Education, 2004, cit. from Wang 2013). Furthermore, 37% of the recipients of the National Award for Science and Technology, the National Award for Technological Invention, and the National Science and Technology Progress Award – have been returnees.

Awakening to the prospect of hosting returnees, all of China's mega-cities – like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen – have developed programs to attract returnees. For example, "Science Parks" are promoting returnees to establish scientific and technological projects. In addition, many special benefits are being offered to returnees - like simplified application and registration procedures for the establishment of businesses, the waiving of business taxes in high-tech areas, the eligibility to receive research funding, and the eligibility to import tax-free goods for personal use (Iredale and Fei Guo, 2001). In the early 2000s, Shanghai - although comprising only 1% of the Chinese population - sent about 25% of the country's

[8] In China hospitals are classified into 10 levels including 9 standard levels (1C, 1B, 1A, 2C, 2B, 2A, 3C, 3B, and 3A, whereby 3A is the highest) and one reserved level 3AAA.

international students abroad and received an estimated 16.5% of the country's returnees between 1980 and 2000 (Iredale and Fei Guo, 2001).

Returnees have founded numerous high-tech enterprises in China since the 1990s and hence, "the new generations of returnees have become a major driving force behind China's new entrepreneurial movement" (Wang 2013). Apart from boosting the capacity of the technology, media and other modern sectors, businesses set up by returnees have also contributed to the revitalization of traditional industries. Due to their international connections and experiences, returnee entrepreneurs act as bridges to international markets.

Since the early 20th century returnees have also actively participated in China's politics and have held key responsibilities in various governments. In this way, these returnees have also supported China's international relations which have become increasingly important with China's economic uplifting. As the country meets a broad range of economic and technological challenges, the employment of highly skilled experts with international experiences and academic formation will be essential for the country's progress.

Since most upper-tier multinational enterprises are now operating in China, there is a burgeoning demand for professionals with good management skills and access to transnational networks. Chinese who have graduated and/or worked for big companies abroad, are filling many of the top management positions in these enterprises. The list of companies in China which have hired returnees for top management positions includes Google, Microsoft China, UBS, Alcatel, News Corps, Siemens, Hewlett Packard, Ernst & Young, BP and General Motors (Wang 2013).

No reliable information is available concerning the share of Chinese students who return following their graduation from a foreign university. Apart from the conditions expect at home, the motivation to return seems to be essentially determined by the prevailing economic, political, and social conditions conditions in the host country. In this context, Iredale and Fei Guong (2002) showed that the return rate among the publicly sponsored Chinese who graduated from foreign universities around 2000 was 50% for those who studied in Germany, 62.5% for GB, and 63.6% for France; these contrast with the rate among those who studied in the USA which was just 18.8%. The estimated return rate is lower among self-financed students

which is probably due to the return obligations of publicly-sponsored students (Zhao and Knerr, 2015); while the overall average is 33.3%, it is 83% among state-sponsored students, 56.5% among institution-sponsored students, and just 3.9% among self-sponsored students (Iredale and Fei Guong, 2002). In a more recent survey among Chinese students in Germany, Zhao and Knerr (2015) found that 8% were determined to stay in Germany after their graduation; another 3% had planned to stay in Germany prior to leaving China but had later on changed their mind and decided to return to their home country.

6 Perspectives

Chinese migration to Europe has exhibited new and strong trends in the early 21st century that have important implications for the future of the Chinese diaspora as well as for Europe and China. In particular, the pursuit of a highly-qualified labor force is of increasing importance. The ever-rising numbers of Chinese international students who are seeking an upgrade of their qualifications in European countries hold a strong potential to influence China's economic as well as social conditions. Mobility is easier for those possessing sought-after skill sets, and to-and-fro movements have become more and more easier for highly skilled. This means we can expect a dynamic exchange of human capital between China and the international community.

Though the strategy of leaving the country to earn money abroad for a restricted and pre-defined period of time was historically a characteristic of low-skilled Chinese migrants, the early 21st century has seen this trend become more common among the highly-skilled strata of the labor force, including scientists, engineers, doctors and teachers (Zhang 2003). Today, both low-skilled and highly-skilled migrants are bringing human and financial capital back to China which will bring short and long-term benefits to China's economy.

Additionally, if the Chinese language is indeed gaining momentum as a spoken foreign language in European countries – which has been shown to be the case – then we should expect positive effects concerning the ability of Chinese migrants to integrate into their host societies and to build up more of Putnam's so-called "bridging capital" (Putnam, 2007), adding to the "bonding capital" which is normally

quite strong within Chinese diaspora communities (see, e.g., Zhao, Ma and Knerr, 2015). Such an effect will also be beneficial for those who will eventually return to China as well as for the Chinese economy and the scientific community who might profit from the established networks.

When investigating which countries may reap the benefits of joint Chinese and European investments in the human capital of Chinese migrants, a third country enters the picture. The United States is offering attractive opportunities to highly educated foreigners, particularly within the academic sphere. Ample anecdotal evidence points to rising popularity of a "triple movement" – that is, basic studies in China followed by an academic or professional upgrading in a European country where university fees are low, and concluding with a third movement to the US to reap the financial benefits of the previous investments. Such a trend is gaining popularity, supported by strengthening social networks[9]. Furthermore, the return rates to China among migrants who take this route to the US are considerably lower than for those who do not move on from Europe. This is an area where future research is urgently required.

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[9] In fact, this trend has also been observed among highly-qualified Indians (Knerr, 2009).

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PART II: CAREER CONTEXT

Qingtian immigrants in Europe: developments and trends in their progress, status, and business affairs

Xu Liwang and Yang Taoyu

1 Introduction

Qingtian is a mountainous region located in the Zhejiang Province of China and is the place of origin of the overwhelming majority of Chinese immigrants living in Europe. Qingtian emigrants have exhibited a very different development pattern than that of those coming from the neighboring provinces of Guangdong and Fujian – often considered the “homeland of Overseas Chinese” - one that demonstrates an individual uniqueness. Throughout their long history of emigration, migrants from Guangdong and Fujian have predominantly clustered in Southeast Asia, with their development relying upon the economic growth of the very region in which they resided. Qingtian migrants, in contrast, have mainly moved to Europe and the fundamental driving force and basis of their development has been the reform and opening-up policy implemented in Mainland China since in the late 1970s. This period witnessed a large-scale wave of out-migration of Chinese to overseas countries, forming a new group of emigrants. In Europe, over the subsequent decades, Qingtian immigrants exhibited several archetypal shifts in their economic activities, starting with small-scale commodity vending, followed by the establishment of Chinese restaurants, the vending of Chinese daily consumables and finally returning to China to make investments. Each of these developmental phases and their respective business patterns have been inextricably linked to the situation in China.

2 State of research

In the early 21st century the majority of overseas Chinese residing in Europe have originated in Zhejiang Province although Guangdong and Fujian Provinces are known in China as the "Home regions of Overseas Chinese" as they have such a long history of overseas migration, and most of the Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia and America originated from there. However, an overwhelming majority of the Chinese immigrants in Europe are originally from Qingtian City, Zhejiang Province, rather than Guangdong and Fujian Provinces which breaks the traditional pattern. The first pioneers leaving Zhejiang to head for Europe were from Qingtian. This group has formed the core of the Chinese immigrant population in Europe and has continually exerted a significant influence. In this context, there are several intriguing questions:

- Why, under the same conditions, with the start of China's reform and opening-up policy, did migrants from Zhejiang Province - and not those from other regions in the country – and root themselves in Europe, and thus become an essential part of Chinese overseas migration?
- Why do overseas Qingtianese from Zhejiang Province - rather than those from Guangdong or Fujian Province - maintain such a dominant influence in Europe?
- With respect to patterns in their economic development, are there any substantial differences between people from Zhejiang and those from Guangdong or Fujian?

Research on "modern" emigration (i.e. emigration starting from around 1840) from China and Overseas Chinese first appeared during the late Qing Dynasty[1] and a large number of studies about Chinese emigrants and overseas Chinese emerged in the period after the founding of the Republic of China. Most of the research, however, focused on Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia, with only limited research shedding light on the diaspora residing in Europe, let alone the Qingtianese in Europe. *The Life of Chinese Immigrants in Europe* by Chen Lite was one of the pioneering studies in this area. Chen Lite (1983) recorded old stories of Qingtianese who immigrated to Europe; he wrote of their distribution across Europe,

[1] The Qing Dynasty ruled China from 1644 (following the Ming Dynasty) until 1911 when – after the Xinhai Revolution – the founding of the Republic of China was announced (on the 1st of January 1912).

their life and working conditions. In his travelogue of Europe written in the 1930s, Zou Taofen (1987) mentions Qingtianese immigrants in Europe, and in his study, *Qingtian People in France*, he describes in detail their living conditions, daily life, and working conditions in France.

In the early 1990s, Chen Murong produced a work called *The Qingtian Gazetteer*, with one volume exclusively dedicated to Chinese migrants, divided into four parts: their history; their sub-groups; their personal relationships; and their various activities, such as business and social affairs. In the historical section, he outlines Qingtian migrants' origin and development, their migration routes and destinations, and their regional distribution and occupations.

Through on-the-spot investigations comprised of interviews, records of observations, review of documents, and oral histories, Wu Jing et al. (2006) compiled the volume *Chinese Immigrants Travelling around the World - Research about the Culture of Qingtian Chinese Immigrants*, which offers a fairly holistic approach for the study of Qingtianese immigrants. One of the chapters is specifically devoted to understanding the Qingtianese who immigrated to Europe; he explores their motivations for going abroad, the reasons they collectively emigrated to Europe, the routes they took and patterns of movement to move there (Wu Jing et al., 2006). Furthermore, in 2011, Zhou Wangsen published *The History of Qingtian Chinese Immigrants,* which offers a thorough introduction of the history of Qingtianese international migrants. Exploiting various materials, it outlines their history, culture, economics, political attitudes, associations and contributions to their countries of residence. (Zhou 周望森, 2011)

3 "Arduousness and adventure": Qingtianese immigrants' collective memory and consolidation of mindset

Qingtian is located in the southeast of the Zhejiang Province, which is situated among the lower reaches of the Ou River. Ever since the Tang Dynasty[2] established it as a "county", Qingtian was subordinate to the Lishui Region (although it belonged to the Wenzhou Region for a short period). Qingtian County, with a total area of 2,493 km^2, borders Wenzhou to the east, Ruian and Wencheng

[2] The Tang Dynasty was in power from 618 to 907.

to the south, West Lishui and Jingning to the west and Jinyun to the north. It is characterized by towering mountains and rolling hills; its landscape consists 90% of mountains, 5% of rivers, and the remainder are agricultural lands（Qingtian Gazetteer 1990:3）. The scarcity of arable land, the inconvenience of transportation, and the long distances between lands and settlements create challenges in terms of heavy subsistence burdens and for the local people. However, the county has been endowed with an abundance of pyrophyllite, which is commonly referred to as “Qingtian Carved Stone”.

Several prominent scholars, such as Chen Xuewen（2011), Zhou Wangsen（1985）and Chen Menglin（2001), have published considerable groundbreaking research on the origin and development of Overseas Chinese originating from Qingtian. They found the earliest records of Qingtian Overseas Chinese in the English version of the *China Annals* published in 1935: “In the 17th and 18th centuries a small number of Chinese people took land roads to Europe by way of Siberia. Among those who went to Europe, people from Qingtian accounted for a considerable proportion number and they sold the artifacts from Qingtian County”. However, this report has no empirical support and therefore cannot be guaranteed as valid. Under the reign of Emperor Guangxu, who was in power from 1875 until 1908, people from Shankou Town reached Petersburg and Minsk in Russia to sell carved stones. Scholars agree, in fact, that the trade of Qingtian pyrophyllite helped many Qingtianese peasants of that time to survive (Li, 2002b).

Qingtianese have a long history of exploring and engraving local pyrophyllite. The oldest unearthed carved stone sculpture - four piglets on a tomb - dates back 1500 years and is now kept at the Zhejiang Museum (Chen Murong et al., 1990:281). The mineral resources are found mainly in the southeast of Qingtian, with particularly eminent ones in Shankou and Fangshan. Other places such as Tanggu of Renzhuang and Zhoucun as well as Jishan and Lingtou of Fushan are well-endowed. These places are also the major places of origin of Qingtian migrants. The intersection between the origin of many overseas Chinese and a major production area for carved stones demonstrates the close connection between them. A master in the art of stone carving, Lin Fuzhao, once said: “Our living conditions at that time were extremely bitter. The long war left us a situation of lots of people sharing small amounts of lands. How did we deal with it? We went

abroad and carved these stones."[3] Mastering a unique skill allowed them to leave their hometown and also offered the possibility of adventure. In most other Chinese regions, people who fled from natural disasters or human-related accidents were normally driven to begging or manual labor in order to subsist. Once the situation in their hometown became more favorable, they would return and continue to cultivate their land. Over time, these cyclical movements became a normal lifestyle. People from Qingtian, in contrast, were able to make use of their skills in order to travel to faraway places for longer periods and, in this way, accumulated useful experiences which distinguished them from traditional farmers.

Culturally, the people from Qingtian put more emphasis on pragmatic competences and less on trifling rules and complicated courtesies. As a result of the relatively simple cultural characteristics - which are common among people from mountainous regions - they largely do not exhibit a sense of cultural exclusiveness. Hence, they are less likely to reject the norms and customs of the unknown western world but rather perceive it as a place where they can be better off and have more opportunities to make money than if they remained in China. Besides, as compared to those living in the plains or in coastal areas, Qingtianese are known to have a good command of their courage and generally feel less confined by restricting traditional norms. Furthermore, the traumatic memories of the hardships they faced in their home place has strengthened their hardiness as well as their collective awareness, enabling them to seek out new places when miserable conditions prevail, to adapt swiftly to new environments, and to withstand sufferings.

Historically, the mountainous regions in the south of Zhejiang Province where Qingtian is situated did not offer a peaceful and quiet refuge for its inhabitants. During the Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644), Japanese pirates used the convenient Lishui waterways to move up the Ou River to harass and attack the Qingtian people. According to historical records (Zhang Tingyu, Zhonghua Shuju, 1979), in 1555 Japanese pirates launched an attack which ended in the casualty of 2,000 Qingtian soldiers and civilians. In response, Qingtian decided to construct a wall around the city to defend itself. In order to compensate the lack of able labors, the inbound migration became the primary option. In the early years of the Qing Dynasty (which

[3] 年 4 月 2 日，林福照先生在青田石雕界的座谈会上的谈话录音。 The recorded conversation of Mr. Lin Fuzhao who delivered a speech on the forum concerning the Qingtian Carved Stone Art on April 2nd, 2005.

lasted from 1644 to 1912) when the political situation was unsettled, the population in South Zhejiang declined rapidly; as a result, the local government saw no choice but to recruit inbound migrants to reclaim lands. According to Quingtian Xianzhi (1880): “Ever since the rebellion was suppressed there was a large area of abandoned lands in Qingtian. After the 40th year of Emperor Kangxi (who ruled from 1661 to 1722), the former County Magistrate Zheng Xin ordered that migrants were to be recruited to reclaim lands. Basically, a large portion of abandoned lands could still be reclaimed and therefore used to produce crops.” The project ‘Reclamation and Restoration’ attracted a large number of new migrants to the region, so that in the wake of its completion under the reign of Emperor Yongzheng (who ruled from 1723 to 1735), they accounted for half of Qingtian’s population (Jiamxiong et al., 1993:417). According to the genealogical investigations of the Qingtian Gazetteer Office, a total of 93 clans immigrated to Qingtian between the start of the Tang Dynasty (618-907) and the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911): five of them during the Xiantong and Longji periods which were during the Tang Dynasty; six during the era of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms; nine during the Northern Song Dynasty; 18 during the Southern Song Dynasty; 23 during the Yuan Dynasty and the Ming Dynasty; and 32 during the Qing Dynasty.

The Qing Dynasty witnessed the greatest number of immigrants. In addition to the registered migrants who were recruited by the local government to reclaim wasted lands, a large number of vagrants in Qingtian were living in sheds, most of them in mountainous areas. “People growing linen were mainly from Jiangxi, and people growing chive flowers mainly came from Fujian. People living on cutting firewood were usually from Guangdong, and those who relied upon producing and selling charcoal mainly came from Xianju. There were also some temporary residents in Yongjia, Pingyang, Longquan, Jinhua and Dongyang once in a while.” (Quingtian Xianzhi, 1880a). Although they were not under the official household registration management, and they moved rather frequently, a certain proportion of them, later on, decided to settle down in Qingtian. Hence, throughout its history the adventurous spirit of Qingtian was somehow related to the enormous number of immigrants from which it was made up.

In addition, during the late 19th century, Qingtianese went overseas along two main routes, and many carried the small carved stones to far-away places. Some of

them followed the Siberian railway track to various European countries. Others went by sea, first to Shanghai and from there to Europe on ships. Qingtianese first made their ways to Europe through selling carved stones, but due to the complications of channeling goods to Europe, the supply eventually became quite unreliable. Adapting to these circumstances, the migrants rapidly transformed themselves into mobile vendors, selling ties, pajamas, and leatherwear. These types of small commodities also had a broader market than carved stones since they were closer to Westerners' daily lives. The expanding markets enabled more Qingtianese to enter Europe to seek a better life. Rarely did Qingtianese vending small commodities in Europe take jobs as manual laborers, a job preference that must be directly related to the strong tradition of commerce in southern Zhejiang.

Located in the south of Zhejiang and surrounded by mountains, the conditions in the city of Wenzhou differed greatly from those in the north of the province. To be specific, Wenzhou society was not restricted by innumerable Confucian doctrines. During the Northern Song Dynasty (960–1127), Wenzhou turned into a significant trading port, and with this status it became even more important in the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279). The commercial spirit in this city was very strong, and the "School of Yongjia," one of the most pioneering scholarly groups in the Southern Song Dynasty, embodied the prevailing commercial spirit in the region and supported the growing commercial economy. As mountainous as Qingtian was, its eastern borders to Wenzhou made it profoundly influenced by Wenzhou's commercial tradition. As a result, its inhabitants possess both the determination which characterizes people from mountainous regions and the flexibility of those dwelling along the coast.

During the First World War, Britain and France recruited large numbers of workers from China. There are no exact statistics available, but estimates range from around 200,000 to 300,000 persons (Chen Sanjing, 2013:65). After the war most returned to China. About 2,000 Qingtianese had been recruited, and in the post-war era most of them settled in Europe, more than half of them settling in France. At the beginning, many worked in the French mining industry (for coal and assorted ores) but later gradually turned to selling small commodities or establishing grocery stores and small restaurants. Ma Zhuomin, a well-respected scholar who has done substantial studies on overseas Qingtianese, once interviewed an elderly overseas

Chinese man and recorded the following quotation in his memories: “Around Ratchino Alley and Bai Yuluo Alley adjacent to Lyon Railway Station there were quite a few businesses established by Qingtian people. For instance, there was one named Xia Yueshan who owned a hotel; Wu Yaoting and Zhou Mingyan with their restaurant; Xia Chengren with his bar; Ye Xiufu with his wholesale business; Wu Duanxiu who raised bean sprouts; Lin Yanquan with his casino.” (Ma Zhoumin et al., 2002). According to French statistical data, Chinese merchants accounted for merely 7% of the total number of overseas Chinese in the country in 1926, but had soared to 17% by 1931 and to 27% by 1936 - mainly due to the growing number of vendors from Qingtian. In the 1920s and 1930s, a large number of Qingtianese went abroad - 10,000 of them to Western Europe. More than 3,000 moved to France; about 1,000 to the Netherlands; and the same number to both Austria and Italy; more than 300 to Belgium; and more than 200 to Portugal (Qingtian Xianzhi, 1880b:642). However, with the global economic crisis in the 1930s and the Second World War, European society became destabilized, prompting large numbers of overseas Chinese residing in Europe to gradually return to China. Those Qingtianese who remained in Europe suffered painstaking living conditions, with some of them being detained by local governments and coerced to become manual laborers. Some had their small-scale stores confiscated; some died tragically. Qingtianese, along with Europeans, underwent this period of suffering in which lack of food and other scarcities added a harsh burden to daily life. However, their perseverance finally delivered them to the next peaceful era in Europe following the victory over Fascism[4].

[4] With respect to Chinese people who were in Europe during the period of Second World War, see Li Minghuan (2001).

4 Prosperity of Chinese Restaurants and Nixon's Visit to China

After having been handcrafters and vendors for a long time, Qingtianese gradually shifted into the catering industry. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was dominated by Guangdong restaurants run by Cantonese and people from Hong Kong. In this period, "almost all the new workers that Chinese food restaurants were able to employ were those who could only speak Cantonese. Hence, there was no way for a person to become the owner of such a restaurant if he or she could not speak Cantonese." (Li Minhuan et al., 2002: 412). Other ethnic groups seldom engaged themselves in the catering industry. Compared to handcrafters and vendors, people who went into catering assumed greater risks, because it required technically skilled personnel, a manager, and considerable financial investment. However, it also offered new opportunities and strong growth potential, opening up new occupational areas for the Qingtianese. It allowed them to extend their living spaces and to accumulate management experiences which helped to secure their futures and the means to relocate to other countries in the world. In addition, the associated occupational diversity helped them to gain a firm standing in the West and to be in a better position to face various challenges, such as economic crises and social turbulence.

Three major factors motivated Qingtianese to open up restaurants in the West. Their principal reason for opening up restaurants was to gain higher profits. Since almost all overseas Qingtianese at that time were engaged in traditional occupations like selling carved stones, many perceived it to be extremely difficult to develop alternative careers. But restaurants offered new business opportunities that promoted the mobility of funds and the innovation of operational concepts. For example, Zheng Mingyan, a Chinese merchant, started his "Shanghai Restaurant" in Bremen, Germany, in the late 1950s, precisely because he held a rather negative attitude toward overseas Qingtianese's traditional occupations, such as the selling of carved stones, which, according to his conviction, was doomed to fail (Liu Baogi et al., 1958).

Secondly, political reasons played an important role in the decision to invest in restaurants. In the wake of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PR China) in 1949, most Western countries did not yet have diplomatic relations with PR China but rather sustained their relations with the regime of the National Party in Taiwan. As PR China and the Western countries gradually established diplomatic relations, Chinese embassy staff and related persons, when organizing official and

social activities, were faced with the practical question of where to dine. This encouraged Overseas Chinese from Mainland China to open up restaurants. It was against this background that, for example, Sun Mingquan opened up the Great Wall Restaurant in Milan in 1975. At the time, overseas Chinese in Italy were commonly engaged in the leather business. The opening of a restaurant was, for most, restricted by the financial means as well as the complex administrative procedures such an operation requires. Sun Mingqun recalled: "The embassy let us open up restaurants because there were four or five restaurants leaning toward Taiwan at that time…The ambassador said that the central government will offer its help if you decide to start a restaurant. I replied that there existed so many difficulties. He said that the central government will help to find managers and the necessary resources."[5]

Thirdly, despite the various risks involved in shifting into the catering sector, as compared with other new fields, the industry proved to be a suitable occupation for Overseas Chinese. It was not subjected to rivalries with other ethnic groups residing in the same country, and thereby implied fewer conflicts while exhibiting great inclusiveness to all types of ethnic groups, Chinese and international alike. This was essential for the relatively powerless group of Qingtianese at that time, enabling them to avoid any clashes or frictions at this early stage of their new career. Moreover, Chinese traditionally put a strong emphasis on nutrition so they were familiar with a large variety of foods. Still, catering was, relative to other businesses, found to be simple to establish and manage, making it easier for Qingtianese to change their occupation. A great variety of dishes, vegetables, and culinary approaches were introduced to complement Western cuisine, which made Chinese food quite popular.

Nonetheless, one should also take notice of the fact that, although some Qingtianese switched their occupation to catering industry, the overall situation was still fairly awkward, which to a large extend was due to the international circumstances. Starting in the early 1950s, the East and the West became increasingly alienated from each other as a result of political tensions now known as the Cold War. In the wake of the PR China's foundation, Mao Zedong set up three guiding principles: "set up another cooking stove," "clean up the house and

[5] Recorded interview of Sun Mingquan conducted by Chen Ye and Xu Liwang on April 26th, 2005 (年 4 月 26 日上午陈野、徐立望对孙明权录音采访。)

then invite guests," and "lean to one side" – ideologies that aimed to weaken the privileges of the Western powers and the control they had imposed on China. China actively established friendly and cooperative diplomatic relations with socialist countries, pursuing an independent and autonomous diplomatic policy. During this time, the Western countries - due to their resentment of the newly-born regime and their reservations against its ideologies - launched a long-term containment policy against the PR China and refused to establish normal diplomatic relations with the new nation. At that time, only a limited number of Qingtianese had settled in the West, and they remained a marginal ethnic group.

However, with China's political and economic upsurge, its global influence strengthened increasingly. By 1969, fifty countries had established diplomatic relations with China. With the support of many low-income countries, China regained its legitimate status in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1971. As a global superpower, the USA recognized that in the context of negotiating, resolving international conflicts and expanding international markets, it would need to take China's stance into serious consideration. In addition, by the late 1960s, the Soviet Union (SU) was rapidly expanding its global influence, whereas that of the USA was dwindling as a result of its entrapment in the Vietnam War. Hence, the USA needed a third power on its side to make a stand against the SU. It was in this context that they began to initiate friendly gestures towards the Chinese government. China similarly adapted to the changing international political climate, and by adjusting its diplomatic policy, began to open itself to more negotiations with the USA. Finally, in 1972, efforts from both sides precipitated the visit of US president Nixon to China, an event which was regarded as a most sensational event at the international level. Historically captured scenes - such as that of Nixon eating Chinese food with chopsticks in the People's Great Hall in Beijing - were reported by several major news media groups and disseminated to the global audience. Thereafter, China was frequently represented in mainstream Western media such as television and newspapers; the mass media cultivated a growing interest in China that was entertained by Westerners. For the broad public, the place which most visibly linked China and the West at a local level were Chinese restaurants, and henceforth Chinese food became a commonly known cuisine among Western consumers. When recalling the situation of that period in a 2011 interview, Xia Tingyuan, who had

started a restaurant in Belgium in 1970, expressed that he is still deeply impressed by the turn of events. Prior to Nixon's visit to China, his business was relatively calm. However, immediately after this event, his business took off, and so he created a special dish called "Roast duck, Maotai and Nixon's Dish" which then attracted the attention of many Western customers.[6] As the Chinese influence on the global society gradually expanded, Chinese food became part of the Western cuisine, which consequently turned the catering industry into an essential economic pillar for overseas Qingtianese.

Following the wave of reform and opening-up policies adopted in the 1980s, China became eager to engage like never before with the rest of the world. The mutual integration and communication between China and the international community increasingly intensified an also became more routine. . During this new period, four groups of overseas Chinese took part in this integration. The first group was those who resided abroad. These had emigrated through the networks of their relatives or some other private channels, and most worked in a foreign country. The second group was international students. The tremendous increase in the number of young people studying abroad was the result of the liberalization policy adopted by the National Educational Department. For various reasons, a significant number eventually decided to stay in their host country or move on to a third country – as opposed to returning to China after their graduation. The third group was tourists; and the last group was comprised of official visitors, academic scholars, businessmen and other persons on professional missions. The expansion of these last three groups was directly related to the accelerated growth of the Chinese economy and the consolidation of its national power. Their considerable mobility and their rising numbers were surprising and still continue to this day. The rapid growth of the number of Chinese visitors in foreign countries also supplied a new brand of customers to Chinese restaurants and thereby supported a sustainable development of the Qingtianese catering industry.

[6] Interviews of Xia Tingyuan conducted by Xu Liwang on March 8th 2011

5 The trade with daily consumption goods and Overseas markets after China's economic reforms

Though from the 1950s to the 1970s the economic progress of Overseas Qingtianese in European countries was developing slowly, that of overseas Chinese residing in Southeast Asia was sky-rocketing. In the wake of the Second World War, most Southeast Asian countries abolished the laws of governance established by their former colonizers and entered into a phase of autonomous development. Due to the large share of Chinese holding dual citizenship in Southeast Asian countries in the mid-1950s, the Chinese government announced that it would no longer endorse dual citizenship. Instead, it encouraged Overseas Chinese to assume the citizenship of their countries of residence and engage in the development of the states in which they lived so that they would be better adapted and elicit less distrust. As a result, more than 90% of the Overseas Chinese residing in Southeast Asian countries became nationals of their country of residence. This allowed for an "adapted mentality" which enabled them to actively take part in the modernization and industrialization of these nations. At the same time, the peaceful environment and the favorable international situation during that period provided these countries with excellent international conditions for an economic stimulus. Within this framework, overseas Chinese enhanced their own strengths and developed a large number of capital-rich companies. In the early 1980s, when China opened its doors to international trade and investment, many overseas Chinese residing in Southeast Asian countries as well as entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao immediately seized the opportunity and invested large amounts of capital in South China. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (2014), ever since the start of the reform and opening-up policies, 80% of the total foreign capital flowing into China came from Southeast Asian countries, as well as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. 80% of this foreign capital originated from native Chinese. Based on the existing close ties between regions most connected to foreign states in Asia via the presence of overseas Chinese, regions such as Guangdong, Fujian and Hainan became the primary destinations of Overseas Chinese investment. Supporting this linkage was the similarity of cultural characteristics (languages, customs and faiths) between these regions and the Southeast Asian countries, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. Since

the 1980s, the economic growth of Guangdong and Fujian stayed always ahead that of other regions in China, reflecting the significant contribution of overseas Chinese investment. The tremendous inflow of capital from overseas Chinese decisively influenced China's economic situation, making areas like Guangdong the outposts of the reform and opening-up strategies.

While the late 1980s and early 1990s saw large capital investments by overseas Chinese which boosted the development of Guangdong and other neighboring coastal areas, Zhejiang Province did not receive much investment from overseas Chinese. In the late 1980s, however, the economy of Zhejiang Province skyrocketed and became one of the major centers of growth of the Chinese economy mainly due to its specialized, privately-operated companies. In Zhejiang's liberal economic environment, the development of township enterprises[7] flourished, whereby comprehensive low-cost production units for articles of daily use - largely inspired by the traditional commercial mindset - were built up around the coastal areas. There, a large number of transaction centers operating at a national scale emerged, which made Zhejiang a significant national production center of daily-used items and small commodities. Overseas Qingtianese immediately realized the specific advantages of Zhejiang Province's economy and purchased increasing amounts of goods from Zhejiang and Guangdong to sell them on the markets of their countries of residence. The history of the family of Guo Shenghua[8], an eminent businessman in Guyana, gives witness as to how overseas Qingtianese made full use of the new advantages brought about by China's reforms and contributed to the spreading of Chinese commodities across the globe. During the Second World War, Guo's grandfather immigrated to Guyana, then a French colony in South America, where he made a living repairing clocks. In the 1960s, Guo's father departed from Mainland China to Guyana when he inherited the family property there. In Guyana, he engaged in the occupation of photography as well as in the initial clock-repairing business. In 1976, after Guo Shenghua also had immigrated to Guyana, he too adopted these two skills. Later, Guo found it very hard to make any breakthrough within these occupations. He realized that, in spite of Guyana being a French territory, it was solitarily detached and not even able to

[7] Township and Village Enterprises are market-oriented public enterprises under the purview of local governments based in townships and villages in the People's Republic of China.
[8] Interview of Guo Shenghua conducted by Xu Liwang on May 15th, 2011

produce commonplace daily-used items; instead, such items were imported from Europe and USA. Recognizing that China had transcended the era of material scarcity - and was even specializing in the production of daily-consumed necessities - Guo Shenghua seized this business opportunity and started the very first department store selling Chinese commodities in Guyana. His business flourished from the start, and very soon the inexpensive but well-manufactured Chinese commodities occupied Guyana's market. Guo became one of the most successful overseas Qingtianese during the period of China's rapid economic development starting in the 1980s.

In contrast to the South American market, it was difficult for Chinese-manufactured daily-use commodities to enter the highly-matured Western European markets, which were protected by various trade barriers which limited the scale of the business there. Further, in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, Western countries ubiquitously imposed sanctions on China and closed their doors to China. The steady flow in the number of migrants moving from Qingtian to the West was brusquely interrupted. Hence, the Qingtianese with their adventurous spirit intensively sought out new migration destinations. At the time, an enormous transformation was taking place in Southeast Europe. For historical reasons, there were basically none. connections between China and the socialist countries in Southeast Europe; however, in 1990, a sudden political change occurred in the socialist world as East European and Southeast European countries transformed their economic systems and institutions to align with the market economy model characterized by private ownership. During the long period of "command" economies", most of these countries had focused on the development of heavy industries, which was driven by tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union; naturally, most of them had neglected the production of daily-used consumer items. Furthermore, the light industry they had tried to establish in the early period of the reforms failed to satisfy the population's growing demand which created a vast market gap open to the import of daily necessities. Under these conditions – just as the movement of overseas Chinese to the West was being interrupted – Qingtianese immediately began to channel their entrepreneurial spirit to the opportunities available in Central and Southern Europe. Relying on the affluent resources that their relatives and their fellow-Chinese originating from the same

township had accumulated in Western Europe, and making use of the guidance and information they could provide, the new immigrants from Qingtian took the initiative in setting up new entrepreneurial bases for Overseas Qingtianese.

The primary destination that people from Qingtian - or even Chinese migrants in general - were exploring in East Europe was Hungary, mainly due to the country's liberal visa policy. In January 1989, Hungary announced that incoming tourists were no longer required to have a visa, making Hungary the first European country in which Chinese could enter without a visa; thereafter, a large number of Chinese merchants moved there. By the end of 1991, the number of Chinese merchants in Hungary had reached a peak with an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 (Li Minghuan, 2002). With extraordinary natural scenery, a well-kept cultural heritage, and a government that strongly promotes tourism, Hungary attracted and still attracts large numbers of foreign visitors every year. These tourists constituted a vast market for small commodities and tourist-oriented items, an opportunity that market-conscious Qingtianese seized immediately. For instance, Zhang Manxin moved to Hungary in 1990 seeking business opportunities; the most attractive prospect was working in the country's tourist sector, and he soon found himself confident in his ability to profit from this market niche (Li, Minghuan, 2002b).

Starting from the bottom - similar to their pioneering strategy in Western Europe - Qingtianese painstakingly initiated their enterprises. They started by setting up stalls along the streets, particularly on the banks of the Danube where they sold daily-used items. Countless consumers clustered at their stalls, creating settings that were later regarded as picturesque scenery. At that time, the Qingtianese had no fixed market places so they usually carried their goods as they went. When their street stalls were later on forbidden, they attained booths at marketplaces. To meet the demand of customers at the medium and low income levels they acquired low-priced Chinese imports which they sold quickly and which brought them huge profits since they could be sold at several times their original cost. Between 1990 and 1992, a period known as the "Golden Age," Qingtianese generated their first substantial profits in Hungary, and some of them soon accumulated considerable amounts of capital. After 1992, due to unfavorable changes in Hungarian policy, Qingtianese flocked to the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries. More than 2,000 Chinese merchants emerged in Bulgaria (Li

Minghuan, 2002), half of them Qingtianese. In these regions, together with other Chinese traders, they set up a large number of retail and wholesale markets for Chinese commodities. By providing convenient access to items of daily consumption for local populations, these Chinese contributed significantly to the expansion of international free trade.

The wake of the Kosovo War in 1999 revived the pioneering spirit of Qingtian merchants residing in East Europe who then set their eyes on the former Yugoslavia which had suffered a long civil war and NATO bombardments. As a result of long-term international sanctions, the post-war economic conditions in this region were dominated by a severe scarcity of resources. Since Western commodities were not yet available on the market, the region was seen as offering favorable business opportunities for Chinese merchants. Based on information from the Yugoslavian Immigration Bureau, prior to the NATO air attack in 1999, there were only around 1,000 Chinese merchants in the region. Strange enough, despite the chaotic situation in Yugoslavia, there was still a noteworthy influx of numerous Qingtian merchants. According to the Immigration Bureau of Serbia and Montenegro (2004), 7,000 to 10,000 Chinese were doing business in Serbia and Montenegro in 2004 the majority of them coming from Qingtian. More than 3,000 Chinese merchants were based in Belgrade, with Qingtianese accounting for 80% of them. Qingtianese made up 90% of the Chinese merchants in the prominent Chinese “No. 70 Giant Market” of Belgrade, a famous wholesale marketplace for Chinese people living in Belgrade. Chinese were mostly engaged in wholesale trade and retail businesses, in which they offered goods like leather purses, clothes, toys and shoes, although a few also ran Chinese restaurants (Liu Zhihai, 2004)

The success the Qingtianese achieved in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates their great ability to adapt and expand their economic activities; their flexibility in moving about according to the political climate – seen in their shift from Western Europe to Central and Eastern Europe; and their ability to capitalize on a major industrial breakthrough. “In the developed Western European countries, Chinese merchants were mainly engaged in such services as the catering sector, whereas those in East Europe were doing trade businesses. Besides, Chinese merchants of the new generation entered into international trade as their major career.” (Wu Yang et al., 2002). These developments cannot only be accredited to

the Qingtianese pioneers who strived to establish successful businesses when they were afforded the opportunity by the international environment. Certainly, their success could not have been realized without the economic prosperity that Mainland China achieved after decades of reforms and the subsequent transformation that turned Zhejiang into a major manufacturing hub for daily-used commodities. Considering the small-commodity market in Yiwu (Zhejiang) as a typical example, the journalist Wu Chao wrote: "Out of every one hundred merchants who came here to purchase large bulks of goods, three to five were Qingtianese Overseas Chinese who were engaged in international transactions." (Wu Chao, 2003: 41). Thus, it is safe to say that overseas Qingtianese could hardly have accomplished their shifts to various industries without the steady back-up provided by their motherland. At the same time, Qingtianese indirectly created a large number of jobs in China, thus making a significant contribution to the country's economic boom. According to incomplete statistics for 2002 (Lu Junhe et al., 2002), Overseas Qingtianese shipped more than 100,000 containers abroad which brought them a turnover worth nearly five billion dollars and promoted the advancement of a large number of domestic enterprises. In fact, more than 10,000 enterprises were linked to their shipping orders in 2002, and nearly one million people worked in companies producing for them (Lu Junhe et al., 2002).

6 Business opportunities and investments flowing into China

At least 60% of the Qingtianese living in Western Europe in the early 21st century have been engaged in the catering sector (Zhou Wangsen, 2011). Catering remains their pillar business, and it still attracts a large number of new immigrants from Qingtian. New arrivals usually enter the field by taking a relatively low pay - just enough to cover a basic livelihood and to stand firmly in the foreign country while they strive for advancement. Nevertheless, after decades of development in which the Chinese catering sector matured it reached a point of saturation and has encountered a bottleneck. In order to survive, some medium and small restaurants launch stiff competition, characterized by low-priced meals. The direct outcome of

this disorderly competition, however, has been a downward trend in the food quality, which has damaged the overall image of Chinese restaurants in general[9].

The SARS epidemic of 2003 also had a considerable impact on the Chinese catering sector. During her stay in Europe at the time of the incident, Fu Xu, a journalist from People's Daily, was deeply shocked and reported, "This visit to Europe coincided with harsh times in China. According to many overseas Chinese, Chinese restaurants have become much emptier since there were fewer tourists coming. Therefore, the trade was also affected and even some Chinese were suffering from others' misunderstanding." (Fu Xu & Chen Peng, 2003). The worldwide fear provoked by SARS pushed Chinese restaurants into a rather awkward position due to public safety and sanitation concerns. Although, in the view of customers in the host countries, Chinese food might still have been tasty as before, people worried about its sanitary condition – a concern that was provoked by the media exposure of some Chinese restaurants. Furthermore, because of the uniqueness of the Chinese cuisine culture, there was a lack of criteria for judging the quality of the offered meals. Hence, a qualitative monitoring program on par with that of the Western catering industry could hardly be implemented. In addition, the traditional mentality of small restaurant owners made them more concerned about their own assets than the promotion of a sanitary environment in their restaurants. All of these factors weakened and obstructed the expansion of the Chinese catering sector.

In the 1990s, far-reaching policy adjustments in several Southeast European countries sought to stabilize the economic development of these countries. In order to protect domestic industries their governments introduced numerous restrictive and discriminative measures to control the flow of Chinese merchandise - measures which seriously damaged the businesses of overseas Qingtianese. By 1992, Hungary had become the largest distribution center of Chinese commodities in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of Chinese merchants' efforts. That year, Hungary launched strict policies to limit overseas Chinese business activities and refused to handle Chinese merchants' residence visas. Hence, once their visa had expired, merchants were forced to leave the country – and the market scene they

[9] Much is written on Chinese food restaurants owned by Qingtian people by Zhou Wangsen et al., 1998.

had become accustomed to - which caused them to endure huge economic losses. In March 1995, as a further measure aimed at stabilizing its economy, Hungary increased its tariffs by 8% for all commodities, regardless of their type or purchasing price; naturally, the price of Chinese commodities increased sharply (Yang Yongqian, 1996). In this context, Qingtianese saw no choice but to leave the country that had once brought them lucrative profits. From Hungary, they headed to other parts of Central Europe where they were met with conditions similar to those prevailing when they had first entered Hungary, and overseas Chinese who settled there were able to earn enormous profits.

However, the optimistic prospects that Chinese found in these countries were soon crippled as these countries followed Hungary's lead in regulating Chinese merchants, which to a large extent jeopardized the legal rights of overseas Qingtianese. Even Serbia, the very last country into which Qingtianese entered, announced a new visa policy in 2001 essentially targeting Chinese merchants. Instead of allowing them to reside in the country for one or two years as had been previously possible, the government now permitted them to stay for only three months; the residence policy towards citizens of other nations remained unchanged (Xie Rongbien, 2003). In the pursuit of economic transformation and social stabilization, the legal systems of Southeast European countries were dramatically altered. After having strived for more than ten years in the region, Qingtianese had become rooted in their residence countries – places where they had risen up from a preliminary phase characterized by manual labor and entered into the international trade of merchandise. Nevertheless, compared to former times, their businesses now faced many difficult new challenges, and despite sporadic favorable business opportunities it became more challenging to engage in commercial transactions.

Just as the catering industry had eventually reached a ceiling after its rapid growth during the "Golden Age," the trade industry similarly entered into a period of consolidation. In the mid-1990s some of the Qingtianese entrepreneurs who had accumulated enormous amounts of wealth and management experience in various economic spheres entered into a phase of reorientation, seeking more profitable targets for the investment of their capital. This time they turned their eyes back to the nation in which they had started their businesses. Since the mid-1990s China

had firmly backed up the development of Qingtianese enterprises, incessantly providing human and commodity resources. With the steady growth of its economy China had also built up a vast market with robust purchasing power. This became an essential impetus for Qingtianese to return to China to invest there. Most of the returnees felt a strong nostalgic sentiment towards their hometown; the education they had received as children in China had created a bond which made it difficult for them to dissolve the links with their motherland.

Basically, three types of Qingtian overseas Chinese invested in China. First of all, there were those who gave up their overseas enterprises and concentrated all of their efforts on expanding domestic Chinese markets. For example, this was the case for Chen Xia who had left for Italy in 1989 to engage in the catering sector. Although his business had performed quite smoothly, he had always found it challenging to integrate into the local society. In an interview, Chen explained, "We lived in Italy. I bought my own house but I always felt like that house was not my own. I did not have the feeling that I was at home or that I belonged to that place. Hence, I was thinking of going back to China to develop myself there because there would be no language barrier after returning to China. In addition, when working in China, you feel like you are working for yourself and for your own hometown. As a matter of fact, only when you live abroad can you realize the profound meaning of 'motherland.' That is why I thought I must come back."[10] In 1994, Chen Xia established his own real estate company in China while still residing in Italy and in 2000 decided to move his home from Italy to China. He gradually sold all of his shops overseas and eventually shifted his business focus completely to China.

The second type of Qingtianese who have returned to invest in China are those who invested in building up factories in China; these have made full use of their established selling networks in order to integrate production and sales and thereby eliminate the "middle man" and maximize their profits. These people have gradually shifted from being providers to being entrepreneurs of newly-established manufacturing companies so that they could produce the very goods they intend to sell in their own outlets. In spite of the risks generated by merging production and sales, this flexible, market-oriented production mechanism has remarkably improved efficiency and reduced costs. Lin Wanrong, who first established his

[10] Recorded interview of Chen Xia conducted by Chen Ye on 29th March 2008.

business in Romania, is a typical example for this kind of enterprise. Having moved to Romania in 1993, he became acquainted with East European markets, especially the wholesale of products. In 2004, he started his own clothing production company in Qingtian. This company has aligned itself with the demands of the international market regarding the design of garments, the purchasing of textile, pursuing of fashion and quality management; in this way, Chen's production in Qingtian directly supports his sales abroad.

Thirdly, there were Qingtianese who continued to engage themselves in their overseas businesses while investing their spare funds in China as a means of diversifying their investment portfolios. Chen Naike is a typical representative of this group. He left for the Czech Republic in 1993 and became engaged in international trade. After establishing his own garment brand, he started to produce clothes in Qingtian-based factories for his sales abroad. Furthermore, starting in 2001, he invested in the real estate, commerce and manufacturing sectors, building up his own enterprises in Hangzhou, Lishui, Qingtian and Yunhe in just two years. Seeing the strength of the Chinese economy, Chen made this remark about his return to China: "I came back to China too late. Had I come back two years earlier, the great amount of funds that I had accumulated would not have remained in banks but rather would have been utilized effectively." (Qin Jun et al., 2004).

Overall, the largest share of overseas Qingtianese had accumulated only small or medium quantities of capital. When they decided to invest in China, this group generally chose to invest in small or medium cities where land and labor were cheap and where local governments were offering incentivizing policies. In the early 21st century, the main areas of investment in China have been the real estate, garment processing and manufacturing sectors. In this period, the optimistic prospects concerning domestic real estate have persuaded many to return and invest in China, rendering this sector a priority amongst investors. Given the enormous investment risks of real estate investment in big central cities, however, Qingtianese usually chose places adjacent to Zhejiang Province, such as Jiangxi and Anhui that have been regarded as economically underdeveloped regions, or cities such as Chunan and Jiaxing where the price of land was relatively low.

Still, not all Qingtianese who returned to China to invest there were successful. Having been absent from the country for so many years they often did not have a

clear understanding of the domestic situation, and their investments were prone to flop when domestic economic conditions became unstable. However, after several years of investment experience, Qingtianese returnees have increasingly adapted to China's investment climate and have achieved some remarkable accomplishments, which also supported the local economy. The prospect and attractiveness of returning to China to invest provided a new economic incentive for overseas Qingtianese. We believe that, influenced by expanding globalization and economic integration; the improvement of the investment environment; and the broad business opportunities brought about by China's economic prosperity, the trend of overseas Qingtianese returning to invest in China will only become stronger, with increases both in the number of returnees and in the amounts of capital being invested domestically. This in turn will bring about a win-win situation for both the overseas Qingtianese as well as for the Chinese economy.

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Highly qualified migration from China to Germany. Trends in the early 21st Century

Kaikai Zhang and Beatrice Knerr

1 Introduction

A highly qualified labor force is a basis for economic growth and prosperity. However, in Germany - a country whose development essentially depends on technical innovations - highly qualified staff has become increasingly scarce in the 21st century as the domestic supply of professionals continues to fall short of the demand in many areas. Hence, actively attracting highly qualified migrants from abroad is essential in order to sustain the country's level of economic development. Since this is the case in many other OECD[1] countries too, Germany is competing on an international market whereby it joins the "global race for talents" (Münz, 2014). In order to draw more highly qualified laborers from abroad and to better facilitate their employment by local companies, the German government has made considerable efforts to loosen the entry requirements for this group. Many Chinese have taken advantage of the resulting favorable opportunities offered by Germany which target the immigration of high-potentials by entering the country with employment contracts or as students. A large share of these were issued a "European Union Blue Card"[2] which was adopted in Germany in 2012. Since the early 21st century, Chinese have formed the largest group among Germany's international students (DAAD and DZHW 2014), and a considerable part of them have stayed in the country for employment after their graduation. With the establishment of Chinese companies in Germany on the rise –amounting to about 900 in 2012 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2013) - and the strengthening of trade relations between China and Germany, there has been a great increase in the

[1] The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an international economic organization of 34 countries founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade.

[2] The EU Blue Card is a residence title for specific purposes; it allows the legal stay of a citizen from a non-EU country in an EU member state for the purpose of working as a high-skilled worker.

number of Chinese entrepreneurs and white-collar workers taking up employment and doing business in Germany.

These tendencies indicate that highly qualified Chinese play and will continue to play a significant role in the development of Germany's economy and society. Nevertheless, there have been few systematic studies on highly qualified Chinese migrants in Germany[3]. Research conducted so far about labor movements from China to Europe mainly focuses on unskilled labor migration from China to other OECD countries, particularly Italy, Spain and France. Our paper intends to contribute to the closing of this research gap by addressing the following questions: 1) What is the basic professional and social situation of different groups of highly qualified Chinese in Germany in the early 21st century?; 2) What potential benefits does the migration of highly qualified Chinese bring to the migrants, the host country, their country of origin, and to third countries; and 3) What problems or challenges are the immigrants facing? In examining these questions, we will derive some policy implications for the sending and receiving countries.

Our study is based on primary and secondary data, which are analyzed by descriptive statistics. Primary data is from the authors' field survey in Germany while secondary data is taken from various official statistical resources, namely the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), the Federal Foreign Office (AuswärtigesAmt), the Central Registry of Foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister, AZR), the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, BMWE), the German Academic Exchange Office (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, DAAD), the internet portal "Statista"[4], and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Also, a review of the latest research findings in both Germany and China was conducted.

The rest of this article is structured as follows. A definition for „highly qualified persons" is presented in section (2). Section (3) gives an overview of the economic

[3] In this context, however, the comprehensive PhD thesis by He (2007) should be mentioned which provides a broad overview of the history of Chinese migration to Germany and the situation in the early 21st century from a sociologist's point of view. Yet, it does not focus on highly-qualified workers and further, since it was published in 2007, it omits the critical period thereafter.

[4] "Statista" is the world's largest statistics portal which brings together data from over 18,000 sources. Since it draws from sound databases we directly used their statistical material where appropriate.

context regarding the dynamics of Sino-German relations. The relevant German policies related to highly qualified migration are introduced in section (4). Section (5) describes the new trends of three types of highly qualified migration from China to Germany in the 21st century (academics, employees and businessmen) and analyzes the problems faced by migrants in the receiving country. Section (6) discusses policy implications and offers conclusions.

2 Definition of highly qualified persons

Although there are different definitions of the terms “highly qualified,” “highly skilled” (Nathan 2014), “highly educated” (Peri & Sparber 2011), and „talents” (Solimano 2008), they are often used synonymously. According to Solimano & Pollack (2004), two main approaches are used to define the qualification levels. The educational approach defines highly qualified persons as those possessing a tertiary educational qualification, while the occupational approach defines them as those employed in science and technology (S&T) positions. Incorporating both approaches, OECD and Eurostat5 have developed a widely used conceptual framework combining both educational attainment and occupation: highly qualified persons are those who have either “successfully completed an education at the third level in a S&T field of study, or are not formally qualified as above but employed in a S&T occupation where the above qualifications are normally required” (OECD, 1995), whereby S&T includes natural sciences, engineering, technology, medical sciences, social sciences and humanities.

Different types of highly qualified migrants each have a distinct set of motivations to migrate as well as different impacts on the development of their host country (Solimano, 2008). In this context, Solimano (2008) differentiates between the following broad types of talents:

a. *Directly productive talent*. These are people who are engaged in activities that directly lead to an output of goods and services, including entrepreneurs, engineers and other technical talent, technology innovators, and business creators.

[5] Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union situated in Luxembourg. Its task is to provide the European Union with EU statistics that enable comparisons between countries and regions.

b. *Academic talent*. This includes scientists, scholars and international students; these individuals usually work or study at universities, research centers and in think-tanks and are devoted to the acquisition and/or production of scientific and scholarly knowledge that may eventually be used to produce commercially valuable products and inputs.

c. *Talent in social sectors*. This talent is engaged directly in the provision of critical social services, such as medical doctors and nurses in the health sector.

d. *Talent in cultural sectors*. It includes so-called "cultural workers" such as writers, painters, musicians and others engaged in artistic and cultural/creative activities that have a value of aesthetic enjoyment and personal development.

In this paper, we utilize the definition of highly qualified persons according to the OECD delineation, which takes into account both the migration of directly productive persons as well as academic talents. The secondary statistical resources we use focus solely on people from Mainland China having a Chinese nationality. In our own survey, we also included persons who have changed their nationality from Chinese to German.

3 Macro-economic context

3.1 Demographic changes and labor shortages in Germany

Discussions about the shortage of skilled labor on the German labor market - especially of workers with MINT (i.e. mathematics, information technology, natural sciences and technology) qualifications - are considered high priority on Germany's political agenda. Many German companies emphasize the difficulties they encounter in finding appropriately qualified persons to fill job vacancies. Essentially due to Germany's low fertility rate[6], the potential laborers of the domestic younger generations are not sufficient to replace all the positions left vacant by retiring laborers (Constant & Tien, 2011); this condition is further aggravated by German students' preferences for non-MINT subjects and their comparatively high drop-out rates in these areas (Knerr, 2009). A key challenge of Germany's economic development is thus to expand the supply pool from which it may draw adequately

[6] The average number of children per woman has remained at 1.4 since the end of the 1990s (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015b)

qualified laborers. The admittance of skilled labor migrants from abroad would be an effective way to narrow the demand-supply gap. Hence, since the late 1990s, the German government has initiated a series of policies to attract a highly skilled workforce from other countries as a way to cope with this situation (Tlatlik, 2015).

3.2 Dynamics of the Chinese economy and Sino-German relations

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1972, economic relations between China and Germany have kept moving forward. In 2013, German exports to China reached 67.03 billion Euros (about 5.5 times as much as in 2001) while imports from China amounted to 73.38 billion Euros (3.7 times as much as in 2001) (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014). Germany has become by far China´s biggest trading partner in Europe and ranks sixth among its trading partners worldwide. China is Germany´s major trading partner in Asia and its third most important one worldwide (Federal Foreign Office, 2013). Further, China´s direct investment in Germany has risen tremendously; it increased by almost thirteen fold between 2003 and 2014, from 156 million Euro to 2,128 million Euro (German Central Bank, 2015).

With the rapid development of China's economy, the country's per capita household income has grown accordingly; between 2000 and 2013, the per capita disposable income of urban residents grew from 6,280 RMB (about 924 Euro) to 26,467 RMB (about 3,869 US$) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014). As a result, the number of middle class households which can support their children in studying abroad has continuously grown. As a result, the number of Chinese students coming to Germany strongly increased over the early 21st century, from 6,179 in 2000 to 23,883 in 2012 (DAAD and DZHW, 2015). Many of these students stay in Germany after their graduation to pursue favorable employment opportunities, thereby enlarging the number of highly qualified immigrants in the country (Zhao and Knerr, 2015).

4 Policies to attract highly qualified migrants to Germany

In an effort to attract highly qualified foreign professionals to ease labor shortages – especially in the domestic IT sector – Germany introduced the so-called "Green Card" in the early 2000s, a five-year work permit targeted at highly-qualified persons. However, the outcome of this program was not as successful as had been expected; the number of applicants never reached the established targets, and, therefore, the scheme was abandoned in 2005 (Tlatlik and Knerr, 2015a). In the same year, the government passed the Immigration Law (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*)[7]; it was a historical step in the country's immigration history because the promulgation of this Act signified for the first time Germany's own recognition as being a country of immigration (Tlatlik and Knerr, 2015b). Reacting to the felt mismatches on the German labor market, the reforms mainly focused on loosening restrictions for highly skilled in-migrants while stiffening those for unskilled from Third Countries[8]. The new legislation particularly favors four types of talents (see Federal Foreign Office, 2012[9]):

a. *Highly qualified persons from Third Countries* holding a formal working contract with German company are to be granted permanent residence upon arrival; in addition, family members accompanying them are to be allowed to take up paid employment.

b. *Self-employed persons* are eligible for being granted a residence permit if their planned business is of particular economic or specific regional interest in Germany, with each case to be examined separately to consider its expected economic impact and the security of funding.

c. *Foreign students* who have successfully graduated from German universities are to be permitted to stay for up to 18 months to look for a job matching their academic formation[10].

d. *Researchers* are to be granted residence permits through a simplified visa procedure, provided they would be working at an institution recognized by the

[7] This act entered into force on January 1, 2005.
[8] The term "Third Country" is used by the European Commission to define any country that is not one of the 28 EU (European Union) member States and EEA-EFTA (European Economic Area - European Free Trade Association) states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway).
[9] At the time of the publication of this paper, this legislation is still valid.
[10] Until July 2012, this period was only one year.

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*).

In 2009, the European Union's „Blue Card" regulation was adopted. It aimed to simplify the entry and work permit procedures for highly skilled persons from Third Countries. In Germany it officially came into effect on August 1, 2012. Under its provisions, highly educated immigrants and foreign graduates in Germany earning a gross salary of more than 47,600 Euro p.a.[11] as well as specialists in occupations considered to be particularly scarce[12] earning more than 37,128 Euro p.a. were eligible for visas granting them the right to work and live in Germany for up to four years. In the first eight months following the introduction of this law, 6,200 Blue Cards were issued. However, about two-thirds of these went to persons who were already residing in Germany; most of them had graduated from a German university. Indians, Chinese, Russians and Americans were the top four nationalities receiving Blue Cards (BAMF, 2013).

5 Highly qualified migration from China to Germany in the 21st century

5.1 Chinese migration to Germany

From 2000 to 2013, the number of Chinese nationals residing in Germany increased from 50,885 to 110,284, and the share of females among them from 43% to 52.2% (Table 1). The majority came for study purposes, though their proportion of the total number of Chinese nationals in Germany has been continually declining since 2007.Concurrently, the number of Chinese employed in Germany has steadily grown, rising by 70.7% between 2006 and 2014. The number of Chinese being granted a permanent residence permit similarly increased quickly: in 2014 it was almost six times that of 2006.

[11] Status on 01.01.2014

[12] Special occupations for which there is a shortage of personnel are scientists, mathematicians, engineers, medical doctors and IT specialists.

Table 1: Residence status of Chinese nationals in Germany*

Year	Total	Female, %	Education		Employment (%)		Permanent residence permit (%)	
			total	%	total	%	total	%
2000	50.885	42.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
2001	63.111	43.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
2002	72.094	43.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
2003	76.743	44.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	71.639	46.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
2005	73.767	46.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	75733	47.6	27313	36.0	7901	10.4	3922	5.2
2007	78096	48.3	29702	38.0	10667	13.6	5928	7.6
2008	78960	49.3	29632	37.5	11643	14.7	8424	10.7
2009	79870	50.3	29756	37.2	11000	13.8	11792	14.8
2010	81331	51.0	29762	36.6	11088	13.6	13869	17.0
2011	86435	51.3	26565	30.7	11416	13.2	15512	17.9
2012	93676	51.6	31031	33.1	13520	14.4	17765	18.9
2013	101030	51.9	31950	31.6	12970	12.8	20382	20.2
2014	110.284	52,2	35.051	31,8	13.483	12,2	22.877	20,7

*Statistical data for different purposes of residence is only available for the time period starting after the enactment of the Immigration Act in 2005.

"-" indicates that the data is unavailable

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015a

Most Chinese nationals in Germany are concentrated in the economically and industrially more developed regions and cities, namely North Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, as well as in the cities of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen (Table 2).

Table 2: Chinese nationals in different Federal States of Germany, 2013

Federal States	Total number of Chinese	Total population	‰ of total population	Disposable per-capita income, Euro*
North Rhine-Westphalia	25,633	17,571,856	1.5	21,262
Hamburg	5,327	1,746,342	3.1	23,100
Hesse	9,575	6,045,425	1.6	22,664
Berlin	6,621	3,421,829	1.9	19,022
Bremen	1,222	657,391	1.9	19,843
Bavaria	14,845	12,604,244	1.2	23,035
Baden-Württemberg	14,949	10,631,278	1.4	22,775
Saxony	4,570	4,046,385	1.1	17,803
Saxony-Anhalt	2,567	2,244,577	1.1	17,679
Lower Saxony	6,880	7,790,559	0.9	21,171
Saarland	806	990,718	0.8	21,242
Thuringia	1,551	2,160,840	0.7	18,057
Rhineland-Palatinate	2,884	3,994,366	0.7	21,935
Schleswig-Holstein	1,813	2,815,955	0.6	21,900
Brandenburg	1,169	2,449,193	0.5	19,011
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	618	1,596,505	0.4	17,691

*) Income available from different sources at the place of living, after taxes (available for consumption and savings).

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014a and 2014a

5.2 Academic migration from China to Germany

Chinese students in Germany

The history of Chinese studying in Ger**m**any dates back to the so-called "Westernization Movement" which was advocated by the late Qing government (1840-1912). Before the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 which overthrew China's last imperial dynasty (the Qing dynasty) and established the Republic of China, central and local governments were sending Chinese students to study in Germany. These students mostly took up studies in military theory and weapon manufacturing but

later moved in to other subjects, such as law and the natural sciences (Xu, 2010). In 1911, the number of Chinese students in Germany totaled 114; 87 were financed by the Qing government, while the rest studied at their own expenses (Meng, 2008). After their return home, some worked at newly founded universities and educational institutions and others took official positions in the public administration, which considerably contributed to China's modernization. For example, the well-known education expert Cai Yuanpei became the president of Beijing University after graduating from a German university. He introduced the concept of modern universities based on the German model and initiated important educational reforms in China.

From the 1950s until the late 1970s few Chinese students went abroad. But following the enactment of China's reform and opening policies in 1978, the government sent a large number of students to various European countries in an effort to diversify the overseas destinations of Chinese students (Cheng, 2002). Great Britain, France and Germany became the major destinations (GHK Consulting and Renmin University, 2011). In 2012, the total number of Chinese students in Germany reached 25,521 – about four times the number in 2000 (6,179); the vast majority of them were international students[13] (23,883) (DAAD and DZHW, 2014).The share of Chinese in the total number of international students in Germany increased continually from 2000 to 2005 when it peaked at 14.0%; afterwards it steadily declined to 12.4% in 2012 (Table 3).

International students pursuing certain qualifications are considered a valuable resource for Germany's scientific development and economic growth. Germany is the most popular non-English speaking destination for international students, with 265,000 registered in 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014a). To keep this position, the German government and universities have implemented various measures to attract more international students and to retain those with particularly sought-after qualifications after their graduation. Still, international students in Germany, including Chinese, face a number of major difficulties. Problems frequently mentioned by them are: low graduation rates, few opportunities to remain in the

[13] "International students" are those with a foreign nationality who received their high school diploma abroad. Foreign students, in addition include those with a foreign nationality who received their high school diploma in Germany.

country after graduation, and too little contact with German colleagues (Heublein et al., 2012; Knerr, 2015).

Table 3: Chinese international students in Germany (1999-2012)

Year	Number	Indexed, 2000=100	% of all international students
2000	6,179	100.0	5.5
2001	8,745	141.5	7.0
2002	13,523	218.9	9.5
2003	19,374	313.5	11.9
2004	24,095	389.9	13.4
2005	25,987	420.6	14.0
2006	26,061	421.8	13.8
2007	25,651	415.1	13.6
2008	23,983	388.1	13.5
2009	23,140	374.5	12.8
2010	22,779	368.7	12.6
2011	22,828	369.4	12.3
2012	23,883	386.5	12.4

Source: based on data from DAAD and DZHW (2013)

A large share of Chinese students in Germany are enrolled in engineering (40.9%) and mathematics and natural sciences (18%)[14], though a significant proportion study law, economics and social sciences (Table 4).Accordingly, most of them have graduated from these subjects. A considerable share have also graduated from studies in language and cultural sciences.

[14] Referring to the winter semester of 2012/2013

Table 4: Study fields of Chinese students/graduates in 2012

Study fields	Share of students %	Share of graduates %
Engineering sciences	40.9	39.7
Law, economics, and social sciences	21.0	22.7
Mathematics and naturalsciences	18.0	16.0
Language and cultural sciences	11.2	8.1
Arts	4.7	4.1
Others	4.1	3.7

Source: based on data from DAAD and DZHW (2014)

As shown in Table 5, Chinese PhD students in Germany have mainly chosen MINT-subjects, i.e. engineering, natural sciences and medicine, and more specifically, biology, chemistry, machine manufacturing/technology, medical science and physics/astronomy. All of these subjects are in high demand on the German labor market, meaning they offer promising outlooks for finding employment and favorable career perspectives in Germany. Regarding their share of the total number of international PhD students, Chinese ranked first among nationalities in most of these research areas.

Table 5: Five most-studied subjects of Chinese PhD students in Germany, 2012

Subject	Number	Rank among all international PhD students
Biology	362	2
Chemistry	340	1
Machine manufacturing/technology	310	1
Medical science	223	1
Physics / astronomy	160	1

Source: based on data from DAAD and DZHW (2014)

Chinese academic/scientific staff in Germany

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the number of Chinese academic staff in Germany has increased concomitantly with the number of students (see Table 6).Compared to the year 2000 (1,078), the total number of Chinese academics and researchers in Germany had tripled by 2012 (3,527). During this period, their share among all foreign scientists in the country was between 7% and 9%; China, together with Russia and the UK, constituted the three quantitatively most important source countries of foreign scientists in Germany. The total number of Chinese post-docs as well as their share among all foreign post-docs in Germany remained in a leading position since the beginning of the 00s (DAAD and DZHW, 2014). At the same time, the share of Chinese scientists, including university teachers, among all foreign scientists in the country permanently occupied third place. Chinese academics and researchers came to Germany with different types of funding (see Table 6).

Researchers and academic staff from China contribute considerably to the scientific cooperation between Germany and China. In a survey conducted by the authors among highly qualified Chinese in Germany in 2012[15], respondents were asked about career bottlenecks and future plans. One-fourth reported to have encountered problems, whereby the most mentioned hurdles were the following: few chances of being promoted, unsatisfactory job performance (e.g. too few publications), poor knowledge of the German language, cultural differences between them and the German social environment, low income and limited social relationships. More than half of the interviewed Chinese academic staff members expressed that they plan to stay in Germany for only a short time (less than five years). About 16% wanted to return to China as soon as possible or move on to another country; the USA, England, and Australia were most cited as destinations since respondents believed that English-speaking countries would offer them better environments and conditions for research and innovation.

[15]This survey was implemented in the framework of Kaikai Zhang's PhD research project which investigated the effects of human and social capital on the career success of highly qualified Chinese in Germany. It was conducted between July 2012 and December 2012.

Table 6: Chinese scientific staff in Germany 2001-2012*

Year	Post-docs*	Scientists and university teachers	Supported by various funding organizations	No classification possible
2000	-	-	-	-
2001	452 (14.5) **	310 (5.3)**	1.386	28
2002	524 (11.8)	353 (7.0)	1.502	13
2003	427 (17.5)	381 (6.7)	1.428	17
2004	319 (12.0)	309 (9.3)	1.254	84
2005	417 (13.0)	297 (6.1)	1.415	120
2006	458 (12.9)	319 (5.9)	1.559	119
2007	501 (20.5)	305 (6.3)	1645	134
2008	529 (13.8)	371(5.6)	1.909	290
2009	514 (12.5)	451 (6.0)	2.031	307
2010	578 (13.3)	464 (5.9)	-	-
2011	613 (13.2)	523 (6.3)	-	-
2012	1360 (6.1)		-	-

*) Due to different statistical approaches, data for some classifications of academic staff are not available for 2000, 2010, 2011 and 2012.
**) Figures in brackets indicate percentage of total
Source: based on data from DAAD and DZHW (2014)

5.3 Chinese employees in the private sector

In the early 21st century, the number of highly qualified Chinese labor force, as well as their share amongst the total Chinese population, has rapidly expanded in Germany, especially in the urban centers of economically and industrially more developed regions. An increasing number of Chinese professionals have found employment in Germany following their graduation from German universities, whereby those who had studied a MINT subject could more easily secure a suitable job. After the introduction of the EU Blue Card, many Chinese professionals who had studied in the country enjoyed the benefits of this new regulation.

In 2011, 1,935 Chinese graduates from German universities found a job in the country, which was 1.6 times more than five years before (749). Furthermore, over the same period the share of Chinese graduates taking up employment in Germany

among all Chinese graduates in Germany increased from 24.7% to 39.8% (see Table 7). Chinese graduates formed the most important source of professionals among foreigners in Germany holding a German university degree (based on DAAD and DZHW, 2014).

Table 7: Chinese graduates from German universities and their employment in Germany after graduation (2006-2011)*

Year	Newly graduated Chinese in Germany	Employed Chinese graduates	Share among all employed foreign graduates, in %	Share of all Chinese graduates, in %
2006	3,030	749	27.3	24.7
2007	3,959	1,428	32.3	36.1
2008	4,553	1,910	32.2	42.0
2009	5,843	1,359	28.2	23.3
2010	4,646	1,557	27.4	33.5
2011	4,859	1,935	26.4	39.8
2012	4,919	-	-	-

*) Data for newly employed Chinese graduates in Germany are not available after 2011.

Source: Based on data from BAMF (2013) and DAAD and DZHW (2015).

A significant number of highly qualified workers have been directly hired from China to meet the demand of the expanding market in Germany. This development corresponds with the general increase indirect investments in Germany by Chinese. A considerable number of Chinese companies have invested in Germany through purchases of or merges with existing German companies as well as by establishing new branches; these companies require many locally experienced law, tax and management specialists to help them gain a firm foothold in the country. Likewise, German companies need Chinese professionals to facilitate communication with their Chinese business partners. As a result, the quantity of Chinese white-collar workers in German cities has considerably grown. Between 2007 and 2013 the average number of newly-immigrated Chinese employees entering Germany under the legislation provided by §18 *Aufenthaltsgesetz* (Residence Act)[16] was 2,720[17], with around one-third being females.

[16] This regulation allows for the grant of a residence permit for the purpose of employment.

The number of immigrants permitted to be employed in Germany is related to domestic economic conditions. It can be observed that the number of newly-immigrated Chinese employees increased in years of economic growth and vice versa.

Table 8: Newly-immigrated Chinese employees and economic growth in Germany, 2007 to 2013

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Economic growth (%)	3.3	1.1	-5.6	4.1	3.6	0.4	0,4
Total	2,921	2,406	2,204	2,707	3,137	3,052	2611
Share of females (%)	26.9	34.0	28.5	27.6	29.6	26.5	29.5

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2014a)

On the other hand, according to an OECD report, many German companies have been hesitant to recruit foreign workers because they perceive the German immigration system as too opaque and complex, resulting in high administrative costs (OECD 2013). Further, in most cases, German language skills and educational qualifications are required for working in a company, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises. Hence, many potential migrants are not eligible for such jobs[18].

5.4 Chinese entrepreneurs in Germany

About 900 Chinese companies were active in Germany in 2014 (Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*, 2015), most of them small- or medium-sized[19]. They have mainly been located in the western and southern federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen, Hamburg, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Berlin (see Table 9).

[17] Own calculation based on the data in Table 8.
[18] Tlatlik (2015) arrived at similar results through her survey among companies in the surrounds of Göttingen.
[19] As defined by the European Commission, small enterprises have up to 50 employees and medium-sized enterprises have up to 250 employees.

Table 9: Chinese companies in Germany in 2012, by Federal States

Federal states	No. of companies	Federal States	No. of companies
North Rhine-Westphalia	240	Rhineland-Palatinate	15
Hessen	140	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	5
Hamburg	130	Saarland	4
Bavaria	90	Saxony-Anhalt	3
Baden-Württemberg	40	Thuringia	3
Berlin	35	Brandenburg	3
Schleswig-Holstein	30	Saxony	2
Lower Saxony	25		

Source: Statista (2014)

Between 2005 and 2013, the number of newly-immigrated self-employed Chinese (entering Germany under the legislation of §21 Aufenthaltsgsetz[20]) fell from 201 to152, with around one-third of them being female. Chinese were thus the second largest group of self-employed people from third countries; however, their proportion (9.0%) was far below that of new immigrants from the USA (36.7%) (see Table 9). However, considering those of the self-employed who are not working as freelancers, but rather run small business or similar activities, another picture emerges: within this group, most are Chinese; in 2013 138 opened a business in Germany, while just 62 US Americans did so (Table 10).

[20] This regulation allows for the grant of a residence permit for the purpose of self-employment.

Table 10: Newly-immigrated, self-employed people in Germany, 2005 to 2013

Nationality	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013		
									Total	Non-freelance*)	Females
USA	174 (23.8)	138 (21.5)	276 (31.0)	360 (29.1)	337 (32.9)	384 (36.9)	512 (38.0)	540 (39.8)	621 (36.7)	62 (5.1)	248 (42.5)
China	201 (27.5)	195 (30.4)	214 (24.0)	214 (17.3)	133 (13.0)	85 (8.2)	120 (8.9)	125 (9.2)	152 (9.0)	138 (11.5)	52 (8.9)
Total	732	642	891	1.239	1.024	1.040	1.347	1.358	1690	1201	584

Figures in brackets indicate percentage of total.

*) A freelancer is a person who is self-employed and is not committed to a particular employer in the long-term. These workers are sometimes represented by a company or an agency that resells their labor and that of others to its clients.

Source: Based on data from BAMF (2014)

According to a 2012 survey by the accounting company Ernst & Young[21], machine manufacturing, the automotive industry, chemistry, pharmacy and trade are the most attractive sectors for Chinese investors in Germany. The survey also shows that Germany is the third-most attractive country worldwide for investments by Chinese entrepreneurs. The respondents of the survey particularly appreciated the country's infrastructure, the high qualifications of its workforce, the social climate and the capabilities in research and development. The general manager of Zoje Europe GmbH – founded in 2008 as the first Europe-based subsidiary branch of the Chinese industrial sewing machine manufacturer Zoje – explained the reasons for the continual growth of Chinese investments in Germany during an interview: "Why did we enter and will continue to invest in Germany? It is very simple. We need to enhance the innovation capacity, especially in the high-tech sector. We need to gain access to the global market. We need to promote the brand, and we

[21] The survey was conducted by the accounting company Ernst & Young from April until May of 2012. Four hundred Chinese executives of large companies and SMEs were asked about the most attractive locations for investing.

need to improve the management. Germany can meet all the demands."(China Daily, 2013).

The investment activities of Chinese entrepreneurs in Germany have brought considerable benefits to the German economy. Over the early 21st century, Chinese companies often took over insolvent or insolvency-threatened German companies, thereby renewing employment prospects for workers and offering new job perspectives at those companies. Since 2005 an increasing number of Chinese companies have established their own subsidiaries in Germany, thus creating new employment opportunities for the German labor force. For example, the Chinese telecommunication equipment company Huawei has more than 1,800 employees among its German branches in Dusseldorf, Bonn, Munich and Berlin (Portal of Huawei Deutschland, 2015).The growth of Chinese investments in Germany has thus contributed to win-win business relations for both countries; this growth would not have been attainable without the contributions of highly-qualified Chinese working for these companies in Germany.

6 Conclusions

This article has sought to explain the trends in the migration of highly qualified Chinese to Germany in the early 21st century. Our key findings and major implications for both policymakers and future research work are as follows.

Chinese students in Germany have promoted the exchange of knowledge and culture between China and Germany, and they embody a potential resource for the human capital sought by labor markets in both countries. The share of Chinese graduates who stay to work in Germany has increased considerably. Since Germany is in urgent need of highly qualified laborers to sustain its economic development, the German government and universities should strive to retain this pool of competencies and to attract additional high-potentials from China to study and then work in Germany. In this context, the German labor market would benefit from measures that promote a successful integration of foreign students into mainstream culture and society during their studies and into the labor market following their graduation. At the same time, China would profit from the return of its nationals who gained professional experience in Germany. Hence, the Chinese

government and Chinese enterprises should consider how they might attract expatriates back to China and make full use of the talent they acquired during their studies and work in Germany; this would imply offering them attractive living conditions - including suitable and affordable housing – as well as well-paid, interesting jobs.

Chinese academics in Germany have played a key role in the scientific cooperation between the two countries and have contributed to high-level research. Despite this, some of them face challenges in acquiring promotions within their organizations which is to a large part due to their limitations with the German language and a lack of social contact with German colleagues. Others have experienced difficulty acquiring a long-term work contract and adequate salary. It seems that the benefits to employers of hiring Chinese academic staff could be enhanced if this group was helped to have a more continuous career development in Germany.

Highly qualified Chinese employees in the private sector participate directly in economic and business activities, and thus help to ease the effects of skilled labor shortages in Germany and also contribute to the strengthening of Sino-German economic relations. Usually they are employed in occupations that take full advantage of their human capital and technical skills. Those with MINT qualifications are more easily issued an EU Blue Card, and later on, permanent residency, but others face greater hurdles. Compared to their German colleagues, Chinese employees appear to receive fewer chances for career promotion. This situation might be improved by specific support and attendance by private companies and purposeful policies.

The level of Chinese investment in Germany has risen sharply since the start of the 21st century, attracting numerous Chinese entrepreneurs and qualified employees to the country. Still, more white-collar workers who are familiar with both the German and Chinese cultures and languages are needed by Chinese companies as well as their German counterparts.

Overall, our results demonstrate that highly-qualified Chinese hold a strong potential to support Germany's economic development. However, this potential is not fully exploited due to inadequate knowledge among German companies and policymakers regarding the challenges these high-potentials face in Germany; because of these challenges, their talents cannot fully blossom and they eventually

choose to leave the country. In order to know exactly how the situation can be improved, more comprehensive research – optimally undertaken by bi-national research teams – is urgently needed.

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Ethnic Entrepreneurship of Self-employed Chinese in Germany

Xi Zhao & Beatrice Knerr

1 Introduction

Entrepreneurship, a phenomenon characterized by the emergence of new and innovative business start-ups, can play a significant role in a country's economic growth and job creation (Mc Stay, 2008). Although Germany's economy is one of the most robust globally, German society can be seen as a society of employees; the country exhibits rather low entrepreneurial spirit as compared to other countries seen by the fact that the occurrence of self-employment in the country is considerably below the average for the EU[1] (Eurostat 2015). A considerable share (11% in 2012) of its self-employed are foreigners (Mai et al. 2013)[2]. Although Chinese people constitute only a small fraction of the foreign population in Germany – just over 1% (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014) – Chinese have been in first place in terms of self-employment since the early 2000s among newly registered business people[3] from non-European Union countries (so-called "Third countries") residing in Germany, and they accounted for nearly 30% of this group in 2012 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013).

Aside from age, education, immigrant status and length of stay in the host country, ethnic background is an essential determinant of entrepreneurship (Fairlie and Meyer, 1996). Although numerous studies have investigated the outcomes of ethnic entrepreneurship, few have traced the process by which people turn to self-employment based on their ethnic background. However, those who have studied the latter observed considerable ethnic-specific differences in both the propensity to become an entrepreneur as well as in the performance of immigrant-run enterprises. The results suggest that ethnic background decisively influences immigrant entrepreneurs' business strategies as well as their economic performance in the host country (Ley, 2006; Chaganti and Greene, 2002; Fairlie

[1] In 2014, the average share of self-employed in the economically active population was 13.2 in the EU (28), but just 10.2 in Germany (Eurostat 2015).
[2] In 2012, 13% of the economically active foreigners in Germany were self-employed while this share was just 11% among the economically active Germans (Mai et al. 2013).
[3] Business people are defined in this context as those self-employed who are not registered as freelancers.

and Meyer, 1996). The results further suggest that cultural and ethnic characteristics - such as being more or less risk prone, or using ethnic social networks more or less effectively - are major drivers that influence the degree to which an immigrant group pursues entrepreneurship (Curci and Mackoy, 2010; Chand and Ghorbani, 2011; Koning and Verver, 2013).

Other scholars have highlighted the disadvantageous position of immigrants, showing that it is their circumstances which tend to push them into self-employment (Borooah and Hart, 1999; Green et al., 2005; Neville et al. 2014). When people migrate to a new country, they meet a variety of challenges in their professional life, such as lack of country-specific human capital, insufficient language skills, and deficits of social capital (Neville et al. 2014). These deficiencies pose problems for finding jobs, forcing immigrants to take occupations with relatively low skill requirements and low pay (Green et al., 2005). Hence, individuals who have no real chance of becoming regularly employed, or who can only find low wage employment and/or low social status jobs, might rather choose self-employment, a behavior which is still seen among second generation immigrants (Beckers and Blumberg, 2013).

Early 21st century scholars around the world have been actively debating a number of controversies regarding ethnic entrepreneurship[4], a topic that is highly relevant in Germany. Nevertheless, empirical studies on self-employed Chinese in Germany are scarce even though this group contributes considerably to entrepreneurial activities in Germany. As a contribution to the closing of this policy-relevant research gap, our paper aims to explore the ethnic business characteristics of self-employed Chinese in Germany on an empirical basis and makes an effort to deduce useful policy implications for self-employed ethnic immigrants in Germany. This paper explores their situation and behavior, using both the disadvantage theory and the culture theory to understand ethnic entrepreneurship. Through in-depth semi-structured interviews among self-employed Chinese in Germany in 2014, we learned how they became entrepreneurs and how they operate their businesses. More than half of our respondents had turned to self-employment because they had been unemployed or threatened by the prospect of being unemployed. However, all respondents possessed certain cultural features which

[4] For an overview of the related research see OECD 2013.

then helped them to establish successful business. Based on our study, we derive some policy implications to support immigrants' entrepreneurial activities in Germany. All respondents were members of the Chinese diaspora, which included persons with Chinese nationality as well as persons who had given up their Chinese nationality to adopt German nationality.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section (2) provides a theoretical background and the state of research. Section (3) depicts the social context and policy framework of Chinese self-employment in Germany. Section (4) presents the research methodology and section (5) offers the survey results and a discussion. Finally, in section (6), we draw conclusions and put forth implications of some policies concerning ethnic self-employment in Germany.

2 Theoretical concepts and state of empirical research

Cultural aspects are commonly used to explain the propensity for Asian people to become self-employed (Dana 2007). According to Leung (2002), the strong presence of Chinese in the catering sector suggests that certain predispositions of the Chinese culture have determined their involvement in this sector (Leung et al., 2005). The concept of ethnic entrepreneurship can be traced back to research from the 1910s on ethnicity and entrepreneurship (Sombart, 1915) and was further developed in the first half of the 20th century (Weber, 1930; Simmel, 1950). According to common explanations Kloosterman (2010:258) expresses that "Ethnic entrepreneurship is, by definition, located at the intersection of one sociocultural category, ethnicity, and one socioeconomic category, the status of self-employment.", although by adding that "…ethnic entrepreneurship is by no means clear-cut." It is "a set of connections and regular patterns of interaction among people sharing common national background or migration experiences" (Waldinger et al., 1990:3).

Ethnic entrepreneurs are members of a group that is characterized by a common origin and culture (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990) and "is known to out-group members as having such traits" (Zhou, 2004:1047).

Two major theories explain ethnic entrepreneurship: the "disadvantage theory" and the "cultural theory." The *disadvantage theory* highlights ethnic entrepreneurship as

the only available alternative to unemployment and not as a sign of professional success. It argues that most immigrants have significant disadvantages as compared to the domestic population; these constrain them upon their arrival and predetermine their behavior in the host country (Fregetto, 2004). First of all, they lack a number of components of human capital such as language skills, education, experience, and adequate knowledge of the local culture and habits. Moreover, they may face problems of discrimination. These disadvantages may prevent them from acquiring regular salaried jobs, leading them to take up self-employment in order to make a living. Empirical evidence supports the disadvantage theory for ethnic entrepreneurship (Picot et al. 1998; Werbner 2002; Green et al., 2005; Ndofor and Priem 2011). For example, in his research on the economic benefits of migration, Borjas (2002) highlights the challenges immigrants face when moving to another country, such as learning a new language, becoming familiar with an alien culture, establishing new social networks, and adapting to new formal and informal laws. Applying data from the Samples of Anonymised Records (SARs) from the 2001 UK census, Green et al. (2005) found that ethnic minorities are over-represented in occupations with relatively low-skill requirements and under-represented in higher skill occupations, especially at the management level. From their study of 23 OECD countries, Thurik et al. (2008) concluded that the conditions of unemployment and low income tend to lead immigrants to start up their own businesses, a phenomenon they called the “refugee effect” (Thurik et al. 2008). In particular, ethnic minority groups are likely to turn to entrepreneurship when they experience frustration in reaching their goal of joining the mainstream society (Werbner, 2001).

The *cultural theory* states that certain ethnic immigrant groups have culturally determined characteristics which can translate into a favoring of self-employment; these characteristics include “dedication to hard work, membership in a strong ethnic community, economical living, acceptance of risk, compliance with social value patterns, solidarity and loyalty, and orientation towards self-employment” (Masurel et al., 2004). These characteristics mean that ethnic entrepreneurs possess specific personal resources which may facilitate self-employment (Fregetto, 2004). Only after arriving in the new environment do immigrants become aware of the particular advantages their own culture might provide (Jones and Mc

Evoy, 1986). The theory that cultural characteristics are responsible for the attraction of ethnic minority immigrants to self-employment is supported by solid empirical evidence. Based on a survey among 300 entrepreneurs in Asian, Indian and African communities in South Africa, van Scheers (2010) found a significant positive relationship between ethnical and cultural background on the one hand and the successful operation of small businesses on the other hand. Self-employed Chinese – who commonly have a large presence among the self-employed in many countries – have been extensively studied. For example, Koninga and Ververb (2013) demonstrated that specific Chinese cultural values and strong intra-ethnic networks were the keys to the establishment and development of ethnic businesses in Bangkok, Thailand.

Ethnic entrepreneurs are usually both the owners and the operators of their businesses (Brzozowski, et al., 2014). This form of entrepreneurship is often considered a kind of survival strategy; without feasible economic alternatives, ethnic entrepreneurs rely heavily on the social capital of their ethnic group (Christiansen, 2003). Access to ethnic and migrants networks supports the development of their businesses (Greene and Owen, 2004). Thus, they mostly operate within their ethnic enclaves, serving the co-ethnic population in a certain location, acting as middlemen for minorities, or using their ethnic resources to trade between the host society, their ethnic group and their country of origin (Koning & Verver, 2013).

According to Zhou (2004), compared to the more successful immigrant enterprisers, who lose their ethnic mark and become incorporated into the mainstream economy, ethnic entrepreneurs are more survival-oriented. Pushed to self-employment by unfavorable employment and labor market conditions in the host country, their businesses usually face fierce competition, small profit margins and limited growth prospects (Rath & Kloosterman, 2000).

Both the disadvantage theory and the cultural theory are supported by a number of empirical studies, although they do not fully explain the entire phenomenon of ethnic entrepreneurship of Chinese in Germany. In particular, as trans-national migrants coming from a non-German speaking country with a very different cultural background, most of them suffer various difficulties in everyday life and during their career development (Zhao and Knerr, 2015).

3 Social and political context

3.1 Chinese immigration to Germany

The history of Chinese migration to Germany is one of the longest in Europe. It started in the 19th century with Chinese sailors who were hired aboard German ships; over time more of them decided to take up residence in Germany, often joined by their families. The first to settle were Cantonese-speaking seafarers from Guangdong province in 1822; in 1870, a considerable number of them began working in the ports of Bremen and Hamburg as lubricators, stokers, and coal trimmers on German steamships (Benton 2007). Consequently, a small Chinatown developed in Hamburg and many Chinese restaurants and teahouses emerged (He 2007). Around the year 1890, 43 Chinese were officially registered as residents of Hamburg; some Chinese in Hamburg moved on to Berlin where they took up a variety of jobs (Gütinger 2004). Later on, these first Chinese settlers were followed by students and groups of entertainers originating from Shandong and Zhejiang (Gütinger 1998). By the mid-1920s, Chinese students had become the fourth largest group of foreign students in the country[5]. When the Hitler Regime rose to power in 1933, however, many Chinese left Germany because they were being politically[6] and ethnically persecuted, among other reasons (He 2007). Most of them relocated either to Spain or back to China. In 1935, around 1,800 Chinese were still living in Germany - more than 1,000 of them in Berlin plus a few hundred seafarers in Hamburg; but by 1939 their number had dropped to 1,138 (Benton 2007).

After the Second World War, while Germany was divided into the socialist "German Democratic Republic" (GDR, informally called "East Germany") and the "Federal Republic of Germany" (FRG, informally called "West Germany"), migration of Chinese to Germany resumed along two different routes (Zhao, Ma and Knerr, 2013). After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and its recognition by the GDR government, many Chinese traders moved to the east sector of Berlin, expecting to be better protected by their home country's government. In 1972, the PRC established diplomatic relations with the GDR, and

[5] One of the Chinese students in Germany was Zhou En Lai who later on became a central leader of the Communist Party.

[6] In general, the Chinese diaspora in Germany had a reputation of being politically oriented with the left; a considerable share of them were members of the communist party (see He 2007).

China thereafter supplied the GDR with skilled workers who were officially invited under bilateral agreements; in addition, a number of individual migrants arrived (Gütinger 1998). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a growing number of ethnic Chinese from Great Britain and the Netherlands migrated to West Germany (Christiansen 2003). Although PRC nationals usually were not granted permanent residence permits by FRG authorities, the number of Chinese in Germany continued to rise (Van Ziegert, 2006). After diplomatic ties between China and the FRG were established in 1972, cooperation and exchanges between both countries intensified, especially following the enactment of China's economic reforms and "opening policy" in 1978. With Germany's reunification in 1990, the country's west became more attractive to Chinese migrants than the east, and the majority of new migrants as well as those already living in the east chose to migrate to the west part of the country (Gütinger 1998). At the same time, the PRC was allowing an increasing number of Chinese citizens to move abroad, a policy which also helped to boost the number of Chinese migrants in Germany. While only about 3,000 Chinese nationals were living in the FRG prior to 1970, their number reached 101,030 by 2013 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2015: 241), not including nearly 5,000 Taiwanese passport holders and an additional 10,000 ethnic Chinese who had received German citizenship within the previous decade. Considering the additional presence of an unknown number of undocumented migrants, Oblau (2011) estimated that over 100,000 Chinese were settled in Germany in 2010[7]. The number of incoming Chinese immigrants has permanently increased, reaching 22,350 in 2013. However, in the same year 14,751 Chinese nationals residing in Germany left the country, resulting in a net migration of just 7,779 which demonstrates a particularly high fluctuation rate among migrant groups (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2015:23). A similar trend was seen in the decade prior.

52% of the 101,030 Chinese, who officially resided in Germany by the end of 2013, were females (National Statistics Bureau of Germany (*Statistisches Bundesamt*, (StBA), 2014). More than 20,000 held a permanent residence permit, about 13,000 had a working visa, more than 15,000 had been issued residence on the basis of

[7] It has to be emphasized that widely differing estimations of the number of Chinese in Germany exist, essentially depending on which of the following groups are included: Chinese nationals, the entire Chinese diaspora (i.e. including also former Chinese who have gained German nationality and their descendants), and those whose residency was not officially registered (i.e. "illegal").

family reunion, and more than 32,000 held a student visa. Assessing the total number of Chinese in Germany on the basis of previous research results (see, for example, Gütinger 1998 and 2004), the total number of ethnic Chinese in Germany might reach 110,000 by the mid-2010s. This figure is produced by including those who have adopted German citizenship, those with Chinese roots who have come from other countries with Chinese minorities, like Indonesia or Singapore, and those who are staying illegally.

3.2 Self-employed Chinese in Germany

Due to the low occurrence of self-employment in Germany as compared to the EU average, Germany is sometimes viewed as a society of low entrepreneurial spirit (Knuth, 2006). Nevertheless, non-German ethnic groups have considerably contributed to the country's commercial activities. According to the 2015 report of BAMF, between 1991 and 2012 the share of those from third countries among all self-employed in Germany increased continuously from 5.7% to 9.6% From 2005 to 2012, the number of newly self-employed immigrants from third countries grew from 732 to 1,358, respectively. Almost 50% of them were engaged in the "trading and hospitality" sector (BAMF, Ausländerzentralregister, 2015). An important implication for the German labor market is that the development of entrepreneurial activities among immigrants has contributed significantly to employment creation for low-skilled persons. In 2012, 125 Chinese migrants registered themselves as self-employed. In that year, Chinese ranked second place among self-employed third country nationals in Germany, after US Americans (BAMF 2015). However, when freelancers [8] are disregarded, another picture emerges. While the overwhelming share of self-employed US Americans – as well as a majority of the self-employed from other third countries – work as freelancers, this applies to only a minor share of the Chinese (Table 1). In 2013, 138 Chinese registered as self-employed non-freelancers (i.e. business people engaged in production, trade or the provision of low-skilled services), and thus constituted the majority of all non-freelancer self-employed.

[8] Freelancers are persons who, with their specialized set of higher skills, provide personal services to customers such as consultants, lawyers, or medical doctors.

Table 1: Number of newly self-employed immigrants from third countries in Germany (2005-2012)

Year Nationality	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
USA	174	138	276	360	337	384	512	540	621	62 (9.9)*
China	201	195	214	214	133	85	120	125	152	138 (90.7)
Others	357	309	401	665	554	571	715	693	917	189 (20.6)
Total	732	642	891	1,239	1,024	1,040	1,347	1,358	1690	389 (23.0)

*) Figures in brackets indicate percentage of total
Source: Based on BAMF, Auslaenderzentralregister, 2015

The *catering sector* is frequently the basis of the livelihoods of Overseas Chinese, because setup costs are quite low compared to other investments, like, for example, for manufacturing works, and higher skills are not required to supply tasty food to customers (Van Ziegert, 2006). Chinese restaurants can be found in nearly every German town where they generate employment opportunities for low-skilled and unskilled labor.

According to estimates made by China's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, more than 7,000 Chinese restaurants existed in Germany in 2005, most of them located in big cities, including about 170 in Munich, 500 in Berlin, more than 200 in Hamburg, more than 300 in the Bonn-Cologne area, and more than 300 in Dusseldorf (Yan, 2005). Even after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, the number of Chinese restaurants in the country still increased as many owners of Chinese restaurants in Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and other European countries moved their businesses to Germany where the economic situation remained relatively stable. Anecdotal estimates suggest that in 2012 more than 10,000 Chinese restaurants were operating throughout Germany, mostly as small-scale family businesses (Schwäbisches Tageblatt 2012).

Travel agencies are another type of business commonly run by Overseas Chinese in Germany (Leung et al. 2005). Since China's economic take-off, increasing numbers of Chinese tourists have become interested in visiting other countries, especially in Europe because of its long cultural history and fascinating landscapes.

At the same time, with the expanding of bilateral trade and the intensifying of economic and cultural exchanges between China and Germany, German authorities have gradually made access to tourist visas easier for Chinese who wish to visit Germany. In 2011, the number of Chinese tourists in Germany reached 1.3 million – twice the number that had visited ten years prior (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). Chinese travel agencies in Germany also organize journeys to China and other Asian countries (like Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos) for German clients. The increasing number of tourists in those countries encouraged many self-employed Chinese to fill this gap in Germany's tourism sector.

In Germany's most-circulated Chinese-language newspaper, "Chinese Business Newspaper" (*Chinesische Handelszeitung*), most job advertisements are for the catering sector; job advertisements for travel agencies are the second most common, which indicates their high importance among Chinese communities in Germany (Lin 2005). Numerous self-employed Chinese are engaged in a number of activities outside of the catering and tourism sectors, such as trade, retail, traditional Chinese medicine, hotels, e-business and law consultancy.

In the early 2000s, He (2007)[9] conducted a survey among 103 ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in Germany, asking about their personal background, family situation and business concepts. More than half of his respondents were born before 1950, and about one third has immigrated to Germany before 1990. Just a little bit more than one quarter (26.2%) still had a Chinese passport, while more than half had assumed German nationality, and 6.8% the nationality of some other European country, while the rest were official citizens of some South East Asian country, in particular Vietnam and Malaysia. Overall, they are characterized by a comparatively high level of education. Most of them had arrived in Germany as adults and did not undergo any further education in the country. Almost half had finished secondary school in China; 60% had undergone a professional training in China and 28.2% in Germany. 14.6% and 27.5% had visited an institution of higher education in Germany or China, respectively, whereby economics, law and engineering had been the most common subjects. Prior to entering self-employment in Germany, 72% had worked in restaurants, 7.4% had been unemployed and 4.5% had been factory workers. 82.5% of He's respondents

[9] In the study, He made comparisons between Chinese and Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany.

owned a restaurant, 5% were in other food businesses 8% were in trade, and 2% were running travel agencies. While business people from Zhejiang and Guangdong province had largely clustered in the catering sector, those originating from Southeast Asia were rather running shops and grocery stores. Still, highly-qualified migrants who had arrived in the 1980s and 1990s largely focused on service-oriented businesses like travel agencies, language schools or internet shops. The majority of the entrepreneurs had less than five employees; most of the employees (57.2%) were Chinese nationals or Chinese with German citizenship (19.2%) who had been matched by relatives or friends.

3.3. Policy for self-employment in Germany

Chinese residing in Germany who intend to enter into self-employment have the possibility to make use of public subsidies. Since the 1980s, in an effort to promote new entrepreneurial activities in Germany, the German government has initiated a series of programs to turn unemployment into self-employment. In 1986, the German government introduced the so-called "bridging allowance" (*Überbrückungsgeld*) program for the unemployed, which was targeted at persons threatened by unemployment who were prepared to found their own business[10]. In 2000, the Federal Ministry of Labor spent around 750 million Euros on that same program to provide lump sum payments to financially support the initial six months of self-employment. In 2003, the government introduced another new program known as the "start-up subsidy" (*Existenzgründungszuschuss*) which similarly supported the establishment of new businesses by unemployed persons. In 2005, funding for this program reached 3.2 billion Euros (Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008). Unemployed individuals could choose between this "start-up subsidy" program and the older "bridging allowance" program. The two programs differed mainly in the amount and duration of the subsidy. The "bridging allowance" paid recipients the same amount they would have received as unemployment benefits plus a lump sum to cover their social security contributions for six months. On the other hand, the "start-up subsidy" offered three years of support, paying a lump sum of 600 Euros per month in the first year, 360 Euros per month the second year, and 240 Euros per month the third year.

[10] The legal basis is §57 SGB (Sozialgesetzbuch) III.

In 2007 the two programs were merged into one named the "start-up allowance" (*Gründungszuschuss)*[11]. Under this program, in addition to monthly unemployment compensation, the beneficiary receives a lump sum payment of 300 € per month in a first phase that lasts six months; a second phase is granted for an additional six months provided the business is running successfully. With the reform two regulations were changed: the first phase was changed from nine to just six months; and secondly, the unemployed no longer had an undeniable legal claim to the subsidy but rather their applications were subject to the approval of a placement officer. Although several studies have shown that the previous support programs were successful (Caliendo and Künn, 2011), the German government decided to reduce the overall budget of the "start-up allowance" program from the very beginning. In 2013, it lowered the available funds from 1.8 billion – which had been the estimated expenditures for 2011 – to just 470 million Euros (Fritsch, et al. 2012).

With the support of these programs, the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) funded 37,000 business start-ups by formerly unemployed individuals in 1994. In 2004, when two support programs were available, the number had increased to more than 250,000, accounting for nearly half of all newly registered self-employed in Germany. The reform that merged those two programs in 2007 has led to a drastic decline in the number of supported start-ups (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2014, based on calculations by IfM, 2014). The number of unemployed making use of these programs was 125,923 in 2007, 119,325 in 2008, 137,108 in 2009 and 146,512 in 2010; this number dropped to 20,321 in 2012 and slightly increased to 32,531 in 2013 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2014). After the reform, 22% of the formerly unemployed who set up a business made use of the subsidy while prior to the reform it had been 62%.

The success rate of the businesses has been comparatively high. For example, Strobl (2010) surveyed 358 subsidized founders of new businesses that started in 2004 and found that more than 85% were still in operation in 2007 (Strobl 2010).

However, the amount of windfall gains accruing to the newly founded enterprises actually increased after the reforms, contrary to the government's intentions. : 57% of the sponsored declared that they would also have become self-employed without

[11] The legal basis is §93f SGB III.

the grant compared to 47% who said so before the reform. 22% even indicated that they had only become registered as “unemployed” in order to qualify for the grant (Evers and Schleinkofer 2015).

4 Methodology

Through the use of semi-structured interviews and participant observations conducted in 2014, we investigated how self-employed Chinese run their businesses in Germany. For that purpose, we selected 20 interviewees in different German cities through convenience sampling, a methodology we applied due to time restrictions, feasibility, and a lack of information about the basic population. Eight of the respondents were settled in Düsseldorf, three in Essen, three in Frankfurt, and two in Neuss. The remaining four were in Kassel, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Göttingen; a number of different regions of the country were thus covered. We conducted most of the interviews in Düsseldorf because the city is home to the largest group of Chinese businesspeople in Germany. Although we have attempted to extract a typical profile of self-employed Chinese in Germany, the sample size is not adequate to guarantee representativeness. For example, the self-employed in small-sized towns have not been sufficiently represented.

The interviews consisted of three parts. The first part sought to understand the respondents’ personal characteristics. The second part focused on how they run their businesses, and also sought to understand how and why they became self-employed. A final part sought to understand their future plans and perceptions regarding life in Germany. Afterwards, we performed a descriptive analysis and further processed the data using the statistical software package STATA.

Among other practical difficulties encountered, the target group exhibited a particular sensitiveness to being approached for information, which posed a barrier to acquiring information about their businesses. Many Chinese who are running a commercial enterprise have their own specific advantage in the market which secures their position in addition to their own business secrets which they are not willing to disclose. They are usually reluctant to unveil such kinds of information for fear that other Chinese may copy their ideas and strategies which could threaten the survival of their own business.

5 Survey results

5.1 Quantitative results: descriptive analysis

Table 2 summarizes the personal and business characteristics of our respondents.

Personal characteristics

55% of the respondents were males; their ages ranged from 27 to 52 years, with an average of 37 years; 90% were married and had one child on average; 50% possessed German nationality, which was often due to marriage to a German spouse, while the rest held permanent residence permits in Germany.

On average, our respondents had stayed in Germany for 11 years, with a minimum of three years and a maximum of 20 years, at the time of the interviews.

Table 2: Personal and business characteristics of self-employed Chinese

Variable	Mean	Min	Max
Age (years)	36.9	27	52
Children per couple	1.05	0	3
Stay in Germany (years)	11.55	3	20
Annual income (Euro)	41,500	15,000	60,000
Number of employees	3.35	0	18
Age of business (months)	52.1	10	186
Weekly work hours	40.75	30	50
	Indicator	**F**	**%**
Gender	Male	11	55
	Female	9	45
Family status	Married	18	90
	Single	1	5
	Divorced	1	5
Nationality	German	10	50
	Chinese	10	50
Education	High school	9	45
	Bachelor	4	20
	Master	7	35
Sector	Catering	4	20
	Travel agency	3	15
	Cultural events	1	5
	Massage therapy	2	10
	Amway agent	1	5
	Asian supermarket	1	5
	IT services	1	5
	Trade-coins	2	10
	Trade-machinery	2	10
	Trade-clothing	2	10
	Trade-kitchenware	1	5
Business partner?	Yes	7	35
	No	13	65
Working on holidays?	No	1	5
	Seldom	0	0
	Often	7	35
	Very often	12	60

Source: Authors' survey 2014

Kind of business and revenues

35% of the respondents were working in the trade sector (particularly in clothing, machinery, coins, or kitchenware), 20% in the catering sector, 15% in travel agencies, and 10% in Chinese massage and beauty salons. The others ran an Asian supermarket, provided IT service, organized cultural events and cultural exchange, and worked as an Amway agent[12]. 35% of the respondents, especially those from the catering sector, ran their businesses in cooperation with a partner. Our respondents indicated an average pre-tax income of 41,500 Euro p.a., with a maximum of 60,000 Euro (which was for an entrepreneur in the catering sector) and a minimum of 15,000 Euro (which was for an IT business owner). Businesses owned by the respondents had been running for an average of 52 months, though the maximum was 186 and the minimum was 10 months.

Starting up of businesses and business concepts

45% of our respondents had graduated from a high school in China. Most are engaged in the catering sector and came to Germany with the intention of opening their own business with the support of family. 20% held a bachelor's degree and 35% a master's degree. Those who underwent higher education in Germany had initially moved to Germany to study for an academic degree and not to start a business; these individuals were mostly engaged in the trade sector or in IT services. Their income was generally not as high as for those in the catering sector.

40% of the interviewees had undergone some sort of training to help with starting their business, for which most had received an allowance from the German government during a phase of unemployment. For example, Mr. Hu[13] received free training in catering management after he lost his job with a computer company. Mrs. Lijun received massage therapy training before opening her therapy center. Mrs. Qian became an Amway agent after receiving training from Amway Company.

Those who came to Germany in the 1990s set up their businesses in a variety of sectors with the help of governmental "bridging allowances" and "start-up

[12] Amway (exactly: *Amway Global*) is a network of marketing companies (a special form of direct sales and distribution).
[13] The names of the respondents have been changed in order to secure their identities.

subsidies." The newcomers, in contrast, were not so lucky; instead, they were most often supported by their families.

Employment creation

Most of the respondents had no employees since their financial status could not support hiring. Respondents in the catering sector had created the most employment. The highest incident of employment creation was a 10-year-old Chinese restaurant that employed 18 workers. 60% of the respondents reported that they very often work on holidays, weekends, and nights because their services need to be continuously available in order to maximize profits. For example, Chinese restaurants are usually open from 10:00 am to 11:00 pm, but also on Saturdays and holidays. The Chinese massage center was open from 9:00 am to 9:00 pm, from Monday through Saturday.

Business networks

60% responded that their social networks consist mainly of Chinese because their business partners are Chinese and they are more integrated into Chinese communities. For example, most customers and suppliers of the Asian supermarket were Chinese. The travel agency catered to Chinese travelers, both within Europe and in China; their business advantage was their ability to supply Chinese language guides for Chinese coming to Europe and the assistance they could provide to tourists in terms of applying for visas. Seven interviewees reported that their social networks were composed of an even mix of Chinese and Germans. However, it is the self-employed who are engaged in the trade sector that most frequently connect German and Chinese partners who may be their suppliers, distributors, or clients. They reported that through their work, they make many German friends. Only one interviewee responded that the majority of her social connections were with Germans. She had come to Germany because of her German husband and had been integrated into his social network. At the beginning she could not find employment due to her weak German language skills, but after some language training she founded a Chinese health center that provides

Chinese massages and other traditional Chinese therapies. Most of her customers are German.

60% of the interviewees have joined Chinese business associations as they find it to be helpful for the development of their businesses. Most of the owners of Chinese restaurants were members of the Zhejiang Chinese Business Association. This organization has helped establish connections between Zhejiang Chinese all over Europe and helps owners find suitable employees and business partners. Members may even take care of each other's family members in China. Furthermore, in the textiles trading sector, for example, Chinese businessmen only deal with peers from the textiles business association. Similarly, for the self-employed coin trader it is important to be a member of the coin association since it helps traders exchange information about coin exhibitions and similar events where they can buy and sell valuable pieces.

5.2 Characteristics of ethnic Chinese businesses

Comparative ethnic advantage

Most of the businesses being run by the respondents of our survey link Chinese and German market segments. For example, Mrs. Li and her husband export German and French kitchenware to China. They have signed favorable contracts with kitchenware manufacturers and can thereby offer attractive prices to Chinese customers. Mr. Li is familiar with the Chinese market and his company has introduced advanced German kitchen equipment to China. Mr. Luo and Ms. Liu are from Zhejiang Province, China's manufacturing center for clothing; they purchase their merchandise in Zhejiang at good prices and sell all over Europe.

Most of the respondents benefited from their ethnic advantages to survive in Germany. For example, Mr. Hu specializes in the trade of antiques and Chinese coins and he sells these in both Europe and China. He is also competent in recognizing the value of Chinese artworks, an area in which Germans can hardly compete. Ms. Liu has opened an Asian supermarket where she sells Chinese food and homemade snacks that cannot usually be found in German supermarkets. Most of her customers are Chinese. However, there is also an example of an ethnic disadvantage: Mr. Zhao established a German website that enables customers to

order meals online, but addressing essentially non-Chinese customers in a culturally different environment, his business has struggled to survive and will probably have to close.

Reasons for starting one's own business

55% of the interviewees started their own business because they were unemployed. Since they were disadvantaged in the national language, in their knowledge of social norms and in terms of membership in networks in Germany - they had limited job opportunities and difficulties competing with Germans and other Europeans. For example, Mr. Hu, a 52-year-old man who trades coins, came to Germany 25 years ago and first worked for a Chinese government agency as a financial accountant for moderate pay. He migrated to Germany after the 1989 "Tiananmen incident", after which the German government issued a large number of permanent residence permits to Chinese. Worried about the unstable social situation in China, Mr. Hu decided to stay in Germany and started to work in logistics for a Taiwanese computer company. After ten years, however, the company went bankrupt and he lost his job. With the support of the German government, Mr. Hu received training in catering management. Since he was not able to find regular employment, he opened a small Chinese food stand that catered for parties and events. However, his business struggled and finally, after a divorced from his wife, he once again became unemployed. In 2004, he found a business opportunity as coin trader and became self-employed again. Still, until the time of the interview, the business was not very profitable but has saved him from unemployment.

Two women in our sample established Chinese massage centers because they could not find other employment and because Chinese massage can be relatively easy for Chinese to learn. The owners of Chinese restaurants similarly hinted at a lack of employment options, stating that, aside from running a Chinese restaurant, they do not know what else they could do to make a living in Germany.

30% of the respondents started their business because of a personal interest in a specific discipline. For example, Mr. Li, a 48-year-old man from Hunan Province, had worked for 20 years in a trading company, during which he accumulated many business experiences in international trade. After he and his friend contemplated

the market implications of China's entry into a period of rapid modernization that would seemingly result in increasing demands for advanced technologies and machinery - they decided to establish a small trading company in Düsseldorf in 2010. Their market-oriented strategy enabled them to export hundreds of German-made agricultural and industrial machines each year to China. Mrs. Qian had run a Chinese massage center in Düsseldorf, but it kept her too far away from her family, so she decided to become a saleswoman for Amway products. She expressed that entering into direct sales is her long-term career goal.

Copying the business concept of their parents as a basis for an own enterprise was yet another important reason for starting one's own business, a situation that was true for 15% of our respondents, particularly the Chinese restaurant operators and clothing traders. These respondents had started supporting their family's business at a young age and had forfeited a higher education. Later on, with the help of their families, they started their own business which often mimicked the one run by their family. Ms. Jiang, a 27-year-old single woman, opened a big Chinese restaurant in Frankfurt with the financial support of her family and the help of other relatives. Ms. Liu opened an Asian supermarket upon getting married which is a branch shop of her husband's family business.

Business rules

Since ethnic entrepreneurs mostly develop their businesses by using their ethnic advantage, they usually adhere to certain business rules to avoid stiff competition from their compatriots. An example is the 1.5 square kilometer campus of the Chinese Clothing Wholesale Center in Neuss where more than 40 Chinese companies are situated. The owners of these companies have organized a business union which excludes non-members from access to the center. Most of them purchase products in China and distribute them to retailers in Europe - mainly in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and some Eastern European countries. Each company specializes in a narrow set of products such as garments with a special design or distinctive accessories. To avoid copy competition from Chinese compatriots, they usually do not allow other Chinese to enter their shops. Discouragement of competition is seen in other sectors as well. For example, if a Chinese entrepreneur opens a new Chinese barbecue restaurant in Düsseldorf, he

or she would publish a statement in the local Chinese newspaper that warns other Chinese not to open the same kind of business in the area.

The owner's place of origin is an important determinant of the kind of business he or she engages in as well as for its development. Five of our respondents were from Zhejiang Province, three from Shandong Province, three from Jiangsu Province, two from Hubei, and the remaining seven individuals were from Guangdong, Sichuan, Fujian, Yinchuan, Beijing, Shanghai, and Hunan. In our investigation we found that the catering sector and the clothing trade in Düsseldorf are dominated by Zhejiang Chinese, especially by persons from Wenzhou who have created a unique business union that excludes persons who are not from there. Our survey participant, Ms. Mao, was one of its members. According to her, there are around 4,000 Zhejiang Chinese in Germany, most of whom are engaged in catering, trade, and the housing industry. They all come from the same region, and there is a high degree of kinship among them. They have their own social networks, which enables them to support each other financially and in aspects of everyday life.

5.3 Future plans of self-employed Chinese in Germany

60% of our respondents expressed that they would like to stay in Germany forever; nearly 90% of those who answered in this way were women. 25% - all of them men - wanted to return to China within 10 years. 15% were still not sure about their future plans.

What factors make it attractive for Chinese to stay in Germany? The outcome of the discussions with the respondents suggests that the most important aspect is the excellent social security system, especially in terms of family allowances and health insurance. Compared to China, Germany's social security system provides more favorable unemployment benefits, tax regulations for low-income families, childcare allowances, health and accident insurance, and pensions, among other benefits. Child education constitutes the next most attractive factor. While education in China means fierce competition at school and high costs, schooling in Germany is much more relaxed, flexible, and application-oriented, and also less costly. Hence, most Chinese parents would like to stay in Germany to give their children the

advantage of a German education. Furthermore, self-employed Chinese appreciate the favorable business environment in Germany. Due to superior administrative mechanisms, corruption is much less of a problem in Germany, which helps to facilitate the starting up of businesses. In particular, the respondents considered the German government's programs to support jobless persons to shift to self-employment via start-up allowances to be highly attractive as these have helped many Chinese to escape unemployment. In addition, there are a number of conditions appreciated as favorable by self-employed Chinese which encourage them to stay in Germany, such as a healthy natural environment and a good quality of life, greater political freedom, international mobility, and uncomplicated personal relations.

On the other hand, which aspects make self-employed Chinese want to leave Germany? First, there are traditional Chinese culture and value systems which are embedded in all ethnically Chinese persons. In this context, the most important motivation to return is to take care of one's aging parents back in China. Feeling excluded from the host society is another important factor. Most self-employed Chinese stated that they could not be fully integrated into the German culture and social order due to poor German language skills and insufficient knowledge of the local laws and habits. All reported that they have encountered some problems while running their business. Major difficulties had arisen with their relations with the Foreign Affairs Office (*Ausländeramt*), the tax department (*Steuerbehörde*), and the administration for industry and commerce (*Industrie- und Handelskammer*). Although their lifestyle has changed considerably in Germany, they are still are more accustomed to Chinese food, values, and ethnic communities. The success of their businesses also depends decisively on their ethnic comparative advantage. Many European countries have still not escaped from the unfavorable economic situation which resulted from the global financial crisis that began in 2007. Under these conditions, Germany - as Europe's "economic engine" - is facing considerable economic challenges, while the progressive investment environment and new preferential policies in China are attracting Overseas Chinese to return. Especially those self-employed Chinese whose businesses have not run smoothly in Germany are expecting a better future if they resettle in China.

6 Conclusions and recommendations

Our research has provided us with new and deeper insights into the business concepts and characteristics of self-employed Chinese in Germany. We have learned that many of them are disadvantaged in the national language and are poorly integrated into the host society. Usually due to a limited number of job options, they started their own businesses in order to escape from unemployment. Their businesses largely rely on their ethnic comparative advantages with which Germans cannot effectively compete. Although they have contributed to a strengthening of Sino-German economic relations and, to some extent, a reduction of the unemployment rate in Germany, their potential in this respect is limited due to their generally low profit margins. They are struggling against stiff competition and constantly seek opportunities to further develop their businesses.

Self-employed Chinese possess culturally-determined characteristics which help them to benefit from their ethnic comparative advantage, such as a dedication to hard work, a willingness to work in the evenings and on holidays, and membership in a strong ethnic community. In particular, Zhejiang Chinese as a specific sub-group are more prepared to take risks and better oriented towards self-employment. Most of them are more attracted to doing business and to making money instead of pursuing a university degree. Normally, their childhood is spent gaining experience in the operations of a small commercial enterprise, and they are later encouraged and supported by their families to start their own. In the own words of one of them: “They have the natural blood for doing business from their birth.” From their viewpoint, cultural assets are more helpful to the running of a successful business than a high level of education.

Based on the above findings, we can see that the disadvantage theory can largely explain why some Chinese start their own businesses. However, it does not explain all cases. Notably, the catering and clothing sectors are dominated by Wenzhou Chinese, a fact which rather supports the cultural theory. Through the accumulated experiences of several generations, this group exhibits deeply rooted social networks in Germany by which they have established an ethnic community that excludes other Chinese groups. Through strong group adherence, acceptance of risk, dedication to hard work, and orientation towards self-employment, the Wenzhou have expanded their business web throughout Germany and have even

pushed other Chinese groups out of the market. In addition to their ethnic comparative advantage, they possess particular strengths in financial cooperation and business expansion through partnerships.

The German government tends to view high levels of self-employment as a positive indicator of entrepreneurial activity, but it also needs to pay attention to the quality of self-employment. Supporting self-employment among ethnic minorities can reduce overall unemployment pressure and create new job opportunities for others. Although our survey only covered a small part of the Chinese self-employed, it can also be used to understand the situation of other immigrant groups in the country.

Based on our findings, we can propose policies to support self-employed ethnic immigrants in Germany. Firstly, the government start-up allowance programs for unemployed persons are indeed helpful for those who wish to turn to self-employment. However, self-employed Chinese struggle to survive, especially in the first years after the establishment of their businesses due to fierce market competition. Stronger support is needed in the first years to help them sustain their enterprises, for example, through additional credit programs, vocational training opportunities, policy-oriented consultancy and the provision of consultancy services.

Secondly, since the Chinese business community is divided into different clusters, different employment targets should be created for specific groups. While most self-employed Chinese are working in sectors with relatively low-skill requirements, they are under-represented in higher-skill occupations; particularly those with a higher education do not demonstrate much success in their businesses. Apparently they cannot make appropriate use of their education and skills, leading many of them to eventually turn to low-skilled sectors which can be considered a waste of their human capital. Although the issue may be related to the fact that there is an over-supply of certain qualification categories on the German labor market, the government could still offer more support to those who are prepared to start their own business in a highly-skilled sector. Such businesses may be useful for the German economy and would be likely to open up more job opportunities for highly-educated people.

Thirdly, social networks have turned out to be an essential ingredient for the success of the businesses of self-employed Chinese. Most Chinese business

associations in Germany were set up spontaneously by Chinese business people themselves. These associations would benefit if the German government offered them administrative and perhaps also financial support; these associations fulfill important services which are in the public interest. There exist numerous Chinese associations of different scales in the country, all of which have considerably helped their members with respect to social integration and problem-solving. The German government could learn from their extensive experiences and thereby encourage and support other ethnic minority groups to develop similar associations.

Finally, a lack of competences in the national language and a limited cultural integration are decisive barriers to the success of most self-employed Chinese. These appear to be the most difficult obstacles to most immigrants, restricting them to a limited spectrum of job choices and limiting the potential success of their enterprises. We recommend that self-employed migrants be offered training in German business language, relevant legal matters, and cultural issues; such trainings would also be helpful to reinforce business connections between the German and Chinese economies. In addition, since family is an important determinant for the future plans of self-employed Chinese, comprehensive integration programs that support their businesses, families, and the second generation would likely help many self-employed ethnic minorities to get a firm economic foothold in Germany. In order to establish more solidly-based recommendations, further research should cover more regions in Germany and should collect more representative samples.

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Unbreakable "Glass Ceiling"?

Investigating the Living Situation of First Generation Overseas Chinese in Denmark

Jing Zhao and Yuan Li

1 Introduction

The number of Chinese residing abroad has increased rapidly since the economic opening of China in 1978. Many Chinese –especially from China's coastal areas like Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong Provinces –have left their hometowns for Europe, America and other destinations. There are a number of reasons as to why people move abroad: to find better jobs, to avoid natural disasters, to join family members residing abroad or simply to pursue new experiences. This emigration out of China has not come without broad consequences for the societies of origin, the societies of destination and the migrants themselves. It is certain that in the future global economic development will further encourage the movement of Chinese seeking economic, social and cultural opportunities in new places. In this study, we aim to investigate the living conditions of the first generation of Overseas Chinese thirty years after the first wave of emigration as a means to understand the challenges they have faced which have prevented them from successfully integrating into the host society.

Sociological studies often emphasize the well-known "glass ceiling" phenomenon, which describes the factors that prevent a person from achieving his/her career goals due to gender differences or ethnic discrimination. The research presented in this paper deals with the Diaspora situation of the Chinese in Denmark, concentrating on their daily activities. We conducted ten narrative interviews with Chinese migrants in Denmark, and we will present three of the most representative biographies of interviewees which were chosen so as to demonstrate the core elements of "glass ceiling" outcomes.

One's living situation is comprised of a complex spectrum of various aspects. Many important questions can be raised regarding how migrants navigate between two (and sometimes more) cultural realities in the various domains of their lives, including family roles and responsibilities, parenting, work, work ethic, and relationships with authorities. These questions are especially pertinent for those in their 50s and 60s who are planning to go back to China, or "back to the roots," as it is often said. Regarding their children, the second generation Chinese immigrants, it is interesting to know their point of view towards their parents and towards China, and whether they really understand their parents' way of thinking and behavior. Based on these questions we conducted a survey in Denmark in January 2012 among overseas Chinese in order to derive relevant answers from their transnational biographies. Our fieldwork sought to find out if there is really such a "glass ceiling" above Chinese immigrants in Denmark, and to reveal whether, should it exist, it is breakable.

Based on the biographies shown in previous research, this article regards Danish and Chinese language proficiency as the critical study point, and tries to investigate the problems associated with language learning, including the circumstances for learning the new language and attitudes towards acquisition of proficiency in the Danish language. Processes for the acquisition of a new language were analyzed prior to raising questions about the following: individual strategies for coping with cultural and language differences; the significance of retaining one's language of origin; the circumstances under which cultural boundaries are actively maintained or indeed transformed; and how language affects migrants' ability to negotiate multiple identities and form hybrid or transnational identities.

2 State of research

The term "glass ceiling" originated in the 1980s in Western sociological studies. It means that women and non-WASPs (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) were constrained in terms of employment opportunities and promotion due to general prejudices based on gender and nationality (Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia & Vanneman 2001: 655). According to those studies, this "ceiling" prevented them from achieving their goals and developing their careers. These experiences have become an issue among Chinese immigrants in Denmark, especially the first

generation. From our investigations, we made the following general observation: regardless of how old they were, how well they spoke Danish, or how many relatives they had in Denmark –all had been unable to fully realize their life and career goals in the host country. Further, and in a broader sense, their livelihoods contrasted significantly with those of native Danes.

To date, most research on the “glass ceiling” has focused on mechanisms of exclusion and selection as the dynamics through which organizational culture forms a barrier for women’s careers. It has been argued that women are silenced and banned from the dominant male culture by selection processes that are biased against females. In most of the literature, the concept of the “glass ceiling” has just been used to describe difficult situations women have to face in their career; further explanations or relevant factors which lead to this phenomenon have not been presented. Indeed, there is considerable empirical evidence that exclusion mechanisms - such as gender schemes, gender stereotypes, or prejudiced attitudes - play an essential role and influence judgments and evaluations of women unfavorably (Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Kanter, 1977; Lyness & Thompson, 1997; Morrison & Von Glinow, 1990; Valian, 1998). However, women are not mere victims of the dominant culture. In addition to being actively opposed and discriminated against by the dominant culture, women are also agents of their own careers. They have their own motives, desires and preferences to work in a particular culture, and they therefore feel more or less attracted towards specific organizational principles.

In the area of migration studies, in contrast, research about the “glass ceiling” phenomenon is nearly nonexistent, although there is a need to explain how ethnic minorities can better their living and working conditions within a dominant culture. In the same way, in which migrants are agents of their own life and career, they may simultaneously be opposed or discriminated against.

Studies focusing on Overseas Chinese in Denmark are a relatively new, hardly worked field of research. A glance at the literature shows that in the scientific debate this subject has received scant attention - both in Denmark and in China. There are numerous monographs, articles and websites covering overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (Wang 2001; Huang 2005; Ju 2006; Li 2007; Liu 2010), in Canada (Wang & Liang 2003), in some European countries such as Great Britain,

Italy, and France (Li 1995; Wang 2001a; Zhang 2002; Fu 2006) and in the USA (Cheng 2000; Wu 2002; Zhao 2003; Zeng 2005). However, Overseas Chinese in Denmark are addressed in only a few articles, showing that research on the living situation of Chinese residing in Denmark is still in its infancy. Since the related literature is sparse, we frequently resorted to English literature and newspaper articles so as to exploit secondary sources.

The current trends of migration research increasingly lead to new preferred terms, such as the oft-used words“transmigration”, “transnationalism” and “diaspora”. This alludes to the dynamic nature of transnational migration (Bauböck 2000; Dimock 2006; D’Amato 2009; Schönwälder 2009; Hanrath 2012). It is further necessary to emphasize migrants’ strong connection to China. Overseas Chinese should not be regarded as a homogeneous group; rather, differences due to social, regional and ethnic origin, political leanings, legal status in the host country and purpose of stay have to be taken into account.

3 Methodology

In this study, we applied a qualitative methodology to address the aforementioned issues through a combination of biographical and semi-structured interviews comprised of several open-ended questions constructed prior to the interviews. Participant observation was chosen as a complementary action, so that both “an inside perspective” and “an outside perspective” were taken into consideration. The framework was put together after a thorough literature review. To obtain a wide range of information from the participants, questions about their migration and family background were included, as well as questions about their language, competencies, their activities in Denmark and in China, and their feelings regarding identity.

To investigate the barriers that Chinese migrants encounter in Denmark in their living and working environments we employed semi-structured interviews. Ten participants recruited from Chinese communities in Copenhagen were interviewed. The interviews were conducted mainly in Mandarin Chinese. However, two interviewees spoke only a Chinese dialect, necessitating the researchers to request bilingual members of their community to participate in the conversation as

interpreters. To reflect the diversity of the Chinese community in Copenhagen, people from different working areas were selected; these included a cook, a teacher, a restauration worker, a restaurant owner, a translator and a travel agency owner, among others. To be selected, participants had to a) have been living in Copenhagen; b) have a Chinese background by having being born in China and still maintaining Chinese cultures, beliefs and practices; and c) have work experience in Denmark, or in both China and Denmark. The study employed a thematic or grounded analysis approach in which data was coded and categorized as the researcher came to recognize emerging patterns. The theoretical background was developed throughout the research process as data interpretation took place and that interpretation was compared with new data collected (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In the transcripts, particularities of the respondents' views were highlighted, categorized and organized according to the focus of this study, which then enabled the interpretation of the collected information.

4 Main findings

In this section, three of the biographies of our interviewees are presented in order to provide an overview of the living situation of Overseas Chinese in Copenhagen. Several transcript excerpts are cited for further interpretation. We present direct quotations so that bias by the researchers could be reduced to a minimum.

4.1 "Glass ceiling" component language barrier

Interviewee I: Mr. A

Mr. A is in his middle 40s. He spent five years, from 1997 to 2002, in Denmark, where he worked both as a cook in a restaurant and as a restauration worker. He speaks very little Danish.

"My family is in Shanghai. I had some problems with my company at that time, so I made up my mind to come to Denmark since my brother runs a small fast food restaurant in Copenhagen...I feel there areno big differences for me between working in China and working Denmark."

Mr. A explained the reason why he migrated in 1997 and why he chose Denmark as his destination. This chain migration or family-based migration has been popular among Chinese migrants. Mr. A lived in Copenhagen for five years without Danish language competences[1]. *"On the one hand, it's too difficult for me to learn a foreign language; I only finished my primary school in China, I don't like schools, books etcetera. On the other hand it was not necessary for my work at the beginning...All I wanted to do was to make money and I prefer to use the time to cook more dishes rather than learn a language."* Learning the official or majority language of a country is often a social, economic, and civic necessity for an immigrant or potential citizen. Language skills are a crucial ingredient for successful economic advancement and social interaction. Most migrant integration theories hold the view that knowledge of the majority language is key to civic participation in the political process and thus a vital part of being a citizen (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008:169). This emphasis on proficiency in the host country's language is so pervasive in the discussion of immigration and assimilation that language acquisition is often considered a means to promote the integration of immigrant groups. *"I wanted to be a Dane in those years and tried my best to learn a couple of words of Danish. But still I failed. It's too difficult to get my tongue used to a new language. Although there are courses offered especially for people like me, I still can't persuade myself to concentrate on learning Danish. After several months, I saw that I was making no progress so I decided,'Okay, I give up!'"* Language acquisition is much more difficult for individuals like Mr. A as they become older.

The research findings of the economists Chiswick, Lee and Miller demonstrate that an immigrant's proficiency in the destination language is correlated with the person's age. Proficiency falls by nearly one percent for every year the individual is older than a critical age (Chiswick, Lee & Miller 2006: 441). The level of educational attainment shows even stronger implications for language acquisition. Even if an individual has little or no knowledge of the destination language upon arrival, literacy in his/her native language correlates positively with the speed of learning and the level of proficiency in the dominant destination language. In addition to the effects of age and education, a further practical observation pertaining to language learning is a regional or racial bias related to the linguistic distance of an

[1] At the time of the interview, Mr. A was mainly living in China.

immigrant's native language to the destination country's official language. Simply put, it is easier for an individual to learn a language that is more similar to the one(s) he or she already speaks. For example, a native German speaker will have an advantage over a native Chinese speaker in learning English, given the relative similarity between German and English as compared to Chinese and English (Chiswick, Lee & Miller 2004: 615). With these observations in mind - and without explicitly stating preferences for certain types of immigrants - countries can use language policies as tools to increase the chance that accepted immigrants will be young, educated, and socially/culturally similar to native residents.

For Mr. A, the foremost barrier to living in Denmark was his lack of proficiency in the Danish language. He made every effort to learn the language in order to acquire Danish citizenship, but failed. His lack of proficiency in Danish was perhaps the sole requirement that he did not fulfill. Without this, he did not comply with the Danish immigration regulations. It is a common phenomenon among older Chinese immigrants in Denmark in similar circumstances that all requirements are fulfilled except for the language competence. This shortcoming renders a "glass ceiling" above their heads which brings about various difficulties in their daily life and in their working environment.

Almost half of our interviewees expressed a willingness to return to China after having worked in Denmark for several years, for which all had faced problems with the Danish language. Without being able to communicate effectively in Danish society, these immigrants have access to only a limited amount of information and often experience feelings of helplessness and exclusion.

4.2 “Glass ceiling” component cultural barrier

Interviewee II: Mr. B

Mr. B is in his late 40s. He has been living in Copenhagen since 1979 and owns a Chinese restaurant there. He speaks fluent Danish and Chinese.

Talking about his own identity, Mr. B exhibits a sense of pride: *“We are Chinese here in Denmark; we should try to spread our culture to others, and Danish people are interested in Chinese culture to some degree, hmm, I think. Eating is the most important part of our everyday life, so running a restaurant is a direct way to get into contact with Danish people and make it possible for them to learn something about China and Chinese people... Many guests are satisfied with our dishes.”*

During the survey we noticed the Chinese decorations in Mr. B’s restaurant and the clothes of his waitress which were all of a traditional Chinese style. Mr. B is also the chairman of a Chinese association in Denmark. He and his family pay a lot of attention to Chinese festivals and traditional customs. *“I’ve organized several Spring Festival galas in recent years, and our performances have attracted lots of people every time, haha. I myself also participated in Tai-chi…ehmm…Chinese opera etc. I really enjoyed myself.”* Mr. B had already been granted Danish citizenship and speaks fluent Danish. *“For me, it’s very important to learn Danish here, and it’s not so hard to learn Danish. If you live here, you have to communicate with your neighbors...I want to tell my guests something about China…even, I want to introduce a typical dish to them, how would I do this if I couldn't speak a single Danish word.”*

Strict language-learning policies favor younger immigrants, especially those exposed to the dominant language before puberty - the “critical period” after which language acquisition is considered to come with less ease. Mr. B profited from his immigration to Denmark at the early age of 13 years. He learned the language quickly and speaks it almost as fluently as his mother tongue.

Living in a new country is never easy for migrants since they have to face a new environment with a new culture and quite often a foreign language completely different from their own. As Schott and Henley (1996) stated: “For many, life outside the security of the home becomes a series of exhausting compromises and adjustments, many of them touching people’s deepest feelings and undermining

their confidence. The personal and social skills that worked in their own culture may no longer be effective. And it can be hard for them to understand those that are effective in the new culture and harder still to adopt them."(Schott & Henley 1993: 23). The dynamic paradigm of transnationalism views migration as "a proliferation of patterns of recurring, circulatory and onward migration" (Castles 2007: 353).

Mr. B involves himself in the expat Chinese community in Copenhagen by organizing and participating in many activities. He regards this connection to China and Chinese culture as indispensable. Such connections to manifestations of the native culture allows for a continuation of social, economic and cultural linkages between migrants and their country of origin while living abroad (Basch, Schiller & Szanton-Blanc 1994; Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt 1999; and Vertovec 1999). This understanding is considerably more intricate and more rich than the way in which migratory connections were considered in previous centuries when they were commonly perceived as one-off physical movements and often defined in terms of loss and gain. Mr. B generally feels more comfortable connecting with the local Chinese community than with the Danish community in overall everyday life. "*It's hard to say… Danes are very friendly indeed, but I don't know why, every time you talk to them, you try to make friends with them, it's just…hmm…like kind of strange, you can't get a deeply stable friendship with them. Yeah, that's it.*" Although -from the researchers' perspective - Mr. B's behavior does not seem different from that of a Dane, he admits that there are still some moments in which he struggles to understand the people and the culture of the host society and would rather be a Chinese than a Dane. This seems to be consistent with a statement by Portes who offered that, "common people...have created communities that sit astride political borders and that, in a very real sense, are 'neither here nor there' but in both places simultaneously" (Portes 1997:1077). There is constant interplay between the two places; connections are active, concerning the concrete and the virtual. Thus, culture is 'alive' and so transformation can occur, depending on the context, and as a result cultural identity "belongs to the future as much as to the past" (Hall 1990:225). Mr. B is not the only Chinese immigrant who behaves like a Dane, from the perspective of the researchers.

Yet, through conversations with them, we found evidence of a kind of self-disappointment. Although most of them live good lives in Denmark - running

their own businesses and not having to work too hard to make their livings - they are still not satisfied with their living situation abroad. They desire to become better integrated into the host society, to understand more and to participate in more public activities, including voting in elections. However, their Chinese origin and their general adhesion to a Chinese way of thinking and behaving, is often not conducive to achieving a high level of integration. In this way, cultural barriers can be the most influential component of the “glass ceiling” above their heads.

4.3 “Glass ceiling” component gender socialization

Interviewee III: Ms. C

Ms. C is in her early 50s. She has been living in Copenhagen since the late 1990s. She works as a company secretary in Denmark and speaks fluent Danish, good Mandarin and very good Cantonese.

Hall describes “hybrids” as individuals who do not expect to return “home” since that journey would reveal a place transformed by modernity, and thus unknown to them (Hall 1993: 362). For our third interviewee, Ms. C, it is really difficult for her to recognize a single identity because it switches between Chinese and Danish all the time. *“I’m a Chinese of course, sometimes…hmmm…I don't know, maybe sometimes I’m more like a Dane maybe...but my son, he is absolutely Danish, 100%.”* Speaking about the possibility of returning to China in the future, she straight away dismissed the possibility and proceeded to explain the reason using the example of a previous experience of visiting family members in China. *“I’ve been back to China several times in the last years, but I couldn't imagine a life in China anymore. ... When I was back, my mom called me to have lunch together with her; all we eat are warm things, some are even hot... Oh my god, it kills me...”* She regards language as a way in which migrants can maintain cultural links to their home country - for example, by regularly talking with friends and relatives on the telephone. Acquisition of a new language, however, ensures access to the cultural capital of the host country. Ms. C explained that she employs an open and democratic parenting style regarding the issue of whether her son should or should not learn and speak Chinese. *“My son…well…it’s his own decision whether or not to learn Chinese. I don’t really care about that!”* To Ms. C, learning the destination

language was perceived to be “a key mechanism for ensuring positive integration among migrants and the host society” (CEC: 2005).

During her first years in Denmark, Ms. C experienced firsthand that a low level of proficiency in the state language adversely affected her ability to access social services in the new country. But she also emphasized that language is not the only barrier which prevents migrants from accessing available services and information; the cultural barrier also plays a decisive role. Traditional Chinese culture teaches women to be unassertive and inhibited from childhood. Thus, Chinese women are often reluctant or ashamed to express their needs or inquire about services. In her interview, Ms. C commented on that: *“Because we are Chinese and we don’t speak Danish well, we are very reluctant to ask someone for more information.”*

The rate and degree of cultural adjustment differs across generations, and it is evident that families utilize an adherence to their native language as part of a strategy of positive coping and parenting. In particular, this adherence is used to improve parent-child communication, ensuring harmonious adjustment while at the same time instilling knowledge of, and pride in, the migrants’ heritage (Perreira, Chapman & Stein 2006:1383). But it is clear that the value associated with language retention is not necessarily uniform across generations; younger generations seeking to “fit” into their new environments avoid using their native tongue in public spaces. Hybridity does not come without its cost: asymmetrical relations develop as migrants become creators of culture.

5 Conclusion

The results presented in this article explore the life experiences of Chinese migrants in Copenhagen. This required talking to people, hearing their perspectives, analyzing their stories, and discovering the meaning of their actions through ethnography, participant observations and interviews. Ultimately, the results allow us to address the questions posed in section (1): firstly, there is indeed a “glass ceiling” that impedes the integration potential of the Overseas Chinese community in Denmark; secondly, three core components contribute to this phenomenon: the language barrier, the cultural barrier and the gender socialization barrier.

Language has implications that go beyond spoken communication; it has cultural and emotional implications as well. It is a certainty that today's global economy will continue to promote the migratory movement of individuals seeking better opportunities elsewhere. As the international flow of migrants continues to grow, it becomes crucial that receiving countries are adequately equipped to deal with the needs of increasingly diverse societies. A major challenge to harmonized social diversity could be immigrants' proficiency in the language of the host country. Language barriers imply that there is a lack of knowledge regarding available services in the host country, especially if such services did not exist in the migrants' country of origin. It is common knowledge that a lack of proficiency in the destination language can result in family tensions, downward assimilation (i.e integrating culturally, but not into the mainstream culture), failure to naturalize and restriction to co-ethnic enclaves (Duncan & Waldorf 2009; Portes, Fernández-Kelly & Haller 2009; Tardif-Williams & Fisher 2009), although it is to be acknowledged that monolingual immigrants can manage their way through strong social networks (Iosifides, Lavrentiadou, Petracou & Kontis 2007; Ryan, Sales, Tilki&Siara2009). Also, many migrants who do not speak the state language are multilingual in other languages which might be helpful in their daily life (see for example Valentine, Sporton & Nielsen 2008). Language proficiency is a vital component of any migrant's integration repertoire, facilitating mobility and helping to develop social networks and social capital (Pfeffer& Parra 2009; Ryan, Sales, Tilki & Siara2009a).

Cultural knowledge relates to aspects of private and professional life that require social interaction, such as knowing how to behave in particular social settings, such as at work or school or within the family, with the latter being useful for possible repatriation and for visiting family members who still live at "home" (Valentine Sporton & Nielsen 2008a).

The diversity of the migrants included in this exploratory research was striking and it would be overly simplistic to categorize and generalize our results according to features such as gender, age or nationality. Rather, one must acknowledge the heterogeneity of migrants at the beginning of the 21st century which suggests that integration is composed of countless aspects - differences that are celebrated within new hybrid cultures. Although the final outcome cannot be predicted, it is

obvious that “creating culture” is a work-in-progress, and that social structures and social agents can significantly influence the process.

Processes of integration are unpredictable and cannot be considered as a static continuum. As migrants experience changes in their home as well as in their host country, they develop new cultural attributes that add to and alter their original culture. This research has highlighted language as such an attribute that shifts and evolves over time. The role of individuals is important within these processes of integration. Personal characteristics allow particular agents to view culture both from the inside and outside and, on that basis, to mediate between dominant and marginal groups (cf. Hall & Sakai 1998: 363).

In summary, language barriers, cultural barriers, and the traditional forms of gender socialization are three main components responsible for the slow integration and upward mobility of Overseas Chinese living in Denmark. Chinese migrants are agents of their own life and career advancement, but are simultaneously victims of discrimination and bias. Our research exclusively focused on self-selection in the process of attraction to the host country and the dominant cultures. Future studies should include both selection and self-selection mechanisms in order to be able to compare the roles of these two mechanisms in explaining the persistence of the “glass ceiling” in the lives of immigrant Overseas Chinese in their host country.

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PART III: THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE

Studying Abroad and its Consequences for Chinese Language Classes at Zhejiang University

Eline Joosten

1 Introduction

Globalization, expanding international markets and new technologies in transportation and communication are shaping our world today: economies are becoming more and more interconnected, and citizens increasingly multilingual and mobile. The demand for global competences – e.g. different language and intercultural competences – driven by this development has led to an increasing internationalization of higher education (Spaulding et al. 2001: 190-191).

Within this globalized world, the attention given to China is growing due to the country's opening-up policy started at the late 1970s and its ongoing economic upsurge. As a result, the Mandarin language is attracting a growing number of students (Chen et al. 2010: ix), and international student exchange with China is intensifying, facilitated by curricular flexibility and increased funding opportunities (Yue 2013). Between 1999 and 2013, the number of international students in China increased from 44,711 to 356,499 (Fig. 1). Since 2004, the majority have come from Korea, although the share of Korean students studying in China shows a significantly declining trend (Table 1). Among the groups of international students who are increasing in number are people of Chinese origin living abroad who choose to come to China to study.

Fig. 1: International students in China, 1999-2013



Source: Based on data from Yue (2013) and UNESCO (2014).

Current trends in educational science and language teaching reflect global changes in historical, political and economic factors. In many countries, the rising number of people with an immigrant background and the corresponding needs of this group has led to the adoption of new approaches in intercultural education as well as to increased research on heritage language (HL) learning (Peyton et al. 2001a, He 2010, Fürstenau & Gomolla 2011, Duff & Li 2014). As the learning of foreign languages and the need for global competences become more important, linguistic and cultural diversity within countries of immigration receives higher priority in the public as well as in the private sphere. Complete assimilation into a host country's society - via learning the language, adopting aspects of the dominant culture and participating in formal schooling - is less idealized by economy, politics and educators than it has previously been. The prior approach, however, has led to a language shift among following generations of migrants, demonstrated by the fact that immigrant children are showing rapid decline in their HL skills (He 2008: 1-2). In the early 21st century, destination countries for migrants have come to recognize the value of human capital that migrants bring to their host countries; at the same time countries should be aware that neglecting necessary HL instruction can cause educational hurdles for migrants (Krüger-Potratz 2011: 51).

Table 1: International students in China from top-ten countries sending students in 2013 (percentages in brackets)

	2004	2005**	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Korea*	(39.4)	54,036 (38.3)	64,481 (33.0)	66,806 (29.9)	64,232 (27.1)	62,975 (23.8)	62,442 (21.3)	63,368 (19.3)	63,029 (17.7)
United States	(7.7)	10,299 (7.3)	14,758 (7.5)	19,914 (8.9)	18,650 (7.8)	19,668 (7.4)	23,292 (8.0)	24.625 (7.5%)	25,312 (7.1)
Thailand	(2.1)	3,668 (2.6)	7,306 (3.7)	8,476 (3.8)	11,379 (4.8)	13,177 (5.0)	14,145 (4.8)	16,745 (5.1)	20,106 (5.6)
Japan	(17.2)	18,906 (13.4)	18,640 (9.5)	16,733 (7.5)	15,409 (6.5)	16,808 (6.3)	17,961 (6.1)	21,013 (6.4)	17,226 (4.8)
Russia	(2.1)	3,527 (2.5)	7,261 (3.7)	8,939 (4.0)	10,596 (4.4)	12,481 (4.7)	13,340 (4.6)	15,103 (4.6)	15,918 (4.5)
Indonesia	(3.4)	4,656 (3.3)	6,590 (3.4)	7,084 (3.2)	7,926 (3.3)	9,539 (3.6)	10,957 (3.7)	13,333 (4.0)	13,492 (3.8)
Viet Nam	(4.0)	5,785 (4.1)	9,702 (5.0)	10,396 (4.7)	12,247 (5.1)	13,018 (4.9)	13,549 (4.6)	13,133 (4.0%)	12,799 (3.6)
India	-	3,245 (2.3)	7,190 (3.7)	8,145 (3.6)	8,468 (3.6)	9,014 (3.4)	9,370 (3.2)	10,178 (3.1%)	11,781 (3.3)
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	5,666 (2.5)	6,497 (2.7)	7,874 (83.0)	8,287 (2.8)	9,522 (2.9)	11,165 (3.1)
Pakistan	-	-	4,698 (2.4)	5,199 (2.3)	5,738 (2.4)	7,406 (2.8)	8,516 (2.9)	9,522 (2.9)	10,941 (3.1)

*until 2011: South Korea;
**2006 not available

Note: France, Germany, and Nepal had been in the top 10 prior to 2013.

Source: based on data from the China Scholarship Council (CSC), cit. from Project Atlas (2015)

As a consequence of this development, HL teaching has gained attention in universities and other study programs as a way to support language conservation among migrants and their descendants. In this way, a significant body of knowledge about HL acquisition, maintenance and shifts towards the dominant language has accumulated in Western countries (Peyton et al. 2001; Hopf 2005; Löser, 2011).

This study aims to analyze the links between the aforementioned trends in international education through the use of a case study of Overseas Chinese who come to study at Zhejiang University in China. The study thereby involves a highly diverse group of people from different countries in order to explore the challenges they face in Chinese classrooms.

2 Heritage language learning

2.1 Defining heritage language learning

Foreign language (FL) learning and first language (L1) and second language (L2) acquisition have been widely studied. HL now appears as an additional term within the field of language acquisition though its need has often been questioned. Moreover, different definitions have been assigned to the term HL learning (cf. Valdes 2001; Polinsky & Kagan, 2007; He, 2010).

Narrower definitions reduce HL learners to their language competence. The definition most referred to is that of Valdes (2001), according to whom a HL learner is a "language student who is raised in a home where a non-English language is spoken, who speaks or at least understands the language, and who is to some degree bilingual in that language and in English." (Valdes, 2001: 38) For our study, Valdes' definition is used with the slight adjustment that we extend it beyond English. Since prior research on HL learning has largely focused on the case of the United States, English has been the language of focus in related research, and thus, in Valdes' definition. The participants of this study, however, have grown up in many countries where English is not the dominant language, and hence we apply a more suitable definition.

Broader definitions have been criticized for not sufficiently characterizing learners' linguistic knowledge. According to Polinsky & Kagan (2007), there is a need to differentiate between HL learners, and culturally motivated learners, who did not acquire the HL during childhood but are motivated by their familial past. The latter only differ from typical L2/FL learners with respect to their motivation but not in terms of linguistic competence.

The definition of HL already specifies the crucial differences between HL and L1 acquisition. During childhood, both L1 and HL learners are exposed to their L1 at

home. It is only at the start of formal schooling or kindergarten that these inputs start to differ. While L1 learners extend the learning of their L1 in a formal schooling environment, the HL learners' exposure usually focuses on the host country's language in schooling contexts (including kindergarten) (Xiao 2008: 261).

The advantage of HL learners over late L2/FL learners of the same language is their early exposure to the HL and thus to a (similar) phonetic system, since the HL is often a dialect of – or even the same as – the standard language taught in educational institutions (Polinsky & Kagan, 2007: 378). In addition to native-like pronunciation, HL learners often have acquired a wide range of syntactic structures and an extensive vocabulary. These are, however, only based on oral traditions. In terms of literacy, HL students often have to learn as much as non-HL students, because their language acquisition has been bound to their home environment, which often does not enforce formal rules.

The advantages of HL learners are not restricted to linguistics. Because the language has been learned mainly at home, they also possess a certain familiarity with cultural norms reflected in everyday communication which are necessary for effective language use (Li & Duff, 2008: 23). They also exhibit specific motivations for learning their HL. Influenced by parents, family and the society they live in, their HL learning can be seen as compensating for "insufficient exposure to their language and culture" which – in contrast to L1 learners - prevents them from fulfilling "basic identity and linguistic needs" (He, 2006: 2). Learning a HL usually goes hand in hand with (re)establishing "similarities with members of one's heritage culture or [re-]establishing differences from members of mainstream (American) culture" (He, 2004: 213). Moreover, HL learners often participate in social environments where their language abilities are reviewed and criticized. This is especially observable among Chinese HL students. Due to their visible ethnic traits it is often assumed that they already know the language (Kelleher, 2008: 242).

2.2 Chinese as a heritage language

Aside from sharing similar characteristics with other HLs, Chinese as a heritage language (CHL) has its own specificities, e.g. language diversity in both the spoken and written forms. In this context, Chinese is used as an umbrella term including Mandarin, Cantonese and the many dialects spoken in Greater China as well as overseas (see He & Xiao, 2008). Mandarin, also called Putonghua (普通话) in mainland China, is used as the standard language taught worldwide. It is often mentioned that the Chinese language has over one billion native speakers globally, making it the most widespread language in the world (He, 2006: 3). Although the majority of speakers live in China and other Asian countries, the various Chinese diasporas in countries like Canada, the USA and Australia has furthered its spread. These Chinese communities have mainly been shaped by migrants from the southeastern coastal provinces of Greater China, including Fujian, Guandong, and Hainan. The languages traditionally spoken in these provinces (Cantonese, Hokkien, Hakka) have in this way spread around the world. Whether the language is still maintained or has shifted towards the host country's majority language is determined by its origin, the time of migration, and the extent to which families have assimilated over generations (He, 2006: 3, Wei & Hua, 2010: 155-157).

In addition to different dialects, there are also two different Chinese writing systems: the simplified script, which is officially used in Mainland China and Singapore, and the traditional script, which is mainly used in other Chinese-speaking regions (He, 2006: 3). The simplified script was introduced during China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), and thus, all those who left China prior to this period are familiar with the traditional script, while later migrants had been taught the simplified script. Consequently, He (2006: 3) distinguishes the two main types of CHL learners as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Chinese heritage language learners and the relation of their home dialect to Mandarin

Mandarin is identical to home dialect or comprehensible to home dialect speakers	**Mandarin is unintelligible to home dialect speakers**
classroom script = home script (i.e. Traditional and/or Simplified scripts)	classroom script = home script (i.e., both use Traditional and/or Simplified scripts)
classroom script ≠ home script (i.e., Traditional in class, Simplified at home)	classroom script ≠ home script (i.e., Traditional in class, Simplified at home, or vice versa)
no home literacy in Chinese	no home literacy in Chinese

Source: He, 2006:3

These descriptions illustrate that the home language can differ significantly from the standard form taught in school.

3 Methodology

Our study focuses on eight overseas Chinese students participating in the Chinese Language and Culture Program offered by the International College of Zhejiang University (ZJU) in Hangzhou. All of them came to China for the purpose of learning the Chinese language and acquiring more knowledge about Chinese culture. Their personal characteristics are shown in Table 3. The term overseas Chinese students is used here to refer to students with either Chinese birth or heritage who do not live in Greater China (China including Taiwan and the cities of Hong Kong and Macau) due to migration. The study draws on material derived from a prior research project (Joosten & Käis, 2012).

Table 3: Overview of the interviewees

Participant	Gender	Interview Duration	Migrant Generation	Home Country
AU-M-1	M	00:30:30	third	Australia
FR-M-1	M	00:31:30	second/third*	France
TH-F-1	F	00:51:46	third	Thailand
TH-M-1	M	01:00:28	third	Thailand
TH-F-2	F	00:46:53	third	Thailand
CA-F-1	F	01:15:20	second	Canada
AU-F-1	F	00:54:32	second	Australia
FR-M-2	M	00:29:15	second	France

*) The father's and the mother's family migrated at different times. Within the mother's family, FR-M-1 would be third generation, within the father's family second.

Source: Author's survey

The International College of ZJU is a special teaching and administrative institute responsible for student enrollment and services, as well as for instructing Chinese as a FL/L2 program. Each semester different language classes are organized at elementary, intermediate and advanced levels (see Table 4). Prior to participating in a course, applicants have to take a placement test. Classes are usually composed of 15 to 20 students. Additional elective courses are offered for students to choose from according to their specific interests and Chinese language capacities (Zhejiang University, 2012).

Table 4: Language levels offered at Zhejiang

Level	Focus
Elementary Level (Grade 1-3)	Intensive Reading, Practical Conversation, Listening Comprehension, Extensive Reading, etc.
Intermediate Level (Grade 4-5)	Intensive Reading, Listening and Conversation, Practical Writing, Extensive Reading, etc.
Advanced Level (Grade 6-7)	Intensive Reading, Advanced Comprehensive Chinese, Practical Writing, Extensive Reading, etc.

Source: Based on data from Zhejiang University, 2012.

In our survey we conducted semi-structured interviews. To provide a framework for the conversation, several open-ended questions about the respondents' migratory, familial and educational backgrounds were prepared based on a literature review (e.g. He & Xiao, 2008, Maruyama et al., 2010) with the support of Prof. Dr. Yuan Li, deputy director of the Institute of German Studies at Zhejiang University at the time. The respondents were also encouraged to introduce their own topics during the interview. Not subjected to a time restriction, the interviews lasted between 30 minutes and more than one hour. Most interviews were conducted in English, being the L2 language of only three and a FL for five participants. However, some interviews utilized the help of interviewees' friends, who provided a sense of security and allowed us to overcome the prevailing language barriers by assisting the interviewees with unknown words.

In order to also take into account the teachers' perspective, a semi-structured group interview with two teachers was undertaken. In addition to questions about their personal teaching background, it included inquiries regarding their teaching experiences, specifically with overseas Chinese. The questions were sent to the teachers before the meeting to allow them to prepare because their English was limited. We also analyzed their preparation notes which they were willing to share with us. One teacher had asked a student for help with translations. The personal experience of this student within this specific learning environment was also taken into account.

4 Survey results

4.1 Students' regions of origin

Overseas Chinese participating in the Language and Culture Program of the International College of ZJU come from a variety of backgrounds, as shown in Table 5. Our interviewees belong mainly to the second and third generation of migrants. While the third generation participants came mainly from Asian countries (with AU-M-1 moving to Malaysia before moving to Australia), the second generation participants came from North America and France.

4.2 Language proficiency and generational language shifts

None of the learners were absolute beginners at the time of the interview, all of them were going to classes ranging from level two to six. There are, however, some remarkable differences between them with regard to language background (Table 5) and language proficiency (Table 5).

Table 5: Survey results of interviewees from the Language & Culture Program

Partici-pant	Age	Home Country	Migration Past			Language Use				Language Learning		
			Migr. Generation	Migrated From	Migrated to	Parents' Language	Siblings' Language	Language of friends at home	Friends	ZJU-Level	Mother tongue	Chinese learning background
FR-M-2	21	France	2nd	China, Zhejiang	France	Wenzhounese (mostly), Mandarin, French	French	French and Chinese	half Chinese, half French	n. a.	Wenzhounese, French, Mandarin	extra-curricular weekend (Mandarin) classes
FR-M-1	21	France	2nd/3rd	China, Zhejiang	France	mother: French, father: sometimes Mandarin and sometimes Wenzhounese	French	French	mostly Asian	6	French	summer school in China, parents paid for extra-curricular classes during childhood
CA-F-1	24	Canada	2nd	China, Guangdong	Canada	Taishanese, Cantonese	no siblings	English, some Cantonese in university	many Chinese friends	n. a.	Thaishanese	learned traditional script when she was younger
AU-F-1	21	Australia	2nd	China, Hong Kong	Australia	mother: Cantonesefather: English	French, Cantonese, English mixture	English	100% English	4	Cantonese	extra-curricular Cantonese weekend classes, Mandarin in university
AU-M-1	37	Australia	3rd	China, Fujian/ Guangdong	first Malaysia, then Australia	Cantonese English	English	English	95% English	3	English	Mandarin in school, masters in China Studies at university
TH-F-1	26	Thailand	3rd	China, Guangdong	Thailand	mainly Thai, also some Chaozhouhua	Thai	Thai	mostly Chinese	3	Thai	learned Chinese in high school (a bit), learning Mandarin in university (minor), prior university exchange
TH-M-1	28	Thailand	3rd	China, Guangdong	Thailand	Thai	Thai	Thai/English	n. a.	2	Thai	learning Mandarin at ZJU
TH-F-2	28	Thailand	3rd	China, Guangdong	Thailand	Thai	Thai	Thai	n. a.	2	Thai	has been learning Mandarin for one year

Source: Author's survey

The Thai-Chinese students were third generation migrants, which explains their low level of HL proficiency (cf. Wei & Hua, 2010: 155-157). The main language they use in everyday life is Thai, and they all agreed that Thai was their mother tongue. Although there were some individual differences with regard to language use within the families as well as among friends, the parents and grandparents of all Thai-Chinese participants were still speaking their Chinese dialect or had some competence in Mandarin. All of the respondents admitted to having undergone a language shift in the family. TH-F-2's older siblings can still speak some Chinese while she, being the youngest child of the family, speaks only Thai. TH-F-2 also mentioned an important driver of shifts to the dominant language by Thai-Chinese people:

> [TH-F-2]: You mean (dialect). All my cousins and my family still use (dialect), but my friends don't. Because, you know, in Thailand, like during world war second, the former Prime Minister did not allow people learning Chinese and did not allow people speaking Chinese. So my grandparents, or people who moved from China at that time, had to behave like Thai, had to wear a hat, had to be glad and change their surname from their Chinese surname to a Thai surname. They had to behave like Thai. So many people, actually most of the people in Thailand who have mixed blood cannot even speak Chinese. But in my family only a few still speak (dialect).[1]

This corresponds to other findings (e.g. Ueda, 2001) which emphasize the differences between second and third generation Thai-Chinese. Most third generation Chinese have little knowledge of Chinese, while second generation Chinese have kept the Chinese language because they were able to study it. During the second Phibun government in Thailand (1948-57), many discriminating policy measures were implemented, because the government feared the expansion of communism from China. These measures included restrictions on the number of Chinese lessons taught at schools by funding only those teaching Chinese lessons for less than six hours per week and by strengthening control over Chinese teachers. As a result, it was almost impossible for ethnic Chinese children to learn Chinese within the framework of formal education, which eroded Chinese language

[1] Because many of the interviewees were non-L1 English speakers, the quotes are not transcribed according tp exact linguistic usage but were modified to better transport the meaning to the reader.

proficiency among those born in the 1950s. Afterwards, since the costs of learning Chinese (e.g. school fees, tutorial fees, or expenses for overseas studies) exceeded the benefits which could be derived from it, the motivations to formally learn the language was only moderate (Ueda, 2001: 171).

However, with China's economic upsurge seen in recent decades, the benefits of learning Chinese have considerably increased. All three Thai-Chinese we interviewed were determined to take up Chinese again. While TH-M-1 is implicitly motivated by his uncle who operates an import/export business, the other two Thai-Chinese (TH-F-1 and TH-F-2) emphasized China's rising importance as their major motivation. They now learn Mandarin - and not their families' dialects - which does not make communication between generations easier. As pointed out by other researchers (e.g. Hua, 2008), this type of language shift leads to communication problems between generations:

> [KK[2]]: And but your grandparents? Do they still live?
>
> [TH-F-1]: The same, they speak (dialect).
>
> [KK]: Can they also speak Mandarin?
>
> [TH-F-1]: No, they cannot.
>
> [EJ]: Do you understand their (dialect)?
>
> [TH-F-1]: Sometimes when they talk together I wait and then I ask them what they meant and they will tell me and when I hear it often I can remember and recognize what that means and then sometimes I can speak a little bit, like a word not a sentence.
>
> [EJ]: How close is it to mandarin?
>
> [TH-F-1]: It's not close. I think it is totally different.
>
> [KK]: And your grandparents, do they also speak Thai?
>
> [TH-F-1]: My grandparents? They can speak only a little bit of Thai. But most of the time they just use (dialect).
>
> [EJ]: And how do you speak with them?
>
> [TH-F-1]: I (laughing) rarely speak with them. I just use body language.

Communication problems between generations are not only observed among Thai-Chinese. They were found among nearly all respondents. Students speaking Chinese with their parents mostly switched to the dominant language of their country of residence when communicating with their siblings, if they had siblings

[2] KK = interviewer Katrin Kais; EJ = interviewer Eline Joosten

(Table 5). Although FR-M-1's father, for example, does not speak French that well, he and his brothers speak French when among each other:

> [FR-M-1]: Yeah, one younger and one older.
>
> [KK]: Ok.
>
> [EJ]: What language do you speak with them?
>
> [FR-M-1]: French
>
> [EJ/KK]: French?
>
> [EJ]: All the time?
>
> [FR-M-1]: Yeah. Although my dad doesn't like it.
>
> [KK]: And if your dad is sitting with you, would you then still speak French?
>
> [FR-M-1]: Yeah.
>
> [KK]: Yeah?
>
> [FR-M-1]: Yeah. But I mean, when you're used to it, it's like pretty difficult to change.

CA-F-1 does not have siblings and still finds difficulties in clearly communicating with her parents about certain issues:

> [CA-F-1]: I still have a lot of difficulty expressing complicated things, like complex ideas in Chinese. Like, if I wanted to say certain things like fear, feelings or things with my family, I wouldn't really be able to. And then subsequent of an awkward situation, we don't really talk about our feelings. At home it starts with that Chinese culture is not very, like, affectionate in a sense that Western culture is […]. So it's uncomfortable in the sense that I can't really show them who I really am, because I have that Western side of me, but I don't think they see it. Whenever I want to express anything that I feel, like someone needs to know in order to know really who I am, I can't really get that across in Chinese. I think, in that sense that I can't express myself and I just feel silly and frustrated. I think that you just kind of learn to deal with it, (laughing) and that's just the fact. […]

Additional evidence for the generational language shift is provided by the fact that most students stated that the language in which they possess the strongest competences was the dominant language in their country of residence. They also mainly used this language to communicate with their friends and siblings. Only with their parents did they continue to speak variations of Chinese.

Although FR-M-1 speaks French with his friends, he mainly connects with other Asians in France, while FR-M-2 said half of his friends are Chinese and half are French, so he uses all three languages with them, depending on the situation:

> [EJ]: With your friends in France, which languages do you speak?
>
> [FR-M-2]: Sometimes Chinese, (dialect) and French.
>
> [EJ]: What does it depend on?
>
> [FR-M-2]: Sometimes I hang out with my French friend and sometime I hang out with my Wenzhounese friends. Sometimes we hang out with Chinese who cannot speak Wenzhounese so I speak Putonghua with them.
>
> [KK]: How many friends are in each of the groups? Which language would be used the most?
>
> [FR-M-2]: Most? Half, half.

The strong connections among Wenzhounese living in Europe and those in China have also been observed by Li (1999), who emphasized their regional loyalty and wide-ranging circle of family and friends. Both FR-M-1 and FR-M-2 want to start a business after their graduation. In this environment it would be necessary to adequately speak Chinese, as FR-M-2 explains:

> [FR-M-2]: In fact for later, when I do business with China and back in (place) there are a lot of places that you have to speak Chinese to do things that you can't do if you are not of Chinese origin.
>
> [EJ]: Like what
>
> [FR-M-2]: Like work. It's kind of a high society, so you have to speak proper Chinese, Putonghua, and (dialect) just to show your ability in business and sort of to show that you can speak Chinese with them.

4.3 Prior institutional language learning and shifts towards Mandarin

All students, except for TH-M-1, had to some extent studied Chinese before coming to ZJU. Compared to the other participants, the Thai-Chinese had started their institutional language learning later.

In China, the respondents were all learning Mandarin. As expected (cf. Wei & Hua, 2010), none of their parents and grandparents had come from Northern China, because Chinese diasporas have been mainly composed of migrants from the coastal provinces (Table 5). Therefore, the participants speak Cantonese and some

less common dialects. Nevertheless, most students had learned some form of Chinese in an institutional setting prior to coming to ZJU (Table 6).

“Chinese” is, however, a rather flexible term in such a diverse environment. Unlike other dialects, Cantonese is quite prominent. Due to Hong Kong’s importance during British occupation and the great extent of Cantonese speakers worldwide, it is easily possible for students to learn this dialect in language teaching institutions (Hua 2008: 1804). AU-F-1, for example, learned Cantonese in weekend classes:

> [AU-F-1]: Cantonese is my first language. I learned English when I when I got put into pre-school. My mother always spoke to me in Cantonese. My father sometimes. I was sent to Chinese school when I was younger. So, it was Cantonese, we were learning. It was, I think, two hours a week on a Saturday. Then later it changed to Sunday. I learned basic things and I did that until I was in year ten and then I stopped. I think learning Mandarin is important for me, because I really enjoy travelling and I think that for this a new market is in China, so I decided to study Chinese when I got to university.

Whether prior knowledge and formal instruction of a dialect, however, is really beneficial to HL learning in the CHL context is debatable. Li & Duff (2008: 23), for example, argue that dialect speakers (e.g. Cantonese) might not even have the advantage of a native like pronunciation when learning Mandarin. Two of our interviewees did also point out how difficult it is to manage the language differences between Mandarin and Cantonese in the beginning:

> [CA-F-1]: When I’m learning Mandarin, I’m getting almost mixed up with my Cantonese, because the languages are similar but different and there are different tones. When I’m thinking of how to say something in Mandarin, I automatically think of it just in Cantonese, because the structure is the same, but then you have to switch the tones, which I then get mixed up. Sometimes when I say something in Mandarin it sounds alright to me, because that’s kind of the way you say it in Cantonese, but it’s TOTALLY different and. I say it totally wrong then.
>
> [AU-F-1]: […] but Cantonese and Mandarin are not mutually intelligible so I really struggled. All classes were taught only in Mandarin. For my first

half of year learning Chinese I didn't learn Pinyin and that was it. I was just sitting in class not understanding and my classmates were actually native Chinese speakers, so they didn't want to study. Their Chinese was better than my English. So they just went to Chinese class and got 100 percent and I would be just passing.

Although this shift is difficult, as both learners pointed out, both are still aiming to learn Mandarin. According to Hua (2008: 1804), the desire of many Cantonese speakers to learn Mandarin is often the result of the handing over of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Since then, more and more Cantonese speakers started speaking or learning to speak Mandarin, the dominant and standard language of mainland China.

This language shift from dialect to standard dialect is observed in all participants, however, at different stages. FR-M-1 and FR-M-2 had already started to learn Mandarin during their childhood. They often visited China and were even sent there to learn Chinese and about Chinese culture, as explained by FR-M-1:

[FR-M-1]: They sent me to China to a teacher's family and so the only thing I could do is speak Mandarin.

[EJ]: How long did you go there?

[FR-M-1]: For the summer vacation, so every year for two months I went to China.

[KK]: In Paris, did you learn Chinese there as well somewhere?

[FR-M-1]: I was supposed to learn.

[KK]: Huh?

[FR-M-1]: I was supposed to learn, because they paid some school fees, but I didn't go to class.

[KK]: You didn't like to?

[FR-M-1]: No

[KK]: But now you are here because you wanted?

[FR-M-1]: Yeah.

[KK]: When did your opinion change? What do you think?

[FR-M-1]: When I was in first grade, it was like, because the school, the Chinese translated in French and stuff, I just didn't like it I don't know. I didn't like the teacher at school and stuff, and so I just kept party. Now I have grown up and I think I have to learn Chinese. I was always like,

> China is different and pretty far and it would be pretty useful to learn Chinese. So, I just decided, I have to learn Chinese.

As FR-M-1 emphasized, he did not like learning Chinese when he was younger. The same was observed among all the students who had started learning Chinese during their childhood - except for AU-M-1 who was living in a community where he was expected to learn Mandarin at school:

> [AU-M-1]: You have to understand. When you are growing up in Malaysia you speak a lot of languages. The region where we are from in Malaysia spoke Cantonese but our family spoke Hakka and then at the same time in school you had to learn English and Mandarin and Malay. So, we spoke four or five languages. You have to adapt to when you are young. So, actually I was lucky, I am glad I grew up in Malaysia to adapt to so many languages.

Other students (AU-F-1, FR-M-1, FR-M-2) were sent to Chinese schools by their parents. Since Chinese language classes were usually not available in the regular school curriculum, these students had to attend Chinese classes over the weekend while all their friends would be playing outside:

> [AU-F-1]: They liked to speak Chinese to each other and they all listened to the same music and I just wasn't interested. I wanted to play soccer. (laughing) I couldn't play soccer, because I had to learn Chinese, so yeah. But now I am very grateful that I went, because I think I'd have a really hard time, if I didn't know some basics.

Although most students did not like this extracurricular activity when they were younger, they now often appreciate having learned the language:

> [AU-F-1]: Sometimes I was crying, because I didn't want to go to Chinese school and I was like five or six years old. I started it when I was four. My mother was saying, you'll thank me when you get older and I'm thanking her now.

4.4 Influences on language teaching

Most students had taken up learning Chinese and had moved to China for three reasons: 1) to find out more about their ancestral culture; 2) for practical reasons (e.g. scholarship, or cheaper studies); and 3) to improve their Mandarin competences for business purposes (see also Joosten & Käis, 2012).

The motivating factors put forward by the students were confirmed by the teachers. As general incentives for all students to learn Chinese, they mentioned economic reasons (business) and the desire to know more about Chinese people and China as a country. One teacher also emphasized that the students wanted to return to their "motherland" and to find "in the language of their ancestors more a sense of belonging" (T1).

Motivations do not always lead to good results, however. According to both teachers, many learners are quite young and their attitude towards learning is suboptimal. "Some students always skip classes. Because their parents force them to study, they study Chinese not by free will." (T2). This lack of motivation was also observed among one of our interviewees.

> [FR-M-1]: Well, after all, I'm not very serious, because I party. Maybe because when I speak like everyday words, they're words I already knew so it didn't really work.

The various skill strengths of overseas Chinese generally illustrate some trends. Both teachers pointed out that in speaking and listening they are quite good, but in grammar and reading they are not similarly advanced (Carreira & Kagan, 2011: 62). According to the teachers, overseas Chinese students are usually almost perfect in pronunciation, but use very simple, everyday words and phrases. As some of them, like FR-M-1, are unmotivated to improve their Chinese they rarely use newly learned words and sentences.

ZJU copes with this variability in individual skill strengths by placing students in the appropriate level course according to their competence. This affords an advantage as compared to many other programs offering Chinese as a FL. As mentioned above, before being allowed to participate in classes, students have to take a placement test. Although ZJU already separates students according to their different language proficiencies within different fields of language learning, the

variety among the students, being HL and FL/L2 learners, was sometimes perceived as difficult. The teacher for reading reported that within the classroom she was not able to significantly adjust the level of the material to the level of the student since the reading material was the same for everyone. Oral-practicing classes, in contrast, could be adjusted by using the same text but applying different requirements for different students.

ZJU also offers extracurricular activities for students of the Language and Culture Program, introducing them to Chinese culture, i.e. taiji, Chinese calligraphy, ancient Chinese language and doing business with China. The translator for our interviews, herself a student, claimed however, that almost none of the overseas Chinese students normally join the offered activities. She mentioned that overseas Chinese students had told her that they had already learned many of the activities available from their parents; for them it was not attractive to visit these classes since they would be instructed together with absolute beginners.

5 Discussion and conclusion

This study has investigated the way in which internal or external factors can be motivating or reluctant in HL contexts; the different levels of language competency among HL learners; and the resulting difficulties experienced by CHL learners and teachers in Chinese classrooms in ZJU. These findings are not new but rather support the results of other researchers (He & Xiao, 2008, Curdt-Christiansen & Hancock, 2014, Duff & Li, 2014). As mentioned above, social, political and economic changes greatly influence the field of education such that new requirements are constantly evolving. Our study shows that challenges in education that have been experienced in countries with a high number of immigrants historically might also be relevant for other countries coping with high fluxes of immigrants or in student exchange settings. As Valdes (2001: 25) emphasizes: “Instruction for heritage language speakers who are to some degree bilingual requires that language educators build on these students’ existing language strengths.”

The results of our study demonstrate that research on CHL learning in China should receive more attention by researchers and stakeholders, because only then the needs of this specific language learning group can be targeted. Overseas

Chinese with diverse personal backgrounds are coming to China to study Chinese. Although the majority of overseas Chinese students at ZJU come from European countries and have a Wenzhou ancestral background, HL learners from other regions are also arriving in significant numbers (e.g. Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, Canada and the USA).

Our respondents varied with respect to their places of birth, lengths of residence, parental decisions, political backgrounds in their countries of residence, prior opportunities to visit China, and several other relevant characteristics. All these factors play an important role in language development and identity formation (Li & Duff, 2008: 22, Käis, 2012). As a result, HL students at ZJU were at different language levels which corresponded to their particular background, but all had the desire to move to China to study Chinese for one common reason: the rising influence of China in the world as a result of the nation's economic growth. These overseas Chinese coming to China for study purposes seem to be the highly-skilled migrants currently needed and sought-after in today's worldwide job market. Therefore, China should encourage and support their development Although ZJU already handles the students' different competence levels by sorting them into different language levels within the various disciplines of language learning, improvements in the Language and Culture Program can still be made to encourage less-motivated young CHL learners to attend and actively participate. Currently, HL and FL learners are taught in the same classroom. Considering their different language backgrounds and proficiencies, the introduction of even more targeted language courses which cater to HL learners' needs – like, for example, deficiencies in grammar and reading skills – could prove a better strategy.

Another step into the right direction, as became clear from students' motivations, would be to offer deeper insights into Chinese heritage culture and into Chinese business language - and not just into Chinese business culture. Moreover, extra-curricular activities should not only be offered at the FL level but also at a level which is appropriate for students who have already gained basic insights into Chinese culture during their childhood. All our respondents, including those who have undergone a complete generational language shift, have maintained a hold on their Chinese culture to some extent. Continuing research within this field is important for developing a more appropriate curriculum for CHL learners.

In addition, teachers and future teachers could profit from such a new framework within their training curriculum. The provision of a better education and the preparedness of teachers usually go hand in hand with teachers' sensitivity towards the taught subjects. Surely, if HL theory was included in the curriculum of future teachers who wish to specialize in "Chinese as a FL education", these teachers would become aware of the problems associated with HL teaching and might be better equipped to address them. The California State University-East Bay and the University of California Berkeley Extension branch, for example, are already teaching such additional programs; therefore ZJU would not have to start from scratch but could build on their experiences.

Whereas previous research was mainly carried out in Anglophone communities, our study was conducted in the context of HL language learning in Chinese language classrooms in China. Contrasting with previous classroom studies, the students in our study had been brought up in different communities, spoke different languages, and possessed different cultural habits which determined their language development and identity formation. Notwithstanding these differences, they all shared a common interest in returning to China to study Chinese.

Another unique feature of our setting was that a large number of overseas Chinese were partaking in classes alongside an even more diverse group of "Chinese as a foreign/second language" learners; this is because Chinese language instruction in Chinese universities is primarily designed to address international exchange students. Targeting these different language learning groups in one class is a considerable challenge for the teachers involved. Within a globalized world, increased flexibility is not only required of students but also of teachers. In language classrooms teachers always have to face the difficult task of addressing hand, HL theory can be seen as a research framework for a still fairly young field within linguistics. What is still needed to support heritage/immigrant language education is a coherent body of pedagogical theories about what can be accomplished in such a classroom setting. Understanding the linguistic and cultural potential of each learner with regards to his/her needs and mode of learning. Multinational classrooms are an even greater challenge in this respect. HL teaching is, on the one hand, yet another issue language teachers need to cope with; on the other HL learners will assist teachers in accommodating linguistically diverse

learners and in maximizing the social, academic, cultural and economic benefits of HL maintenance. In many countries these learners are now perceived as a valuable resource. China's policymakers should also recognize their ability as cultural mediators and potential highly-skilled return migrants.

To be able to target the needs of all groups involved, more research should be conducted on Chinese as a HL within the classrooms of Chinese universities. To establish a better baseline, further qualitative and quantitative data collection should include a greater number and a broader. Further research might also clarify a contradiction found during our research; that is, while the respondents all claimed that they had come to China out of their own free will, the interviewed teachers emphasized that many that many had come as a result of their parents' decision. Finally, we agree with Polinsky and Kagan (2007) that an evaluation of placement tests would allow researchers to determine whether the various strengths and weaknesses of HL learners are correctly assessed.

Research has shown that responding to the complexity of HL learners' needs is one of the challenges that educators and researchers face when designing language programs. This study has shown that in terms of CHL this is not only necessary in countries with Chinese immigrants but also in China itself due to overseas Chinese coming back to China for studying Mandarin in mostly international classrooms.

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PART IV: CULTURAL IDENTITY

Cultural identity of the second generation Chinese immigrants: Approaches and prospects of a new research field

Yue Liu

1. Introduction

As people emigrated out of China with growing numbers since the mid-19th century, China eventually became one of the most important countries of origin of international migrants. Although mass emigration out of China in the pre-modern period[1] was seen as early as the first half of the 19th century, its significance since the mid-20th century has stimulated a steady rise in academic interest in Chinese living abroad. Mass migration is a complex social phenomenon, closely related to political, economic, social and cultural factors. In this context, two research approaches can be clearly distinguished. At the macro-level, "traditional" research focuses on structured migration pathways and the political and social reasons for movements, sometimes described as "push-pull"[2] factors that prevail in migrants' original and destination countries. In contrast, other research emphasizes the situation of the individual by considering a person's steps toward migration; by this method, the micro-economic, psychological and intercultural perspectives are taken into account since users of this method argue that personal circumstances highly influence a person's decision to migrate, migrants' identity formation, as well as the integration of individuals and their families into the society of the destination country. This means that migration can be explored on the micro level without ignoring the internal stratification of societies and the heterogeneity of migration decisions.

In order to set a clear basis for understanding present-day cross-border movements it is particularly necessary to first clarify the core concept of "Overseas

[1] Before the establishment of the Republic of China (1911-1949)
[2] The "push-pull" model based on the analytical framework of Lee (1966), cited by De Haas (2008, 8f.), which argued that the decision to migrate is influenced by different factors: factors associated with the places of origin (push factors); factors associated with the place of destination (pull factors) and personal factors.

Chinese" and to define "migration". The term "Overseas Chinese" refers to an increasingly large number of emigrants who - due to their heterogeneity - need to be considered in separate categories. Since the first wave of emigration from China in the pre-modern period, emigrants from mainland China have settled on every continent of the world and have revealed numerous peculiarities, including differences between regions of origin, phases of their arrival and other historical backgrounds related to their emigration. This will be dealt with in the present paper including a special focus on the second generation.

The following section (2) clarifies the term "Overseas Chinese". Section (3) provides a brief historical overview of international emigration from China. This is followed by a look at the current state of research in section (4) wherein we give special attention to new fields of investigation that emphasize the psychological and intercultural aspects. Section (5) presents some results of empirical studies that highlight identity formation as an important part of research on Overseas Chinese and their subsequent generations, research that will likely shape the development of future ideas and models. Section (6) draws some conclusions and offers an outlook on the future of the Chinese diaspora.

2. Overseas Chinese: History, definition, and concepts

In general, migrants can be divided into two categories: long-term migrants who emigrate for more than one year, and short-term migrants who spend between three and twelve months outside the country of origin. In China´s official statistics, the term "Overseas Chinese" is defined as emigrants of Chinese origin living abroad. Until the late 1990's, there was a significant difference between the terms "Huaren" - people of Chinese origin who live outside China, regardless of citizenship - and "Huaqiao" - Chinese citizens settled in countries outside of China who intend to eventually return to their motherland (cf. Wang, 2013: 317f.); but this difference has increasingly been ignored in the 21st century (cf. Liu, 2005: 292f.). According to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the Council of China (2015), about 60 million Chinese were living abroad in 2014.[3] In 2007, 78% of them were staying in Southeast Asia; North America (with 14%) and Europe (with 5%) ranked

[3] Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-03/05/c_119627000.htm

second and third place, respectively (Zhuang, 2011: 14).

The emigration trends of Chinese thus far observed in the 21st century are, of course, products of major reforms and the implementation of the “opening-up” policy in 1978 in the People's Republic (PR) of China. Participants of this wave of emigration are defined as "New Chinese Emigrants," meaning those who emigrated from China (including the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) after 1978 and stayed abroad for at least a year, regardless of whether they retained their Chinese citizenship (Song, 2011: 144). This definition is a significant one for research on New Emigrants living in Europe who have mainly come from Zhejiang province. In fact, it is still disputed in the scientific discourse whether the reform and opening-up policy should be viewed as a turning point in the flux of Chinese emigrants, since international migration from mainland China was largely disrupted after the establishment of PR China, while migration from Hong Kong and Taiwan (to North America, Oceania, and the United Kingdom during the 1950s and 1960s) was largely unaffected. It is undisputed, however, that - due to the complexity of migration directions and pathways - distinct definitions for “new emigrants” from China should be used when analyzing the major target regions of immigration.

3. Historical overview of international Chinese migration since the pre-modern period

The first traces of Chinese in Europe can be dated back to the early 15th century when a fleet of treasure ships commanded by the Chinese mariner Zheng He sailed to Europe during the Ming Dynasty. But the first massive wave of emigration from China did not occur until the 18th century. The main destinations at that time were Southeast Asia and North America, and the first migrants commonly settled and started families in those places. Most of these movements were driven by economic forces under the colonial powers. They usually worked as unskilled "coolies" (hard laborers) and contract workers, though a small fraction of them were businessmen. The estimated number of “first migrants” from China in this early period has been put at 10 million (Li, 2007, cited by Shen, 2010: 31). Mass migration from China to Western Europe did not occur until the late 19th or early 20th century when contract laborers arrived in Europe, mainly in the United Kingdom and France.

The first Chinese immigrants in North America arrived in the 1820s. A large share of them went to California during the Gold Rush. In 1860, 34,933 immigrants from China were registered in the U.S. (Seward, 1887, cited by Zhu 2011: 265), accounting for 0.02% of the total U.S. population (Chao, 2010: 265). In the 1860s, a new wave of immigrant Chinese contract workers arrived for the construction of the Central Pacific Railroad, pushing the number of registered Chinese immigrants in the U.S. to 64,199 in 1870 (i.e. 0.17% of the total U.S. population) (Chao, 2010.). Afterwards, their number declined due to several economic crises, the deterioration of the local labor market, and due to an anti-Chinese movement in the 1870s. After 1949, the number of Chinese in the U.S. rose again, and since the 1980s the New Immigrants have increasingly migrated to the U.S. from mainland China.

Between 1880 and 1920, more than 100,000 migrant workers moved each year from China to Southeast Asia (Shen, 2010). Most of them came from the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, where the population density was higher than in most other provinces and where the population had been strongly affected by wars with colonial powers and poverty was widespread. From the mid-19th century to the early 20th century, most migrant workers chose to move to Southeast Asia; the wave of migration to that region reached its first climax before World War I.

Although in the wake of and during World War II, the number of Chinese emigrants plummeted, millions of people of Chinese origin were living around the world already prior to 1941; most of them - an estimated seven million – have been residing in Southeast Asia but the first emigrant generation also had large numbers in North America and Europe since they had often started families in these places (Zhuang, 2011: 9). In Germany, both before and after World War I, a large portion of Chinese immigrants were intellectuals, and this resulted in an image of the Chinese in Germany which was different than in other European countries.

After the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, due to the changing political conditions, it became difficult to emigrate from China. The next and most recent wave of emigration did not occur until the start of reforms and the implementation of the opening-up policy in mainland China after the Cultural Revolution[4]. The choice of destination countries now extended beyond the traditional destination countries to new places across South America and the African continent. Only rough estimates about the number of new emigrants from China are available. According to an investigation supported by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, during the three decades spanning from 1978 to 2008 more than 10 million Chinese emigrated (Zhuang, 2011: 13). North America continues to be popular, in particular for migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Meanwhile Southeast Asia lost its position as the most important destination for Chinese migrant workers (who had mainly been coming from the two coastal provinces of Fujian and Canton) as the political situation in many Southeast Asian destinations like Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore became adverse for the local residents of Chinese origin. Since the early 1980s Europe has remained an important destination. With the strengthening of Sino-European trade relations, a number of European countries - particularly France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, and later Spain - became attractive for migrants from mainland China who were motivated to leave their homes by the promise of a better life and career prospects.

Only rough estimates about the number of new emigrants from China are available. According to an investigation supported by the State Council's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, during the three decades spanning from 1978 to 2008 more than 10

[4] China's "Cultural Revolution" lasted from 1966 to 1976.

million Chinese emigrated (Zhuang, 2011: 13). Between 1990 and 2010, the number of Chinese migrants living abroad more than doubled (Cui, 2013). By the end of 2008, about 8 million New Emigrants who had emigrated after 1978 were living abroad – with 1.7 million of them residing in Italy, Spain and France. In 2011, Song (2011: 144) estimated the number of Overseas Chinese throughout Europe as between 2.6 million and 3.2 million.

In the first decades of the 20th century, working and studying abroad were the major reasons for emigration from China. The post-1978 wave of migration allowed for the molding of a new political framework for legal emigration not only due to the reforms and opening-up of China, but also due to a number of essential influences: firstly, intensified technical progress and economic globalization have promoted international labor migration; secondly, international chain migration has continuously played an important role in facilitating the paths of the New Emigrants since 1978; and finally, China's economic progress has meant that many have gained the wealth necessary to enable them to do things like internationalizing their businesses or seeking more attractive job prospects. These factors have expanded the set of incentives for potential migrants as compared to previous migration waves. Still, external factors have played a role too; immigration policies of destination countries have undergone significant changes, thereby opening up new opportunities abroad and creating better legal bases for the establishment of Chinese migrants (Li, 2006).

The new wave of emigration is characterized by a variety of pathways and models. In addition to labor migration, new reasons for migration have come into the foreground, mainly the related to the pursuit of superior educational resources to invest in one’s human capital and family reunification,. At the same time the proportion of highly-skilled workers among labor-seeking migrants has continued to rise, and a so-called "elite tendency” has occurred such that the average educational level of the New Emigrants has significantly increased as compared to previous cohorts. This is particularly evident among the new migrants in Europe who mainly come from Zhejiang province, and whose business operations and strategies have considerably expanded over time.

21st century emigration from China is characterized by new features; destinations and migration categories have become more diverse. The movement of several

categories of people have become more popular: skilled professionals seeking work abroad, students - both publicly and privately financed - pursuing international competencies to enhance their repertoire, and people intending to invest in businesses abroad (Shen, 2010: 26). Among the New Emigrants - especially highly-skilled professionals - an enhanced level of self-confidence is evident (Gui, 2011). In contrast to previous generations who moved abroad as a means to cope with difficulties in securing their livelihood or a scarcity of resources in their place of origin, many of the New Emigrants have moved not out of desperation, but in search of professional career prospects and an improved quality of life. Many of them possess strong language competencies and are better integrated into the host society, and their advanced professional skills enable them to maintain an elevated social status. They also show a greater willingness to adapt to the host countries and are politically more active than their predecessors, which is particularly visible among second generation New Emigrants from China; this will be examined in the next section.

4. Younger generations of Overseas Chinese: new features

In many statistics, younger generations of the Chinese Diaspora – from the third generation onward – are not counted as having an immigrant background. However, many of the members of the third, fourth, and even the fifth generation of Chinese immigrants can - at least from an ethnic or cultural perspective - be regarded as belonging to the Chinese Diaspora, so long as they maintain the outward image of an ethnic Chinese or choose to be a "carrier" of Chinese culture.[5]

A number of issues should be considered in the context of these younger generations. Since past waves of emigrants to Southeast Asia and North America have settled in these places over several generations, they have already defined and conveyed their personal, economic and social impacts to the host society. Historically, a large number of representatives of these traditional migrants - among them many famous intellectuals - contributed to the construction and reconstruction

[5] Well-known names from the latter generations of Chinese migrants include Gary Faye Locke, former U.S. ambassador to China and a third generation Chinese immigrant in the U.S.; Hollywood film star Michelle Yeoh, a third generation Chinese immigrant in Malaysia, and the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, son of Lee Kuan Yew and a fifth generation Chinese immigrant in Singapore.

of the Chinese economy through considerable donations and investments. The New Immigrants have a different relation to their country of origin. The changed "push and pull factors" of international migration have deeply influenced the migration incentives and migration behavior.

Unlike the first generation of Chinese emigrants who grew up before leaving the country and whose cultural identity[6] had been formed in China, the second generation was mostly born and raised abroad, and they often do not use the Chinese language exclusively or even natively. At an early age, they begin to confront problems with their cultural identity, and hence their identity usually forms via a dynamic process. Self-orientation and self-assertion of second generation immigrants referring to their fathers' homeland of are sometimes confusing and often questionable. Though first generation immigrants often faced the dilemma of feeling strongly connected to the culture of their home country while needing or desiring to integrate into the host society, the second generation tends to be more interested in creating a unique sub-culture that is neither that of their parents' origins nor that of the host country, but is instead to be understood as a hybrid of both.

These phenomena have resulted in altered points of view of both first and second generation migrants toward their roots of cultural identity. While for first generation migrants - especially traditional migrants - the sense of belonging to their home country can be described by the Chinese idiom "luo ye gui gen" (return to their own roots), this expression cannot be ascribed to their descendants. Another Chinese saying, "luo di sheng gen" ("grow on your own roots"), seems to be more appropriate to describe the unique way in which later generations of Chinese immigrants relate to their parents' country of origin and their country of residence.

[6] Originally developed in the field of psychology, the term "cultural identity" refers to the tendency of a common culture of individuals and between individuals and groups (Cui 2004).

5. Cultural identity of the second generation of the Overseas Chinese: a new research field

5.1 Changing research foci

Previous research on Overseas Chinese has mainly focused on quantitative studies on the motivations and patterns of migration; historical backgrounds and social factors affecting peoples' decision to emigrate; the social status of emigrants; and their development trends in different destination regions - mainly North America, Southeast Asia and traditional European destinations. The two main "emigrant exporting" provinces of traditional emigrants - Fujian and Guangdong - were the most investigated provinces; comparatively, post-1990 New Emigrants - who mainly originated from Zhejiang Province – have been little studied and a large gap in both quantitative and qualitative data still remains.

In the area of micro-theory-based research on Overseas Chinese, a new field is emerging. Under the assumptions of neoclassical economics, individual rational actors decide upon their migratory movements with the aim of maximizing their benefits (cf. Massey et al., 1993: 434f.). The situation of second generation Chinese emigrants - especially those whose parents were among the cohort of post-1980 migrants - has attracted special attention. Born and/or raised in the destination country, they have usually spent most of their lives there. Their attitudes to their parents' country of origin and to the culture in which their parents grew up and formed their cultural identity are different from those of their parents. This generation, therefore, has another understanding of the term "homeland" and many of them sub-consciously possess a mixed interpretation of this term. This new phenomenon can be interpreted through two perspectives: on the one hand it can be argued that the traditional way of thinking "luo ye gui gen" ("returning to their own roots", which points towards China as the place of origin) has lost its validity for the younger Diaspora generations; on the other hand, it might also be the case that in the wake of rising international mobility and changing environments, the meaning of "roots" has simply changed. The descendants of first generation Chinese immigrants were accommodated and assimilated into the receiving countries; they have formed their own cultural identity in their country of birth and it is there that they seek their own cultural roots.

Wang Gengwu (1988, cited by Zhuang, 2002: 64) made the first recognized attempt to categorize the identities of Overseas Chinese. He distinguished between seven types: a Chinese nationalist identity; a local national identity; a Chinese communal identity; an ethnic and racial identity with legal and political rights; a Chinese historical identity; a Chinese cultural identity; and an ethnic cultural identity. Recent studies tend to simplify the categorization of identities and to distribute the different identities into three main ones: a political identity, an ethnic/racial identity; and a cultural identity. Cultural identity, which is distinguished from one's political and ethnic identity, is associated with a cultural consciousness of belonging, centered upon the acceptance and recognition of common values. Cultural identification develops by sharing certain core values, cultural symbols, ways of understanding and thinking and behavioral patterns among members of a group. Unlike ethnic identity, cultural identity and political identity are more dynamic and can be actively formed and developed by individuals. On the one hand, people act passively under wide-ranging cultural influences; on the other hand, they can actively select their own cultural identity or show certain aspects of their cultural identity to the outside, since people are "reproducers" of their own cultural belongings.

5.2 Focus on the formation of identity

In the process of globalization and increased global mobility, identity issues have become increasingly important with regard to Overseas Chinese and their further development and possible repatriation. Since the early 21st century, a number of studies concerning the identities of Overseas Chinese have given definition to a new research field. For example, in his study on the ethnic identity of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, Zhuang (2002), argued that cultural awareness of the target groups as carriers of Chinese culture - which he called "Chineseness" or, the basis of Chinese ethnic identity – was formed in various Southeast Asian countries. On the other hand, he points out that through a decade-long development after the end of World War II, this ethnic identity of Overseas Chinese changed from its original "pure" Chinese identity to an identity as local citizens with ethnic origins in China. Since Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam were confronted with complicated

social conditions and differing immigration policies, identity formation became an extremely complex process that has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. In contrast to previous research on the life status and integration of Chinese immigrants in their host countries, the focus of research in the early 21st century has rather been interested in the intercultural phenomena demonstrated by migrants when interacting with their host societies.

5.3 Focus on the second generation of Chinese immigrants

Two studies by Wu (2004) and Li & Yao (2012) on second generation of the new immigrants from China in North America demonstrate that this group exhibits a limited Chinese identity in the political sense though they tend to retain their Chinese characteristics in cultural areas. The political attitudes of the target group reflected a significant resemblance to those of their peers in the host country. Still, a strong correlation between one's political attitude towards his/her country of origin and one's mastery of the Chinese language was recognizable: the better their language skills, the stronger was their understanding of the political positions of the Chinese government and the core interests of people in China.

Additionally, the identities of younger generations[7] of Chinese origin in Southeast Asia have been explored empirically. Yang & Yu (2007) argue that, instead of adopting an ethnic identity as "Chinese", younger generations developed so-called "memories of origin" which then played an important role for the emergence of their sense of belonging. Interestingly, such consciousness of belonging did not seem to contradict their political identity (self-assertion as citizens of their host countries), but is not equivalent to the sense of belonging to one's country of origin held by their grandparents' and parents' generation due to the memories of origin.

Studies on second generation Chinese immigrants in Europe have significantly increased over the early 21st century as migration to that continent has increased. In their empirical study, Wang & Yan (2011) observed that second generation emigrants from Wenzhou, a major region of origin within Zhejiang Province, have significantly accommodated the values and lifestyles of their host countries and

[7] In fact, the South Asian countries are no longer the main destinations for newer emigration outflows and the term "younger generation" in the context of Southeast Asia has a similar meaning to the term "second generation New Emigrants" on other continents.

successfully adapted into local societies. The target group also demonstrated a double-sided cultural identity: those of the younger generation identified themselves both as citizens of the host country as well as part of Chinese culture, including the regional culture of their parents' home town Wenzhou.

6 Conclusions and outlook

This paper has utilized the experiences of various studies (see Yang, 2004; Wang 2006; Li, 2008; Yuan & Zheng, 2009; Lin, 2010) to investigate second generation Overseas Chinese and their identity development. Three important tendencies seem to prevail. Firstly, in the research field concerned with Overseas Chinese, much interest has traditionally been placed on macro-level viewpoints - such as historical backgrounds, immigration policies of destination countries, emigration routes and types of migration - while empirical research concerning the life experiences of individuals and their offspring has played a relatively minor role. Secondly, research focused on New Emigrants from China - especially those moving to Europe - were quantitatively and qualitatively below that about the traditional migrants; however research on Europe-destined migrants has grown continuously as relations between China and European countries[8] have intensified over the 2000s. Thirdly, the study of how people identify themselves has developed into a new research field that is largely focusing on second generation Chinese immigrants. However, cultural identity as the most dynamic aspect of individual identities has certainly not been sufficiently explored. Furthermore, there is a need to strengthen fresh research on the intercultural phenomena of second generation Chinese immigrants living in the destination countries chosen by their parents.

Identity research has developed a new approach of exploring Overseas Chinese at the micro-level which focuses on the dynamic formation of individuals. Research on the cultural identity of second generation Chinese emigrants indicates a turn towards new investigation pathways to explore identity issues. Studies on Overseas Chinese living in Europe show that integration into the country of residence as well as manifestations of "Chineseness" in the younger generation

[8] For example, the recent trends of Chinese immigrants in Italian cities like Prato and Milan have drawn significant attention since they contrast starkly to those of traditional immigrants, especially in terms of business models and the integration of Chinese immigrants from Zhejiang.

are not repeating the trends that characterized migration to traditional destinations in Southeast Asia and North America, but rather demonstrate peculiar tendencies to be followed in the foreseeable future; these studies must additionally take into account the progress of the multicultural immigration policies of the main European destination countries.

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Cultural Memory of Chinese Migrants in Europe:

An Analysis of Letters sent from Turin to Wenzhou (1957-1985)

Jieping Fan and Jun Sun

1. Introduction

According to Aleida Assmann's theory of memory, communicative, collective and cultural memories cover different time spans. At the same time cultural memory is a particular form of collective memory and its essential characteristic is that it is a long-term memory. "The durability of cultural memory based on external media and institutions are inscribed in the memories and knowledge. In order to keep this type of memory, which exceeds individual experiences upright as intergenerational long-term memory, it requires highly institutionalized repositories" (Gudehus et al. 2010:93-94). Based on Assmann's theory, cultural memory should be one classification of long-term memory, coming after communicative and collective memory, and can be strengthened by various institutions like archives, museums, and libraries. Letters as written sets of documents and imaginative memory space[1] belong to the category of long-term memory and can thus be considered as representations of cultural memory.

In this paper, we distinguish between three forms of cultural memory: namely social (or communicative), collective and cultural memory. They are closely related to each other as each one is a prerequisite for another. Without social (or communicative) memory, a collective memory is not possible; nor can cultural memory exist without collective memory. Social (or communicative) memory requires the individual. "Every 'I' is connected to a 'We', to whom the 'I' relates important foundations of his/her own identity" (Assmann, 2011: 21)[2]. The "I" is the bearer of the "We" memory. By focusing on the written communications between

[1] This is based on the concept elaborated by the French historian Pierre Nora; see for example, Nora (1998)

[2] "Jedes Ich ist verknüpft mit einem Wir, von dem es wichtige Grundlagen seiner eigenen Identität bezieht."

Chinese who were living in Italy and their friends and relatives in China[3], this paper investigates the memory of individuals and further explores the "We" memory.

"Collective memory is unimaginable without media" (Erll, 2005:123). Similarly, cultural memory cannot be transmitted without media, because "the individual memory to a large extent relies on the media phenomenon" (Erll, 2005:123, translated from German by the authors). The collective memory of the extended family of Hu - who is from Wencheng (文成), Wenzhou (温州) in the coastal province of Zhejiang (see Fig. 1) - is recorded in the various letters our research group received from Hu in 2013. The receipt of these letters coincided with research on migrants from Wenzhou which we were carrying out the same year; we received them in 2013 in Wenzhou. Part of the Hu extended family emigrated to Europe between the 1950s and the late 1980s. Since the communication between those family members who had remained in China and those who had gone abroad mainly depended on letters sent through the postal service, the written form of correspondence was the predominant medium for long-distance communication at the time. Hence, family letters are essential records of the common past or communicative memory.

[3] On Sep. 6th 2013, our "transcultural research" group from Zhejiang University received 1,020 letters from Mr. Hu Lisong (who at that time was 84 years old), which were sent between the years 1957 and 1985 from Italy to China. Most of them are family letters from Mr. Hu Yundi (胡云迪), who is deceased, to his son Mr. Hu Lisong, who lived in China in those years. Relatives and friends in Italy also sent some of the letters.

Fig. 1: Geographical location of Wencheng (circled) in City Wenzhou of Zhejiang Province

Our research inquiry commenced with the analysis of Hu's letters in order to confirm that they can indeed serve as a medium of the collective and cultural memory. Secondly, we explored the cultural specificities behind the bearers of the individual and of the collective memory, in this case the memory of the author of each letter and the memory of the Hu's family. Finally, we analyzed certain statements in the letters, especially whether the questions had been posed implicitly and explicitly. These referred to, for example, relationships between family members, motivations for their emigration, the migrants' identity with respect to traditional Chinese culture and values, and their culturally-determined value proposition.

Fig. 2: The first letter sent by Hu Yundi from Turin, 1957



Since there were such a large number of letters available (about 1,020), we had to make a selection[4] . Under the given circumstances, we tried to stratify our selection of letters and conduct the research qualitatively, i.e. we chose one or two letters from the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, respectively. The correspondence between different people was taken into account in the selection of the letters.

2 Mediality of letters

Letters, as a medium for correspondence (in Latin brevis libellus, short booklet), refer to fixed written messages that contain a personal message for a particular recipient. “The medium shapes the message” (Erll, 2005:124, translated from German by the authors) because “everything that can be known, thought, and said about the world is knowable, conceivable and speakable with the help of the media,

[4] The letters are digitalized but not yet in a corpus.

which communicate this knowledge" (Assmann & Assmann, 1990). This so-called "theory of the relativity of media" by Eric Havelock (Gudehaus et al. 2010:124) also applies to letters. Letters are a memory medium of "switching systems between inner and outer worlds, between the individual and collective dimension of memory and recollection" (Gudehaus et al., 2010:129). Letters as a written medium allow for the outsourcing of memory and offer a large storage capacity for memory opportunities.

Fig. 3: Chinese character for "letter" in oracle bone script.

Letters convey memories of different times and faraway places. The origin of such types of writing dates back to Babylonian times in the Middle East. In ancient Egypt, papyri served (papyrus 纸莎草) as a writing material for letters; in China, silk and bamboo were used. In Chinese a letter is called "Xin" (信). According to Chinese etymology it consists of the radicals "human" and "language." The word's meaning can also be translated as "trust" or "reliability," because according to Confucian ethics, "when a person says something, others will believe in you." ("人言则无不信者", 参见《说文解字》). In the written form of Chinese, "Xin" indicates that the words written in a letter guarantee any promise recorded therein.

Since the times of the very first authors of such messages the purpose of letter correspondences has not changed: they are often discreet and private; they can be used to transmit confidential messages but can also serve as a means of public expression (e.g. letters to the editor in a newspaper); they can be a literary form (cf. Goethe's epistolary novel "The Sorrows of Young Werther", or the Pauline Epistles of the New Testament of the Bible); they can be instruments for the dissemination

of official information (e.g. cultural sector's writings); and they can be used for the transmission of personal messages (e.g. love letters).

In the humanities, letters as a means of correspondence are often studied from a historical, literary or cultural perspective. Librarian and cultural theorist Georg Steinhausen was a pioneer in the study of letters and published his history of the German letters (1889-1891) in two volumes. From his historical perspective of science, only the private letter is considered a "true letter." Letters between older and younger generations within a - as between a father and a son - are referred to as "family letters" in Chinese (家书), and they are distinguished from letters addressed to a general public which are considered as literary works in letter form. Because of different varieties of letters (e.g. business letters that include private matters), this terminology is not always found to be acceptable to Chinese historians.

The study of letters is an important part of both literary and cultural studies. Correspondences between writers like Goethe and Schiller, or the Schlegel brothers and Humbolt, preserve cultural memory. Goethe's letters to his various correspondents further show the writer's personal development. Since the 19th century, historiographical approaches have also made use of traditional correspondences. In the 20th century, there was a general rise in interest in the history and the daily lives of "small people", and correspondences of common people began to receive more attention. For example, letters written by soldiers during wars are not only considered as transmitters of their individual stories but also of the life and mindset of larger groups of people. In our case, the letters of the Hu family's migrant members are of considerable relevance for migration research. Firstly, since they depict the experiences of ordinary individuals living in culturally alien environments, they can be regarded as representative of the experience of being a Chinese migrant in Europe at that time. Secondly, since the letters are written media, they require interpretation which lends itself to objectivity and verifiability. Thirdly, the letters are a medium that convey certain perceptions, emotions, attitudes and assessments--all of which are of interest to migration researchers.

As a medium for the conveyance of memory, letters should be considered "not only as a pure transfer system, but also as converters. They form and shape the content

they carry. They are not copies of reality, but through their specific and different representation and narrative process they structure our thoughts, feelings and actions and thus memories" (Gudehus et al., 2010: 27).

All of the Hu family's 1,020 letters written between 1957 and 1985 were sent from Turin, Italy to China. Thanks to the recipient of these letters, Hu Lisong--who was a primary school teacher and known as an "intellectual" in his home village of Yuhu--we can obtain significant insight from their conversations. However, his own replies to the letters that he received have not been found. The reason for this is unclear; it may be explained by constant moving of the various recipients' residences, personal ways of handling the letters, or the return of the principal letter recipient Hu Yundi to China in 1992. The relationship of Hu Lisong to each of his correspondents are given in Fig. 4.

Fig. 4: The relationship of Hu Lisong with his correspondents



From left to right, top to bottom: 1. Grandfather Hu Yundi; 2. Eldest daughter of Hu Lisong; 3. Eldest son of Hu Lisong; 4. Second daughter of Hu Lisong; 5. Third daughter of Hu Lisong; 6. Second son of Hu Lisong; 7. Hu Lisong

3 The specificities of family letters

In Chinese tradition, family letters are a special form of written communication between family members who are usually separated by long distances, and in this case, they are sent between father and son. Du Fu (杜甫), a famous Chinese poet in the Tang Dynasty, for example, wrote in his poem "Spring View," "The beacons have burnt continuously for three months. A letter from home is worth ten-thousand pieces of gold."[5]

[5] 唐·杜甫《春望》诗: 烽火连三月，家书抵万金。

Traditional Chinese family letters have largely been influenced by aspects of Confucianism[6] and thus have three basic functions. Firstly, they are used to exchange information about the life situation of family members living far away from each other (reporting, e.g. personal information about the sender's health or safety). Secondly, they often fulfill an educational function. It is often the case that the author is from the older generation and also the head of the household[7]. In this role, he might feel obliged to advise the younger male generation by giving guidance and instructions founded on his own moral beliefs and certain traditional values (教子). In his letters, the father teaches the son how he should develop himself (修身) and his relationships with others (交友) as well as how to deal with "material" matters and the world (处世, 用人). Thirdly, confidential messages concerned with financial and other family matters (持家, 理财) are transmitted. These three functions correspond with the ethical canons of Confucius' book of rites, The Great Learning《大学》[8].

On the other hand, considered as valuable evidence for cultural studies, the family letters of Chinese migrants mainly exhibit the feature of imaginative cultural space. Particularly for Chinese who emigrated before the age of electronic communication, family letters became the main vehicle for collective communication used within families in order to overcome country-specific and geographical limits. Pen, paper and imagination represented a setting for cultural socialization with their relatives remaining at home as well as a part of their identity. Letter writing was an essential activity of cultural memory and was used to identify with the original culture. The imaginative cultural space thus facilitates collective memory.

(…)

[6] This is because the letter writer has often gained the ability to read and write through guided learning. In China, Confucianism plays a significant role in traditional education system.

[7] For example, the family letters of Fu Lei 《傅雷家书, or the family letters of Zeng Guofan 《曾国藩家书》

[8] This is a collective and cultural memory in itself. In *The Great Learning*, Confucius offers the following instruction: "The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire, first ordered well their own families. Wishing to order well their states, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge." (Legge 1992:3)

(…) I read your letter today, but then I had no more desire to do business. I am very angry. I have no chance to talk to people about it here. I can only be gloomy alone. (Letter 1957)

Another letter reads:

Both your parents are now abroad, and we do not yet know when we will go home. If possible, we will make a ride home next year. The very revered paternal and maternal grandparents have become old. If you move to Wenzhou, then it is not a one-off payment for the house there, but you shall also pay for its upkeep. Now you still work in Yuhu, but if you lived in Wenzhou, then it would be a disadvantage. You have a very spacious house (in Yuhu). It is well furnished and all in all it is very convenient. You should better make the decision after your parents have returned back.

(Letter 1961)

From the fact that the first generation of Chinese emigrants from Wencheng did not attain proficiency in any foreign language, we can conclude that they usually remained solitary and only found their places in small communities. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the writing of letters was an important opportunity for factual and emotional exchanges between family members. For the sender, Hu Yundi, writing the letters was not just a commonplace activity like the regular gatherings he had with his Chinese friends in Milan--a place he frequently mentioned in his letters--but an activity that allowed him to develop his imaginative cultural space. Letter writing promoted a mental and emotional balance.

An analysis of the 1,020 letters revealed that Hu Yundi sent at least one letter home every 10 days in the 28 years from 1957 to 1985. For him, the writing of letters seems to have been more than simply an intellectual activity but also an existential need.

Since not all members of the Hu family were literate, the writing of letters was a collective activity. Hu Yundi often wrote on behalf of his compatriots in Turin, where he lived, transmitting the messages of a large migrant group back to China. Received letters were usually read aloud in front of the entire family, thereby promoting communicative memory within the family. This is seen in the following letter excerpts:

My son Song,

(…)

Today I have heard that you will soon be working in the primary school in Zhuyang, and so I cannot transfer the foreign exchange to you in the future because your mother does not read and hence cannot handle letters and financial issues correctly.

(…)

If your boss does not approve this, then you quit your job and go back to the village. There you can become a farmer and grow crops. I, your father, will transfer you money so you can feed your family. But if you are stubborn and continue to stay in Zhuyang, then you have to support the family yourself.

Your father, Sep. 18th 1957

Another was written by Lisong's uncle:

Lisong my nephew,

The farewell has made me moody. I always think of you at night. Your father has told me that you are on the way home with Yuanshao and Xuanhong. A few days have passed. You should now be already at home. I would like to know whether Lai Zhengwen has said anything to you when you arrived (in Wenzhou). He has promised that (the permit) would take three weeks, at most one month.

(…)

Enough for today. I wish you good health!

Zhixian from Milan

Dec. 20th, 1971

PS: Please send my greetings to my nephews Yawei and Zhilai! At last, I will donate 200 RMB for the construction of the theater in Yuhu. Chuzheng will send the amount to you.

4 Cultural memory

Cultural memory is not easy to define, as the concept of culture is extensive and ambiguous. Can Chinese cultural memory, e.g. Confucian tradition, be identified with the Chinese emigrants over generations? Do Chinese emigrants still share the same values as their relatives and compatriots remaining in the homeland, based on a common cultural memory? And if so, in what forms?

A key feature of cultural memory is that its carrier does not vanish over time unlike the carriers of other forms of memory. According to Erll (2011), the key features of the concept of cultural memory fall into the following six categories: concreteness of identity, re-construction, material, organized awareness, commitment, and reflexivity. The letters of the Hu's family represent retrospective memory. In this form they construct a clear value position by which the family members can be identified. The letters possess a specific carrier – in this case literacy - and thus the "memory objects" are available. Finally, the letters of the Hu's family demonstrate that cultural memory reflects the living environments of the writer and the recipient as well as their self-images and characteristics.

In our case, the family letter is a typical example of cultural memory. Sociologist and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs, who decisively influenced the concept of “collective memory”, for example, pays much attention to the group specific memory (or social memory) as a component of the collective memory (Halbwachs, 1991:125). Cultural memory is based on communication and social memory--not just on individual memories. The history of Chinese emigrants living in Europe - a group composed of different generations, families, ethnicities and sometimes even religions - is illuminated in the 28-year-long correspondence by the central characteristics “filial piety”, “justice and ethics”, “influence of Confucian family values”, and “types of family relationships in Confucianism”.

Fig. 5 Chinese character for “filial piety”

A Confucian emphasis on "filial piety". According to Max Weber, piety is the basis of Confucian moral teaching[9]. Although Chinese emigrants in Europe mostly originated from countryside and lacked a high level of education, they generally adhered quite strongly to Confucian-based familial principals, showing that Confucianism is deeply rooted in the culture of common people, despite the “use” of Confucian ideologies by communistic politics and the forces behind China’s modernization process. Confucian morality is not a culture of the elite--as many outsiders believe--but rather has its solid foundation among Chinese farmers. This can be seen by their observance of filial piety. The Chinese character for piety is called "Xiao" and is composed of the characters for both "elder" and "son." Therefore, "Xiao" semantically implies "respect and care for the parents." The connotation of “Xiao” is a strong bottom-to-top orientation which suggests the kind of relationship a son should have with his father. The letter writer Hu Yundi played the role of a father and a son at the same time, as expressed in the following passages from his letters:

(…)

Your dear grandfather is over 70 years old, and it is not possible for him to work somewhere else. If you obey me, then after having received this letter, immediately go back to Yuhu. (Letter 1957)

(…)

[9] Max Weber: *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, 1951.

You should take care of your family and your mother. I am, of course, responsible for my parents, your grandparents, if they are financially in trouble. (Letter 1957)

In another letter from 1957, Hu Yundi wrote to his wife Xia Hehua who had lived briefly in Italy:

(…)

It is a great fortune that you have embraced piety and are taking care of the parents, which calms me a lot. You should take care of our son Lisong and daughter-in-law Yuemei, too. You should also watch over our youngest daughter Qiuguang and our grandchild Lizheng. It is a lot of work for you. Therefore, you should pay special attention to yourself so that I do not have to worry about you.

(…)

The money for the construction of the tomb of our parents is already on the way. I think the money will arrive in the next month. I know that the money that I paid this time appears limited to others. We have only 15 U.S. Dollars.

(Letter to his wife in 1957)

Confucian emphasis on "justice and rites (ethics)". The cultural memory created by the Hu's family’s correspondences often exhibited a clear observance of a principle of Confucian morality known as Yi (义) and Li (礼), i.e. justice and rites. This demonstrates yet again that the communicative and collective memory of Chinese emigrants in Europe were built at least partially upon Confucian ideologies. The Confucian interpretation of “justice” goes beyond regard for the legal system, emphasizing morally right behavior; the concepts "Yi" and “Li” imply behaviors considered just and obeying rites according to Confucianism (Gu, 1999). In ancient China, "Li" referred to customs and legal standards with compulsory liabilities. Confucius generally did not talk about the law of the state; nor are the legal terms which are familiar in the West found in Confucianism. Nevertheless, his moral teachings went beyond customs and manners to include a fixed code of conduct that offers instruction on “[how] to have the decency to deal with people, to greet, to behave in a particular form; the ways of the victims, the celebrations, festivals, rites at weddings, births, wars, changing days and nights, seasons, the stages of life, the

family, the treatment of guests, the functions of the house father, the priest, the form of life at the court, the officials" (Jaspers 1990:39). The Confucian interpretation of justice, or "Yi", is a matter of one's own behavior at the most personal and independent level. It is about being purely yourself. We also find traces of this perspective in the correspondences of the Hu's family:

(…)

If Kezai and Caihua come to you, tell them Keji is now in big (financial) trouble. He has a large family with five children. I've heard that many relatives and friends asked money from him. He had to behave differently, as he was in an embarrassing situation. I know his situation very well. His behavior is understandable. He has no choice. No matter what he does, somehow he will always be blamed. We simply do our best. (Letter to his wife, 1957)

(…)

Regarding the watches the girls have spoken, we parents are considering the following. The appeal of your sisters is understandable. Watches are useful for some people, but on the other hand, they are impractical for those who do physical work. They are your brothers and sisters, so they should get watches. The same goes for your good friends. (Letter 1961)

The influence of Confucian family values. "Family" is not only a central concept in traditional Confucianism but is also at the foundation of Chinese culture in general. The head of a nation's government can be seen as symbolically parallel to the head of a household, the patriarchal power in the family structure. In remote rural regions of China like Wencheng, kinship and hierarchical order of family members play important roles in family social structure, based on the Confucian principle of filial piety. The Hu's family--a family of farmers from Wencheng--exemplifies such a social structure, and their correspondences in this context can be seen as traditional cultural memory.

Fig. 6: Hu Yundi's place of birth

As a family structured by blood relationships, in the Hu's family in Italy the degree or proximity of blood relations determines the affinity of the family members, who emigrated gradually between 1957 and 1985. Hu Yundi emigrated twice to Europe himself - in 1933 and 1957 - both times bringing other relatives of the Hu family with him. By 2014, 51 members of the Hu's family had lived in Europe, and they represented four generations: sons, daughters, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of Hu Yundi. Within 29 years, Hu Yundi brought 16 blood relatives to Italy, France and the Netherlands, and he helped several hundreds of relatives to emigrate. As of 2014, the Hu's family clan has more than 500 relatives[10] in Italy alone. This family structure, which corresponds to the broad structure of the family in their home region of Wenzhou, also reflects the economic fabric of Chinese-owned family businesses in Europe: the family is the company, and the company is the family.

[10] Here, clan means family members related to Hu's ancestors.

Fig. 7: Order and dates of the Hu family's migrations



Confucianism is based on the belief that the state of the family as a micro-society can be reflected and influenced directly by the state of the whole society and vice versa. If every family is stable, then the larger society will also be stable. Conversely, if families are shattered, order cannot be maintained throughout the country. This idea has influenced Chinese family structure since before China's industrialization and still does so for families in the 21st century, especially those who live impoverished in rural regions. As Hu Yundi wrote in one of his 1,000-odd letters: "It is only the poverty in the country. That is the reason why I had to emigrate to Europe to do business." (Letter 1957.2). Most of the letters deal with two issues: financial issues (i.e. by whom, to whom, and how much money should be transferred) and emigration formalities.

Types of family relationships in Confucianism. If we look deeper into the letters, we find that within the Hu family, the allocation of family roles is still regulated by the Confucian principle that differentiates among five basic types of hierarchical human relationships:

1. Relationships between father and son (父子有亲), which emphasize the closeness of this blood relationship.

2. Relationships between superiors and subordinates (君臣有义), which emphasize the obedience of the latter group.

3. Relationships between husband and wife (夫妇有别), whereby obedience is required from the wife. A woman generally is subject to three types of obedience: obedience to her father prior to marriage; to her husband as long as she is married; and to her son if she becomes a widow.

4. Relationships between siblings (长幼有序), which emphasize a hierarchy according to age and greater respect for older siblings.

5. Relationships between friends (朋友有信), which contrast with the other four types of hierarchical relationships since these are non-hierarchical and friends can be considered as equals.

The following passages demonstrate the relationship between Hu Yundi and his wife Xia Hehua, which provides a good example of Confucian family roles.

Hehua my wife,

(…) I have received your letter. I am very happy that everything looks ***in order*** *at home. (…) The parents are very old, as well as the in-laws. It is a great fortune that you are exercising piety and taking care of the parents* ***on behalf of me****, which calms me a lot. You* ***should*** *take care of the son Lisong and daughter-in-law Yuemei too. You* ***should*** *also watch the youngest daughter Qiuguang and grandchild Lizheng. It is a lot of work for you. Therefore, you should pay particular attention to yourself, so that I do not have to worry about you.*

(…)

In the future, you do not need to do farm work; you should just stay at home and take care of the little ones. If the grain in the coming year is not enough, then you can buy some in autumn in advance. The price is not important; the important thing is that you have bought enough. The grain is a very important issue, which I cannot make a decision in Turin. Therefore, you should make the determination yourself. The money for the construction of the tomb of my parents is already on the way.

(…)

I think the money will arrive next month. I know that the money that I paid this time is limited. We have only 15 U.S. Dollars. The other 20 U.S. Dollars belong to Keji and Wanglin. I hope you understand me. This money is currently sufficient for you. (…)

(Letter to his wife, 1957)

According to the husband's understanding, his wife is mainly responsible for the children and the household. The practice of filial piety is rather the duty of the man. Because he is expected to bring money home, he was obliged to emigrate to Italy in order to do business since this was not possible at home. The expected obedience of the wife to fulfill all of husband's wishes can be recognized by the use of the modal verb "should." It seems that there is no space to discuss with each other.

5 Conclusion

Family letters of first-generation Chinese emigrants in Europe are physical representations of the imaginative spaces of memory. The epistolary legacy of the Hu's family embodies the central feature of the concept of "cultural memory". These letters strongly influenced the author's cultural identity and cross-cultural life experiences. Although they are products of the indivisible individual, they are also part of the larger collective and of the cultural contexts in which they are embedded. The surviving family letters of simple farmers and emigrants from Wencheng, Wenzhou might appear quite unspectacular, but their significance lies in their importance as a key form of media and as historical documentations of daily life in foreign societies; they furthermore give witness to the writers' emotions and cognitions, the basis for their decisions and actions. Finally, they provide insight into the writers' perceptions and experiences, which allows us to experience their fortune and misfortune in their existential cultural space.

Our study of the Hu's family letter collection has confirmed that Chinese Confucian values are influential for the cultural memory of families, for their wealth and happiness, as well as for the behavior of emigrating family members towards other members, their countrymen, and people in the host country. Confucian values are

found within communicative and collective memory, in spite of the fact that Chinese emigrants had no explicit background knowledge of Confucian philosophy. Although from the 1950s to the 1980s Confucianism was largely repelled in China due to the communist ideology, it has remained in the cultural memory of the people. The letter analysis shows that the Confucian-inspired lifestyles and its intrinsic values are deeply rooted in Chinese families--in this case exemplified by a family of the lowest social class. The study further shows how the Confucian tradition has been carried on as a cultural memory through written correspondences that served as the bearers of collective and communicative memory.

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Guanxi and the organisation of Chinese New Year festivals in England[1]

Yi Fu, Philip Long & Rhodri Thomas

1 Introduction

Chinese New Year (CNY) celebrations in England began in London in 1960 (Newell, 1989). They were small and generally confined to people of Chinese origin. By the 1990s, however, CNY celebrations had become more public and open to communities beyond the ethnic Chinese. Typically, attendees watch cultural performances, such as martial arts, dragon and lion dances, and acrobatics, and taste Chinese food. In many cases, annual CNY festival celebrations have now become regarded by city marketing agencies as spectacles that have the potential to attract tourists to their cities (Birmingham City Council, 2012; Visit London, 2012). CNY, alongside other festivals, are also seen as a vehicle for promoting policy goals such as 'community cohesion' or the development of business links with China. Although a few scholars (Benton & Gomez, 2001; Christiansen, 1998) have briefly mentioned CNY in their research on Chinese diaspora communities, limited attention has been given to CNY festivals held by these communities in England. Diaspora communities refer to the groups of people and their descendants who have left their homes and travelled across national boundaries to make new homes and workplaces (Brah, 1996).

In 2007, official statistics put the number of people who identified themselves as being of Chinese ethnicity living in England and Wales at 408,800 (Office for National Statistics, 2010). However, this figure disguises what is a complex picture as people of Chinese ethnicity in the UK include various groups, comprising those born in mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and other countries, and also their descendants. They speak different languages, and have different religious beliefs and ideologies, as well as other contrasting social

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and cultural characteristics. Thus, ethnic Chinese groups in Britain may possess a relative 'absence of community' in comparison with other ethnic minority groups in the UK (Benton & Gomez, 2011, p. 8). However, where there is a significant ethnic Chinese community living within an English city, they typically come together to produce a CNY festival, setting up committees to organise and produce local CNY festivals annually. Examples include the Chinese New Year Celebration Joint Committee in Sheffield, the Chinese Festivity Group in Newcastle-upon-Tyne and The Federation of Chinese Associations of Manchester (FCAM).

Chinese groups of Hong Kong-origin and mainland China-origin are the two largest ethnic Chinese communities in England. Most members of the former work in hospitality businesses and most of the latter are students and professionals studying and working temporarily though often for extended periods of several years (Dobbs, Green, & Zealey, 2006). The CNY festivals discussed in this paper are co-organised mainly by these two groups. This is in contrast to CNY festivals organised by one group such as the Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA) whose organisers and audiences tend to originate only from mainland China.

The institutional dynamics of these community-based, usually non-profit-making organisations, are rarely investigated and discussed. How do the CNY festivals reflect diversity among Chinese diaspora communities? How do the various 'subgroups' work together in the context of CNY festivals? This paper will seek to answer these questions. It discusses the interaction between Chinese subgroups during the organising process of CNY festivals, with particular reference to the role of *guanxi*, a concept associated with group and inter-personal relationships discussed in more detail later in the paper. *Guanxi,* reflects a traditional Confucian culture and is a unique contemporary socio-cultural phenomenon. As a result, the study will highlight a novel interactive process between Chinese people and groups in the context of CNY festivals, which will be relevant to scholars studying diaspora festivals and practitioners working in CNY festivals.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Festivals and Communities

Festivals, which conventionally have connections to religion and tradition (Pieper, 1999), take place all over the world in various forms. Contemporary festivals can be either the transformation of conventional events with a long history (such as Christmas) or new occasions created to respond to social, political, demographic, and economic realities (such as fairs and cultural programmes) (Picard & Robinson, 2006). Whatever form they take, an important characteristic of festivals is their sense of community. Winthrop (1991: 247) articulates that a festival is 'a product of social life' and reflects 'collective conceptions'. Stoeltje (1992) states: "Festivals are collective phenomena and serve purposes rooted in group life... Because (a) festival brings the group together and communicates about the society itself and the role of the individual within it, every effort either to change or to constrain social life will be expressed in some specific relationship to (the) festival." (Stoeltje 1992: 261-263)

Festivals can deliver a message about the shared values of a society, or convey the voices of the subgroups identified by such markers as social class, neighbourhood, and ethnicity (Stoeltje, 1992).

Anthropologists usually investigate the influence of festivals on communities by examining different groups' participation in festivals. Some of them, such as Turner (1995), suggest that festivals can relieve tensions between different groups and develop community unity when they join the same events and communicate with others. However, there are scholars, such as Magliocco (2006), who have found that festivals can be connected with more subtle, nuanced and complex relationships with communities. Such research interprets festivals in connection with social, economic and cultural changes that happen in times of social transformation when traditional social systems have been affected and society is divided by ideological conflicts.

Contemporary scholars of festival management studies such as Arcodia and Whitford (2007), Getz (2008) and Watt (1998) assess the functions of festivals by observing the collaboration (and/or conflicts) between stakeholders. The organisation and production of festivals often require the collaboration of multiple

stakeholders including individuals, organisations or social groups. The different groups bearing their own interests make necessary compromises to set up a negotiated basis for collaboration (Watt, 1998). Arcodia and Whitford (2007) argue that the celebration of festivals increases the social capital of the 'host' community through the cooperation of its different social groups. Larson (2002) suggests that the interactions between different social groups who participate in festivals may be characterised by conflict, competition and power struggles, which may threaten the collaborative relationship between those groups. These anthropological and management perspectives on festivals are applicable in the context of CNY. However, it is necessary to reflect on the particular characteristics and issues associated with festivals organised and performed by ethnic minority diaspora communities and it is to the field of diaspora studies that this paper now turns.

2.2 Diaspora Community Festivals

Despite the plethora of festival studies, it is rare to find systematic research into diaspora community festivals, in which anthropological and sociological perspectives have been employed more often than the management and organisational perspectives. Diaspora festivals are comparatively new forms of festival, emerging contemporaneously with the mass international migration that occurred throughout the twentieth century, particularly from the 1960s (Green & Scher, 2007). As Carnegie and Smith (2006: 255) have argued, diaspora festivals are the 'Festivals and events that have mobilised and recomposed, to varying extents, aspects of the culture of diasporic populations'. Diaspora festivals have also been seen as a means of preserving customs in diaspora communities (Mayfield & Crompton, 1995; Spiropoulos, Gargalianos, & Sotiriadou, 2006).

In terms of the influences of diaspora festivals on communities, anthropologists have found that they serve to construct, represent and enhance communities' ethnic identities, and create or reinforce group solidarity (Bankston & Henry, 2010; Becker, 2002; Carnegie & Smith, 2006; Labrador, 2002; Sinn & Wong, 2005; Spiropoulos, et al., 2006). However, some diaspora festivals express diaspora communities' longing for freedom, equality, or resistance, which reflects the contest between diaspora communities and 'mainstream' societies (Ferris, 2010).

According to these studies, diaspora festivals can have a positive influence, for example through promoting community unity while simultaneously creating or reflecting tensions between diaspora communities and 'mainstream' society or with other ethnic minority communities.

Research into the influence of diaspora festivals on communities is usually focused on the diaspora communities whose place of origin was the former colonies of Western countries. The Caribbean carnivals, such as the Notting Hill Carnival in London (Alleyne-Dettmers, 1998; Ferris, 2010), the Caribana carnival in Toronto (Jackson, 1992) and the carnival in Brooklyn, New York (Scher, 1999), are among those that have attracted the most attention. Most of these studies have a similar theme that demonstrates the Caribbean diaspora communities' struggle for legitimacy and status within the social order in which they are subordinated, exposing the tensions between the subordinated diaspora groups and the dominant 'host' community. Chinese diaspora communities' festivals tend to be neglected in diaspora festival studies. Thus, whether the existing findings on (diaspora) festivals apply to Chinese diaspora festivals is uncertain.

2.3 Chinese diaspora communities in Britain

Literature on diaspora communities is useful in the analysis of festivals and cultural events that are organised by and associated with minority populations (Green & Scher, 2007; Long & Sun, 2006). As Brah (1996) and Clifford (1992) argue, people who leave their homes, travel across national boundaries and make new home(s)/workplace(s), may be regarded as diasporas. According to Shuval (2000: 41), the term diaspora is now used metaphorically, which 'encompasses a motley array of groups such as political refugees, alien residents, guest workers, immigrants, expellees, ethnic and racial minorities, and overseas communities'. The common feature of these diverse groups of people is their experiences of living through cultural differences (Hall, 1990). All diasporas live on cultural borderlands and share spatial experiences with 'porous boundaries' (Ma, 2003: 22). Thus, diasporas construct their identities by means of negotiation, which reflects the cultural influences of home and host countries and also the differences between diaspora groups (Shi, 2005). According to Chan (1999), Chinese diasporas

throughout the world share the consciousness of Chineseness which recognises the heterogeneity and diversity within the global Chinese diaspora community: 'Chineseness does not need a country, a kingdom, or a state; it is a condition and that condition is sustained by its place in a community anywhere'. Further, commentators such as Shi (2005) and Zweig (2008), insist that Chinese students and professionals in the United States belong to the global Chinese diaspora because they engage in the community's activities, linking the home and host countries, and share the consciousness of Chineseness.

This observation is particularly important in the context of this research where some of the participants, Chinese students and scholars, are engaged in organising and producing CNY festivals together with ethnic Chinese people with British citizenship, and share the common consciousness of Chineseness with them. These students and scholars should be regarded as a part of the Chinese diaspora in England.

It is widely recognised that overseas Chinese communities are segmented according to speech groups (related to their place of origin) and the corresponding division of associations in America and Southeast Asia before the middle of the 20th century (Lyman, 1974). One fundamental reason is that their languages are mutually unintelligible. Having investigated the organisation of CNY festivals in England, we suggest that the present-day Chinese communities also have these speech-group differences. However, compared to the elaborate division by regional languages, such as Hokkien, Teochiu, Hakka, Cantonese and Hainanese (Lai, 2003), within the Chinese communities in America and Southeast Asia, the speech-group differences within the present Chinese communities in England are fewer (Benton & Gomez, 2011).

The biggest Chinese language speech-groups in England are Mandarin and Cantonese. The majority of their members are originally from mainland China and Hong Kong, respectively (Dobbs et al., 2006). There are smaller Chinese subgroups whose members are originally from South Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore (Dobbs et al., 2006). The Chinese diaspora communities from these areas tend to speak other regional languages as well as their native languages, for example Hokkien and Cantonese. Few of them also speak Mandarin. Like most studies investigating overseas Chinese communities (Lew & Wong, 2004; Wang,

1994), this research also examined the segmentation of the speech-community via Chinese associations: the membership of which was typically divided between people of mainland China-origin and people of Hong Kong–origin.

2.4 *Guanxi* and Chinese diaspora

This section discusses the literature on the characteristics of *guanxi* compared to personal networking in other cultures, and the implications of this for Chinese diaspora communities. *Guanxi* is usually defined as a personal relationship in Chinese culture (King, 1991; Machailova & Worm, 2003). *Guanxi* is cultivated through comparatively long-term interactions and developed through the exchange of information, gifts and economic favours based on mutual trust and assistance (Chen & Chen, 2009; Chua, Morris, & Ingram, 2008; Sum, 1999). Although personal networks occur in every society, the style and conventions of this varies in different cultural settings. Here it is argued that *guanxi* is a uniquely Chinese socio-cultural phenomenon because it is linked to traditional Confucian social theory and, in mainland China, is also related to the contemporary socio-economic system (Chua et al., 2008; Machailova & Worm, 2003).

Scholars, such as Chua et al. (2008), Luo (1997) and Fan (2002), have studied the differences between Chinese *guanxi* and western personal networking. Following such studies, the authors of this paper have summarised three major differences between the two concepts which will be the theoretical basis for the analysis on how the '*guanxi*', and not 'personal networking' between Chinese people has operated in the context of CNY organisational processes. Firstly, *guanxi* is based on the collectivism of Confucian theory in Chinese culture, whereas personal networking is more related to the individualism that is characteristic of (most) western societies (Fan, 2002; Luo, 1997). Thus, in Chinese culture, (extended) families are prioritised over individuals and the *guanxi* between (extended) family members is thought of as being more important than other individual and personal relationships (e.g. friendship) (Chua et al., 2008). This feature of *guanxi* determines that Chinese people need to perform obligations (such as mutual assistance) for their (extended) family members even though they may not be affectively close. Such obligations are arguably much scarcer in many western societies. Second,

the *guanxi* between Chinese people often reflects the blending of instrumental (e.g. economic dependence including personal loans and budget allocation) and affective relationships. Thus, in *guanxi*, economic dependence may serve to strengthen the affective relationships between two individuals. However, in contrast western cultures may seek to limit or avoid economic dependence in their personal networks (Chua et al., 2008; Machailova & Worm, 2003). Third, through the mediation of *guanxi*, the exchange of services, gifts and resources happens in work places regularly in Chinese society and arguably more so than in other cultures (Chua et al., 2008; Machailova & Worm, 2003).

The comparative studies on '*guanxi*' and 'personal networking' have not concluded that '*guanxi*' has one particular characteristic that 'personal networking' does not have, and vice versa. However, the two concepts do differ at least in the extent of expectations of reciprocity. For example, *guanxi* and personal networking can both involve the blending of instrumental and affective relationships. However, for *guanxi*, this phenomenon is more in Chinese society. Among the existing comparative studies on *guanxi* and personal networking (Chua et al., 2008; Fan, 2002; Luo, 1997; Pearce & Robinson, 2000; Wong & Chan, 1999), most focus on '*guanxi*' possessed by or between business people in mainland China. The planned economy in mainland China determines that the connections between business people and officials in governments are important. In this context, the instrumental relationships (e.g. economic dependence) that *guanxi* reflects may be more obvious than in other national contexts. Therefore, research is needed on how Chinese people's *guanxi* works in other international contexts, such as, in this case, CNY festivals in England.

There are basically two types of *guanxi* in Chinese society: that which is preordained and that which is voluntarily constructed (King, 1991). The family relationship discussed above is the first type. It is related to a strong traditional notion of lineage, which emphasises the loyalties and obligations of family and kinship in Chinese society (Haley, Tan, & Haley, 1998). The second type of *guanxi* is constructed voluntarily through social interaction, based on shared 'attributes' such as locality (native place), kinship, surname, or schooling (Jacobs, 1979; King, 1991). The Chinese terminology for *guanxi* explicitly recognises this commonality: the word *tong*, meaning 'same' or 'shared', is followed by a word describing the

commonality, such as 'native-place' (*tongxiang*), 'education' (*tongxue* or *tongchuang*) or 'place of work' (*tongshi*) (Jacobs, 1979, p. 243). Both the preordained and the voluntarily constructed *guanxi* pervade Chinese diaspora communities (Cheung, 2004; Lew & Wong, 2004). For example, the overseas lineage associations reflect the strong (extended) family relationships between their members. The traditional Chinese geographical and dialect associations are typically based on the shared attributes of native places and languages.

Guanxi plays a significant role in the collective actions of Chinese diaspora communities. Due to the connection of *guanxi* based on the same surname and place of origin, Chinese diaspora associations organise Chinese people's collective visits to their hometowns (Lew & Wong, 2004). Another example of the importance of *guanxi* is in Indonesia where the ethnic Chinese community has established strong *guanxi* networking in order to develop the community's economic power (Cheung, 2004). *Guanxi* between the overseas Chinese organisation members helps them to realise purposes such as chain emigration based on lineage and family relationships, and mutual support in host societies (Lyman, 1974) and also, controversially, in the development of industry monopolies (Benton & Gomez, 2011).

The literature on the *guanxi* of Chinese diaspora communities tends to focus on its positive influences. Chinese diasporas establish *guanxi* to promote the solidarity of the Chinese diaspora communities, and to protect and develop the interests of minority groups (Putnam, 1993). Contrarily, the literature on the *guanxi* of Chinese society in mainland China usually emphasises the negative influences of *guanxi*. Backman (1999) describes how in traditional Chinese society, which lacks a strong legal and commercial system, *guanxi* has been credited with allowing early Chinese entrepreneurs to succeed and exclude others. Viewed in this light, *guanxi* can lead to nepotism, favouritism, corruption, group oppression and limits on one's freedom of behaviour (Lew & Wong, 2004). People use *guanxi* networks to obtain benefits and to satisfy personal demands (Zhai, 2009). *Guanxi* networks have divided Chinese society into various interlinked interest groups, which has seriously damaged social equality (Zhai, 2009). Thus, the existing literature on *guanxi* provides two extreme perspectives based on different contexts; overseas Chinese diaspora communities and Chinese society in mainland China. This research

examines whether these arguments apply to Chinese diaspora communities' participation in Chinese New Year festivals in England, and also whether Chinese peoples need to develop and use different *guanxi* to organise and produce CNY festivals, and if so, what roles *guanxi* play on those occasions.

3 Fieldwork and research methods

The research employed a case-study approach involving qualitative methods and techniques. The CNY festival in Sheffield was chosen as the main case and those in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Manchester, Liverpool, and Nottingham were also examined. The four qualitative methods used for data gathering were participant observation, semi-structured interviews, documentation analysis, and direct observation. Each method was employed to collect data for the topic from different perspectives.

Participant observation made an important contribution to data gathering. One of the research team members, a Chinese national citizen, worked as a volunteer member of the Sheffield CNY festival organising committee between September 2008 and January 2009. 'Participant observers can be insiders who observe and record some aspects of life around them, or they can be outsiders who participate in some aspects of life around them and record what they can' (Bernard, 2000, p. 321). In this study, as an 'insider' of the Sheffield CNY festival organising committee, the researcher observed and recorded how the Chinese communities cooperated and dealt with the difficulties and tensions that emerged during the organisation process of CNY festivals. She also participated in the related social activities, which provided valuable insights into the life styles, social activities, and attitude to others of those organising the CNY festival. When conducting participant observation, notes were made and, where possible, a research diary was written after one-day activities.

Twenty two semi-structured interviews were conducted during which interviewees were encouraged to have open-ended discussions on the organisational process of CNY festivals and the interactions and relationships between Chinese groups. The interviewees were representatives of the organisations that participated in the CNY festivals in the case cities. Most of the interviews lasted between one hour and one

hour and a half. Twenty six interview questions were developed. Table 1 shows the question list. In the table, the boldfaces before the questions show the themes and keywords that were defined to reflect each element of the broad issues on the festival organisational process and the interactions between Chinese groups, according to the research aim and literature review.

The CNY festivals in Sheffield, Nottingham, Liverpool, Manchester, and Newcastle-upon-Tyne were also directly observed by one of the research team members as a non-participant. First, observations of staff training sessions, daily organisational work and meetings provided additional information on the overall context and environmental conditions of the CNY festivals and Chinese diaspora communities. Second, the researcher observed how Chinese subgroups worked together on the days of CNY festivals at the event venues e.g. how decisions made during the organisational process were carried out on the event days. In this way, data collected via direct observation could be compared with those collected via participant observation and other methods. During the direct observational activities, fieldwork notes were made and photographs were taken. After returning from the field, photographs were interpreted into written records that were saved along with the fieldwork notes in separate folders for each case.

Table 1: Basic interview questions

Introductory questions

1. **Personal or/and association status for the CNY festivals.** Which position/responsibilities?
2. **Association history.** Introduce the association history.
3. **History of the local CNY festivals.** Introduce the history of the local CNY festivals.
4. **Motivation for participation.** Why did you/your association participate in CNY festivals?

Overall Organisation process

5. **Organisation process.** How is the whole organisation process?
6. **Difficulties in the organising process.** What difficulties and how to solve the difficulties?
7. **Languages.** What working and out of work languages were used during the organisation process?
8. **Meeting process and decision making.** How to make decisions?
9. **Finances.** Where to get financial support and how?
10. **CNY committee staff.** Who were they and which Chinese communities were they from?
11. **Publicity and promotion.** How to promote the events? Who was the target audience?
12. **Event venue.** Why to choose this venue?

Interactions between the Chinese subgroups

13. **Associations and subgroups.** Which associations and subgroups involved in the CNY festivals?
14. **Motivations for cooperation.** Why did you work together for the CNY festivals?
15. **Leadership**. Who? how did he/she come to take on this role?
16. **Responsibilities and task distribution.** How to divide the responsibilities and tasks? What were they?
17. **Programme and performance.** How to design programme and choose performance?
18. **Development of the working pattern.** Why to work in this way - with the other groups?
19. **Evaluation of the style of working.** Compared to individual CNY festivals, any difficulties, advantages, or disadvantages for this style of working?
20. **Performers**. Who were they? Why to choose them?
21. **Audiences.** Who was the audience?
22. **Languages.** Which languages did you use at the CNY festivals?
23. **Media.** Which media reported on the event? Who was the target audience?

Concluding questions

24. **Overall evaluation.** How to evaluate the CNY festival(s)?
25. **Expectation of the organisation and production of the CNY festivals.** What changes, if any, would help to improve the organisation and production of the CNY festivals?
26. **General comments.** CNY festivals' functions, influences, implications, etc.?

A variety of documents were also used in this research. These included administrative documents, proposals for funding, emails, memoranda, minutes of meetings, contracts, budgets, photographs, videos, and national and local newspaper articles. All documents were summarised or described in words for future data analysis. Many documents were collected on site visits, during the periods of participant and direct observation, as well as in the interviews, especially in the case of archived organisational reports and statistical data. In this study, the three methods (participant observation, direct observation, and interviewing) usually yielded information relating only to the CNY festivals in 2008 and 2009. However, the documentary evidence compensates for the absence of historical information, which helped to understand how the relationships between Chinese subgroups were built up and developed in the context of CNY festivals.

There were several stages associated with data management, coding, and analysis. The first step was to convert the raw data into words. The interview recordings were transcribed, observations were written in fieldwork notes and research diaries, and written documents and pictures were summarised or described in words. The second stage involved coding data into the external and internal context of CNY festivals and Chinese communities, and the interactions between Chinese communities in the context of CNY festivals (Table 2). The first column has a brief descriptive label stating the general categories and the individual codes. The second column states the codes. According to these codes, the word documents prepared previously were coded thematically. Figure 1 illustrates this process. In order to explain the interactions between the Hong Kong-origin people in the Sheffield CNY festivals, the external and internal factors were identified. Then, a thorough thematic index was developed with clear headings and a hierarchical tree (Fig. 1).

Table 2: The code list for data analysis (to be continued on next page)

External context	**EC**
History of Chinese communities in Britain	**EC-CCHIST**
Characteristics of Chinese communities in Britain	**EC-CCCHAR**
Demographics	**EC-DEM**
Subgroups' development	**EC-SUBDELP**
Inter-subgroup relations	**EC-INTERSUB**
Interactions between diasporas and host society	**EC-DIAS-BRI**
Interactions between diasporas and China	**EC-DIAS-BHN**
Britain-China connection	**EC-GB-CN**
Britain-Hong Kong connection	**EC-GB-HK**
Britain-Southeast Asia connection	**EC-GB-SA**
Internal context	**IC**
CNY festival history	**IC-FHIST**
CNY festival committee history	**IC-FCHIST**
Current organisation structure	**IC-ORGS**
Current organisation constitution	**IC-ORGC**
Development of the local Chinese community	**IC-CCDELP**
Interactions between diasporas and host society	**IC-DIAS-BRI**
Interactions between diasporas and China	**IC-DIAS-CHN**
Interactions between local city and China	**IC-CICY-CHN**
Change of CNY organisation structure	**IC-ORGS/CHANGE**
Change of CNY organisation constitution	**IC-ORGC/CHANGE**
Organisation process	**OP**
Leadership of CNY committees	**OP-CNYLEAD**
Work pattern	**OP-WP**
Financial management	**OP-FM**
Programme design	**OP-PD**
Performers	**OP-PERS**
Local Chinese performers	OP-PERS/LOCAL CHN
Local non-Chinese performers	OP-PERS/LOCAL NON-CHN
Performers from China	OP-PERS/CN
Performers from Hong Kong	OP-PERS/HK
Languages	**OP-LAN**

Working languages	OP-LAN/WORK
Social languages	OP-LAN/CASUAL
Promoting CNY festivals	**OP-PROMOTE**
Publicising CNY festivals	**OP-PUBLICISE**
CNY venues	**OP-VENUE**
Guests invited	**OP-VIP**
Local guests	OP-LOCALVIP
Guests from China	OP-CNHVIP

Data triangulation, informant triangulation, method triangulation and theoretical triangulation were used in this study. First, data collected from the interviews were compared with the direct and participant observation, and the various secondary data. Second, the views of the interviewees from the different subgroups were compared to achieve informant triangulation. Third, the findings of the participant observation were cross-checked with those from the semi-structured interviews, direct observation, and documentation. Theoretical triangulation was achieved by comparing the existing theoretical perspectives, especially from (diaspora) festival studies and (Chinese) diaspora studies, through which the researchers defined and integrated the dissimilarities.

Figure 1: Interactions between the Hong Kong-origin people in CNY organisation (Sheffield)



4 Research Results and Analysis:

4.1 Using *guanxi* to establish joint CNY committees

This and the following sections discuss how Chinese people's *guanxi* 'works' in the organisational processes of CNY festivals. The overall process of the establishment of CNY joint committees in different cities was found to be quite similar. At the beginning, a few Chinese people, who usually had good reputations and were well-known in their local Chinese communities, initiated the idea of collaborating to organise a CNY festival. These people were usually regarded as leaders in the local Chinese communities. They used their *guanxi* to call on the other leaders of local Chinese associations to join with them to produce a CNY festival. There were two situations for the establishment of CNY festival organisations; one was when the leaders of the local Chinese communities had *guanxi* directly with the leaders of certain Chinese associations; the other was when they did not have such close connections.

The first situation usually happened between the leaders of the Chinese associations whose origins were from the same place, either in Hong Kong or mainland China. The leaders of the Chinese associations who traced their origins to the New Territories in Hong Kong typically came to England reliant on the basis of family connections and also British colonial era citizenship rights after the Second World War. Most of them belonged to the chain migration of the second Chinese migration wave to Britain from 1948 (Benton & Gomez, 2001; Goulbourne, 1991). These New Territories Chinese migrants were found to possess preordained *guanxi*, based on blood relationships and voluntarily constructed *guanxi* based on the same locality in the New Territories (Benton & Gomez, 2001; Christiansen, 2003). The leaders of the Chinese associations in Sheffield were not widely found to have preordained *guanxi,* though some association leaders claimed their parents were from the same lineage or had the same surname. The chair of the Sheffield Chinese Community Centre, who has become the chair of the Sheffield Committee since 2003, stated: "In 2003, for the first CNY celebration, I called the chairs of (the) different associations to ask them if they wanted to take part in CNY celebration. We've known each other well. So they came for the meeting…" (Interviewer: "How did you know each other?") "We or our parents were originally from the same villages…maybe not exactly the same…but very close… In New Territories, every

village has one surname. It's a big family. So after our parents moved to here, they still knew each other very well… and helped each other. For my generation, we also helped each other… CNY celebration is just one case."

The interviewee clearly suggested that preordained *guanxi* based on family relationships to a large extent involved obligations of mutual support. To cooperate to organise CNY festivals is an extension of the performance of such obligations. This indicates that the ideology of family relationships has a strong influence on the interactions between the leaders of the Hong Kong-origin associations, which to some extent echoes the argument emphasising the powerful influence of family relationships compared to other forms of *guanxi* (Chua et al., 2008; King, 1991).

The other type of *guanxi*, i.e. that based on the same locality (native place), was more widely seen among the leaders of Chinese associations in Sheffield. The representative of the Lai Yin Association (Lai Ying) described their personal relationship with the chair as follows: "We all run catering businesses here, although ours are on this side of the road. His is on the other side of the road. But we have known each other for a long time…We were all from New Territories…we speak the same language. We invited him to attend our individual CNY celebration….and he came. So when he suggested do a common celebration, why not?"

From the interview transcripts, the informants attributed their relationships to the same native place bound with the same native language (Cantonese or/and Hakka), and also with some other shared attributes, such as experience of migration and running a catering business. In their eyes, it accounted for them being affectively close and helped maintain *guanxi,* which, similar to family relationships, determined that they had an obligation of mutual support (King, 1991). Despite such shared attributes, they also had long-term interactions that helped them maintain mutual *guanxi.* The leader of the Sheffield Chinese Church (SCC) described the interactions between them and the initiator of Sheffield CNY Joint Committee: "We (the SCCC and SCC associations) always support each other. When he asked us to take part in CNY celebrations, we didn't take it so special. We just came and support him".

These New Territories Chinese migrants, therefore, had maintained their *guanxi* over a long period of time, either through association activities or personal

interactions, before the establishment of the CNY organisation committee. It is interesting, and perhaps surprising, that *guanxi* can also be found to operate even when organisations such as the CSSA - which receives funding from the Chinese government and/or companies - are present. The personal *guanxi* between the leaders of the CSSA-Nottingham and the manager of Expressing Travel, a travel agency specialising in the ethnic Chinese market, was claimed as an important motivator for their collaboration: "Other associations are usually run by the Hong Kong Chinese. We are both from mainland China. I used to be a member of CSSA. We have known each other for a couple of years. It is much easier to work with people you know more and trust more…This is *guanxi*". This illustrates the key argument that *guanxi* based on shared ancestral origins and/or native places may be found among both Hong Kong-origin and mainland China–origin Chinese communities.

The second situation happened when the leaders of Chinese communities did not have direct *guanxi* with the leaders of particular Chinese associations. This was exemplified where Hong Kong-origin British-Chinese community leaders did not have *guanxi* with mainland China-origin association leaders. The latter were invited to join CNY committees because their associations were thought to be useful for the festivals by being able to provide performances, volunteers and importantly potential links to Chinese government representatives in the UK. In Sheffield, the Hong Kong-origin chair of the Sheffield Committee sought the help of a go-between who had *guanxi* with the leaders of CSSA-Sheffield to make the connection. This go-between was one of his own staff members in the Sheffield Chinese Community Centre (SCCC) who used to be a member of CSSA-Sheffield and had personal *guanxi* with its leaders.

Similar examples were also found in the CNY committees of the other case study cities. In the case of the CNY Festival 2009 in Manchester's Chinatown, the chair of The Federation of Chinese Associations of Manchester (FCAM) did not have *guanxi* with the leader of the CSSA-Manchester and had to ask the chair of the Jin Long Academy [2] to liaise as the latter used to be a member of the CSSA-Manchester. The chair of the Jin Long Academy commented that his association and the CSSA-Manchester had worked together on different social

events before the Manchester CNY Festival 2009 had supported each other's activities. The leader of the CSSA-Manchester validated this statement: "I (and CSSA-Manchester) went there to help them because of Chen (the chair of Jin Long Academy), not because of (any) other (people)…. We have a very good *guanxi* with Chen" In this situation, having *guanxi* with the initiators of the CNY joint committees was an important factor for them to consider as they deliberated on whether to join the committees.

From the above discussion it could be argued that within the CNY organisations, Chinese people of Hong Kong-origin usually had *guanxi* with each other, based on the same native place and/or shared lineage or surname. People of mainland China-origin also had their *guanxi* within their own subgroups, which was usually based on the same locality of mainland China. It was rare that *guanxi* existed between the Chinese people who were respectively from the two subgroups. This influences the power relations between them, which will be discussed later in the paper.

4.2 Using *guanxi* to seek advertising or sponsorship from the Chinese communities in England

Apart from local governmental grants, advertising was an important source of income for the CNY festivals. According to internal financial reports and the programme lists of the Sheffield CNY festivals 2004-2010, most sponsors were from the Chinese communities, particularly Chinese restaurants, companies and organisations that had many Chinese customers. Indeed, during this six-year period, forty four were Chinese and only six were not.

Most of the sponsors for the Sheffield CNY festivals had supported the events for two or three years and had placed advertisements in the programme in each of these years. Their parents, who shared the same surname or lineage, were previously villagers of the New Territories. They inhabited the London Road area after the Second World War and developed a community with close *guanxi* based on their shared New Territories origins. Even now, there are still interlaced extended family *guanxi* networks in the London Road area. As the chair of the Sheffield Committee said: "There are restaurants opened by brothers…or relatives

on the street, maybe neighbours, maybe on this side or the other side of the street. If you can access one of them, you can access others". This is consistent with the findings of Meridien Pure (2006) that traditional Chinese immigrants, particularly those of Hong Kong-origin Chinese, are concentrated around London Road – a 'Sheffield Chinatown' that is becoming increasingly recognised locally as such. This is believed to be helpful in developing and maintaining *guanxi*, and very important in securing sponsorship for the CNY festivals in recent years. However, the close *guanxi* probably isolates other Chinese subgroups not located in London Road and the areas around it. Such a phenomenon is also a characteristic of other English cities such as Newcastle-upon-Tyne. However, in recent years, a growing number of sponsors of mainland China-origin have supported the CNY celebrations there.

From the above discussion, it is argued that the Hong Kong-origin Chinese, including the members of the CNY organisations, tended to have close *guanxi*. Close *guanxi* means 'Network ties that are located in the most inner circle of an ego's *guanxi* net and are characterized by high levels of sentiment and obligation' (Chen & Chen, 2009, p. 38). However, because of the distant *guanxi* between its members and the mainland China-origin association members, the mainland China-origin Chinese tended to have non-close *guanxi*. Non-close *guanxi* refers to 'Ties that are located at the periphery and carry relatively low levels of sentiment and obligations' (Chen & Chen, 2009, p. 38). The implications of this observation will be analysed in the following two sections.

4.3 The close *guanxi* between the chair and other committee members of Hong Kong-origin

The Chinese members of Hong Kong-origin associations within the CNY organisations had exchanged favours over many years. The Sheffield CNY Committee is an example of this. It had four Chinese associations as members; three were of Hong Kong-origin (SCCC, SCC and Lai Yin) and one was of mainland China-origin (CSSA-Sheffield). The chair of the committee had personal business connections with the current chair of the SCCC; the former had sold the services of one of his restaurants to the latter, who paid him rent. The chair described the reciprocal benefits of their relationship: "We support each other in business, but also on other occasions. She (the current chair of SCCC) helped me become the chair of SCCC. I also help her family business. She and her husband run a printing shop on the London Road. I've helped them a lot". The *guanxi* between the chair of the Sheffield Committee and the SCCC was the blending of economic and affective relationships. Such *guanxi* also commonly occurred between other leaders of Hong Kong-origin associations. It has been suggested that such personal relationships closely bound with economic exchanges are less prevalent in other, Non-Chinese cultures (Chua et al., 2008).

Due to such close *guanxi*, the chairs of the Sheffield Committee and the SCCC exchanged favours associated with the CNY festivals. The chair of the Sheffield Committee invited the chair of the SCCC to attend the China-Sheffield Business Network of the Sheffield CNY festival. In doing so, he shared his personal *guanxi* network with her. She, as the current chair of the SCCC, agreed that he used his status of being representative of the SCCC to conduct social activities and interactions with the wider community in Sheffield, even though he did not work in the SCCC at that time. This enabled him to build name recognition which may be helpful for him to do business and achieve social mobility in the future. Moreover, when the chair of the Sheffield Committee was the leader of SCCC, he appointed or recruited staff members for the SCCC who later became his supporters on the committee. The chair also helped the SCCC's Centre Manager to obtain this position. He also provided suggestions when the Centre Manager met with difficulties in her work, even after he had resigned from his position at the SCCC.

Aside from the close *guanxi* between the chair of the Sheffield Committee and the association leaders of Hong Kong-origin, the association members of Hong Kong-origin within the CNY organisations had exchanged favours before joining the Committee. For example, in terms of association activities, they attended each other's association events and promoted their respective services. In terms of private interactions, they supported each other's businesses, loaned money mutually and even took care of their families' children when necessary. Therefore, the members of Hong Kong-origin associations had a long history of exchanging favours and close *guanxi*. However, such close *guanxi* was rarely found to exist between the members of Hong Kong-origin associations and those of mainland China-origin.

Some interviewees believed that the close *guanxi* between the members of Hong Kong-origin associations influenced the interactions between them within the Sheffield Committee. For example, the chair of the Sheffield Committee said: "…we usually support each other very well. I think it's necessary, because we need to be together to protect ourselves in this country….But sometimes I think it is obligation. You have to support other people. If you don't, other people will know…such as his association members… then their families, relatives or friends. You know, it is a network… then bad words…maybe not bad, but not nice... will come to you and your families. Sometimes even your relatives in the hometown (New Territories in Hong Kong) heard the rumours. In Chinese culture, we say *huaishi chuan qianli* (bad news has wings)…"

This finding is similar to that found by Christiansen's (1998) investigation of the Chinese community in Birmingham, namely that Chinese diasporas have two behaviours to support each other: keeping 'face' (respect) with each other and having *guanxi* with the members of different Chinese associations. As for the Sheffield CNY festivals, the chair of the Sheffield Committee held the highest power position. The SCCC controlled the finance and administration of the Sheffield CNY festivals. The close *guanxi* between the leaders or representatives of Hong Kong-origin motivated them to support the chair and the SCCC and protect their power in the committee. Thus, since 2004, when the Sheffield Committee was established, the chair and the function of SCCC had never changed. In this way, they looked after the interests of the community of Hong Kong-origin as a collective,

which weakened the interests of the non-close *guanxi* group, the community of mainland China-origin. As Garapich (2008) suggests, if a group having greater power in a diaspora community is regarded as a bounded object, it is not only to legitimise and fix power relations within the diaspora community but also to deny the ability of others within the community to contest a given social structure and dominant discourse.

4.4 The mainland China-origin associations develop close *guanxi* with newcomers

The mainland China-origin associations were usually non-close *guanxi* associations because of the distant *guanxi* between its members and the Hong Kong-origin association members. However, their members were found to develop close *guanxi* with newcomers such as the Confucius Institute which joined the Sheffield Committee in 2009. The Institute was established to conduct Chinese language (Mandarin) teaching and also research into Chinese culture. It has strong connections with the Chinese government's education department and also with universities in both China and the UK. Among the academic staff working in the Sheffield branch of the Institute, around two thirds are scholars of mainland China-origin and one third Western scholars. Many of the Chinese staff of the Confucius Institute and the members of the CSSA-Sheffield share places of origin and language, Mandarin, along with similar educational backgrounds and close connections with China, all of which are important in constructing *guanxi*.

The members of the CSSA-Sheffield and the Confucius Institute had maintained close *guanxi* in their personal lives. Some members of the two associations have travelled together on holiday within the UK. The close *guanxi* between the members of the CSSA and the Confucius Institute was found to have increased the former's influence on the committee. As the chair of the CSSA-Sheffield in 2009 commented: "We used to be the only mainland China-origin association (on the committee). They are all from the Chinese group of Hong Kong-origin. We have a lot of differences. Now the Confucius Institute has entered…. You know, we're just like a family… (we) have a lot of connections. Most of us are friends…. Although some of them are not Chinese… some of them are Chinese of mainland China-origin, we have a lot of similarities. We can communicate very well… (we)

understand each other. We usually have (a) common understanding of the performances… we can communicate and reach the agreement. So when we talk to the committee, we have more influence."

Although the close *guanxi* between these association members of Mainland China-origin was not found to have influenced the decisions made by the Hong Kong-origin associations, they had increased their influence in the CNY committee. In the earlier years of Sheffield CNY festivals, the CSSA-Sheffield's role in the Sheffield Committee was almost solely to provide performances. However, since the Confucius Institute participated in the Sheffield Committee in 2009, the CSSA-Sheffield has cooperated with them and eventually taken over the key function of programme design and stage management of the Sheffield CNY festivals.

It could be argued that the Hong Kong-origin associations and individuals acted as an interest group. This not only helped them to maintain control of the CNY joint committee in terms of its leadership and finance, but also protected the interest of the community of Hong Kong-origin as a collective thereby weakening the interest of the community of mainland China-origin. Furthermore, the close *guanxi* between the association members of Hong Kong-origin and between the mainland China-origin members of the CSSA-Sheffield and the Confucius Institute, the non-close *guanxi* between the individuals on the two sides, increased the segmentation of the Chinese communities in Sheffield. When they pursue the interests of their communities, the segmentation between them intensified the competition between the two sides and brought about tensions. For example, the individuals of Hong Kong-origin shared and expanded their *guanxi* networks by using CNY festivals to conduct social activities, including organising banquets and visiting stakeholders, which were thought helpful to accumulate their social resources. However, because these activities usually excluded the individuals of mainland China-origin, they were criticised for threatening the nature of collaboration of CNY festivals. Meanwhile, the mainland China-origin individuals and associations had gradually controlled the supply and management of performances and programmes for CNY festivals, which decreased the involvement of Hong Kong-origin associations and individuals in those aspects of CNY festivals.

In this sense, it may be argued that the involvement of CSSAs with their mainland China-origin members in the CNY festivals probably weakened the traditional role of *guanxi* in the organisational processes of CNY festivals, in which the Hong Kong-origin Chinese usually played the leading role. The CSSAs in different British cities are supervised and partially sponsored by the Chinese government. Their members look for sponsors who may not have initial *guanxi* with them. However, it has also been found that the members of CSSAs used the CNY festivals as opportunities to develop relationships with officials of the Chinese government at different levels. Similar to the business people who use *guanxi* with the government officials and gifts in mainland China (Chua et al., 2008; Machailova & Worm, 2003), the members of CSSA also develop such *guanxi* with strong utilitarian purposes, for example for obtaining good jobs. If the influence of the Chinese government on the CNY festivals of Chinese diaspora communities in England is increased in the future, the *guanxi* between the members of CSSA and the Chinese government officials will play a more significant role in CNY festivals. This may lead to increased tension between the Hong Kong-origin British Chinese community and the mainland China-origin Chinese community.

5 Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to discuss the organisational processes of Chinese diaspora communities' festivals, and particularly the role of *guanxi*. The research focused on Chinese New Year (CNY) festivals and Chinese diaspora communities in English cities. Most scholars, e.g. Ma (2003) and Shi (2005), currently suggest that an important feature of diasporas is that they share experiences of living through cultural differences and share spatial experiences with 'porous boundaries' (Ma, 2003, p. 22). In this study, Chinese students and professionals in England were considered as belonging to the Chinese diaspora communities. They were engaged in organising and producing CNY festivals together with ethnic Chinese people with British citizenship, and share a common consciousness of Chineseness with them. The largest Chinese communities in England comprise people of mainland China-origin (Mandarin-speaking) and Hong Kong-origin (Cantonese-speaking and usually British citizens).

Most research on *guanxi* focuses on the area of business (Chua et al., 2008; Fan, 2002). Uniquely, this study has found that *guanxi* played an important role in the organisation of CNY festivals. First, Chinese community leaders used *guanxi* networks to seek the help of different association leaders for the purpose of establishing CNY committees. Second, Chinese diasporas used *guanxi* to access sponsors for CNY festivals. Thus, personal *guanxi* helped in the formation of partnerships of Chinese communities for the purpose of organising CNY festivals. This demonstrates that personal *guanxi* served to enhance the solidarity of Chinese diaspora communities.

This research has also found that *guanxi* could intensify competition between the Chinese communities in the context of CNY festivals. Within the CNY joint committees, the Chinese diaspora of Hong Kong-origin usually had close *guanxi* based on common attributes and past exchanges of favours. Due to this close and often long-established *guanxi*, the Chinese diaspora of Hong Kong-origin formed united interest groups within CNY joint committees, which gave them more control. The Chinese diaspora of mainland China-origin did not usually have close *guanxi* with the Chinese diaspora of Hong Kong-origin. They tried to develop close *guanxi* with the individuals of non-Hong Kong-origin, usually the new members of CNY committees, which helped them to increase their influence on the committees. The close and distant *guanxi* increased the division between the Hong Kong-origin and mainland China-origin communities, which intensified the competition between the two and arguably brought about tensions. This research has demonstrated, therefore, that in Chinese diasporas' *guanxi* may involve both positive and negative implications for Chinese diaspora communities and their festivals. Practitioners and non-Chinese stakeholders involved with Chinese diaspora festivals need to understand the complexity of, and adapt to, the *guanxi* phenomenon if they are to engage effectively with the organisational processes of CNY festivals.

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The Reception of Mainland China TV Series among Chinese Migrants in Southeast Asia

Hong Zhang and Qianqian Zong

1 Introduction

Globally, TV series from international migrants' countries of origin play an important role in connecting migrants to their mother country by reminding them of their cultural and social roots, which produces a sense of attachment to the nation they – or their ancestors – once called "home." Chinese state-owned and private television drama production companies started to export their TV series in the 1990s, and after 20 years of distribution they have considerably increased in quantity and improved in quality. According to Han (2014) 326 Mainland China TV series were exported in 2012, raising US$ 24.6 million in revenues. But although successful series like *Three Kingdoms* and *Yongzheng Dynasty* have had a profound influence on a global scale, China still lags significantly behind the world's leading TV series exporters. For example, by 2008, the United States was shipping an annual total of 300,000 hours of TV programs to the rest of the world - among which TV series contributed the highest proportion, corresponding to over 70% of the advertising revenues (Liao & Wu, 2009). Another significant exporter was South Korea, which exported its TV series to 33 countries in Asia, the Americas, and Europe in 2011, raising US$ 158 million in revenues (Han 2014).Mainland China's TV series are primarily exported to culturally and geographically close regions in Asia. In fact, more than 70% of the exports go to the Asian market, the largest quantity to Taiwan, followed by Southeast Asian (SEA) countries, where 3,472 episodes of television series earned a total of 24.524 million Chinese yuan (corresponding to US$ 4.03 million) in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics of PRC, 2014).

The most important target audience of Mainland China TV series in overseas markets in general – and in the SEA market in particular – is the Chinese diaspora. Approximately 33.5 million people with Chinese background are living in SEA,

accounting for 73.4% of the total number of overseas Chinese worldwide. Since the 1980s, more than 2.5 million Chinese have immigrated to these countries (Zhuang 2009). It is these SEA migrants and their descendants with their Chinese cultural and ethnic background that became the main customer base for historical television series, modern television dramas, and soap operas produced in Mainland China.

When investigating the global dissemination of Chinese TV series, it is crucial to give due attention to the overseas Chinese television market in SEA, as pointed out by Guo Zhengzhi (Guo 2012:49). Our research aims to add to the highly relevant empirical evidence concerning the way in which Mainland China TV series have been disseminated among Chinese migrants in SEA by examining the following questions: How do Chinese diasporas in SEA receive Mainland China TV series? What motivates them to watch these series, respectively these programs? Are there any barriers in the reception process? If such barriers exist, how can they be reduced so as to improve the reception of Mainland China TV series among Chinese diasporas in SEA?

2 Theoretical background and state of research

In the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of cultural proximity – as opposed to geopolitical proximity – had big implications for cultural and media imperialism and dominated the field of international communications research. The media imperialism theory points to the dominance of the United States in worldwide media sales and distribution which has led to a homogenization of global culture and media systems (Zhang, 2014:121-123). In his 1991 study of national television production in Brazil and other economically less-developed countries (LDCs), Straubhaar found that audiences expressed a preference for domestically-produced programs. When national programs were not available, they tended to prefer culturally proximate program. This observation was later reinforced by other empirical studies investigating the export of television programs from LDC countries and the formation of cross-border regional television markets like the sub-market for Chinese-language programming in SEA countries (Banerjee, 2002; Cho, 2005).

In the framework of the so-called “active audiences theory,” Hoskins and McFadyen (1991) employed the concept of “cultural discount” to explain that “a particular program (or feature film) rooted in one culture, and thus attractive in that environment, will have diminished appeal elsewhere as viewers find it difficult to identify with the styles, values, beliefs, institutions and behavior patterns being portrayed” (Hoskins & McFadyen, 1991). In other words, different audiences perceive and understand TV programs differently due to cultural dissimilarities. Within this context, Cooper-Chen (2012) explained that although Japanese animation is popular worldwide, audiences’ favorites differ from country to country. In general, Japanese animation is more popular in Asia than in the West. Therefore, understanding the specific needs of the audience in a certain target market can help to facilitate the export of TV programs.

Since the early 21st century, audience research has received considerable attention among Chinese scholars in the field of international communications research. Cheng (2010) divided overseas audiences into three categories: the sphere of Chinese language; the sphere of Chinese cultural influence; and the sphere of non-Chinese cultural influence. These audience strata also apply to the export markets for Chinese TV series. Mainland China TV series differ in genres and themes; when exported to the three spheres mentioned audience reception is likely to vary greatly. Various studies have examined the historical development of programming, national policies dealing with them, program contents, overseas audiences, and the export marketing of Mainland China’s TV series (Li, 2010; Yang, 2012; He, 2013; Chen 2010; Wang, 2009); few, however, have focused on audience reception and development strategies in specific markets. Recent studies on how Mainland China TV series are disseminated in SEA countries have provided important insight in this respect (Liang, 2011 & 2013; Liu and Li, 2013) but lack sufficient consideration of the audiences’ reception.

3 Methodology

Based on the theory of cultural proximity, we investigate how the Chinese diasporas in SEA receive Mainland China TV series. Besides, we will discuss the barriers occurring during the reception process and possibilities to reduce them. For that purpose we applied an online survey as well as focus group discussions. Because the largest Chinese diasporas live in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, the target group of our investigation is composed of overseas Chinese from these three countries. The questionnaire for the online survey was sent to the potential respondents in March and June 2014. Valid responses were collected from 209 participants, of which 150 were Indonesian Chinese, 34 Malaysian Chinese, 22 Thai Chinese, and three from other SEA countries. Despite the cultural differences between these countries, our research mainly focuses on the commonalities of Chinese diasporas' reception of Mainland China TV series there. The majority of respondents (72.7%) were aged 15-25 years, and more than half (58%) were students.

The focus group consisted of six persons from Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand who studied at Zhejiang University and were friends. The historical drama *The Legend of Zhen Huan* (episode 29) and the modern drama *Little Daddy* (episode 1) were broadcasted to them before the discussion. The two dramas were selected because they were ranked as the most popular Mainland TV dramas by the respondents of our online survey. Since all the group members spoke relatively well Chinese, the drama was broadcasted in Chinese language, with Chinese subtitles. The researchers observed the group reaction during the broadcast, and afterwards moderated the group discussion, and recorded the process.

4. Research findings

Viewing frequency of audiences of Mainland China-produced TV series

The result of the online survey showed that 54.6% of the Chinese migrants in our sample watch, on average, less than one episode of Mainland China TV series each week, while only 13.9% watch more than six episodes per week (Table 1). The majority of Chinese migrants do not seem to be habitual viewers of Mainland China TV series. However, it should be noted that Mainland China TV series are not broadcast on television on a weekly basis in SEA countries. Nevertheless, 60.3% of the respondents watch these programs on their personal computers, so the limitations of television networks do not necessarily mean that audiences cannot access these programs. The focus group members stated that they normally do not watch the dramas because of language barriers or differing social values, which further explains the low viewing frequencies of Mainland TV series by the Chinese diaspora.

TV stars are a traditional attraction for some audiences. However, only 18.7% of the respondents watch Mainland China TV series because they are fans of a particular TV star. Rather, the majority watches these programs hoping to learn Chinese or improve their Chinese language competences (56.6%), followed by those who watch just to kill time (44%), and those who watch to learn something about Chinese culture (25.8%). Some members of the focus group also pointed out that they are not familiar with Mainland China TV stars, which is perhaps another reason they are not lured into viewing the series.

Table 1: Average number of episodes viewed per week

Frequency	Share of audience (%)
More than 10 episodes	8.1
6-10 episodes	5.7
2-5 episodes	31.6
Less than 1 episode	54.5

Source: Authors' survey

Our findings seem to contradict the theory of cultural proximity. Interestingly, however, during the focus group discussion we learnt that Chinese migrants in SEA are more likely to choose TV series originating from Hong Kong or Taiwan when they are available because these programs align more closely with their own culture.

Influence of TV series originating from Hong Kong and Taiwan

Although the political systems and cultural traditions of SEA countries differ from each other, they have many commonalities when it comes to television broadcasting. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the television systems of all of these countries have undergone government deregulation and commercialization processes, and the development of cable and satellite television has since contributed to a considerable diversification of TV channels (Guo, 2012; Banerjee, 2002). The focus group participants reported that there are six free local channels in Malaysia; further, people can subscribe to TV programs from Europe, USA, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mainland China, India, and the Arab region which are made available via approximately 200 domestic and international satellite channels.

The strong competition - especially from TV series produced by Hong Kong and Taiwan – cannot be neglected by Mainland China's TV producers who want to broadcast in SEA. The market strength of Hong Kong and Taiwan television series is due to several circumstances. Firstly, the ancestors of SEA Chinese mostly came from South China, which is geographically and culturally close to Hong Kong and Taiwan. Secondly, as compared to Hong Kong and Taiwanese series, Mainland China dramas were latecomers on the SEA market. Focus group members pointed out that Mainland TV dramas only started broadcasting occasionally on local channels in the mid-2000s. Prior to that, they had only been familiarized with Mainland TV dramas from DVDs brought back by their relatives and friends from the Mainland. In contrast, Hong Kong and Taiwanese dramas were already introduced to Singapore, Malaysia and other SEA countries in the 1960s. Even in Indonesia – where anti-Chinese sentiments were very strong – Hong Kong and Taiwanese dramas arrived as early as the 1990s (Banerjee, 2002; Liu and Li, 2013).

Therefore, it was through youth idol dramas[1], martial arts dramas, and costume dramas originating from Hong Kong and Taiwan that the Chinese diaspora in SEA first experienced Chinese dramas. When Mainland China TV series later entered the SEA market, the audiences inevitably compared them to those produced in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Once dramas of the same genre became available from both Mainland China and Hong Kong/Taiwan, audiences generally chose those from Hong Kong or Taiwan because they were more familiar with them. Even though more costume dramas appearing in Thailand since the early 2000s have been produced by Mainland China than Hong Kong, those from the latter were more influential because they were mainly broadcasted during prime time (Liang, 2013).

The focus group members were also more familiar with Hong Kong and Taiwanese TV stars. For example, several of them insisted that the costume drama *My Fair Princess,* which was jointly produced by Taiwan and Mainland China, belonged to a Taiwanese TV series because Taiwanese stars are featured in it. They were also convinced that the presence of the Hong Kong and Taiwanese stars Nicky Wu and Kevin Cheng contributed to the popularity of the Mainland drama *Scarlet Heart* in SEA countries. Focus group members also expressed that viewers of *The Legend of Zhen Huan* and *Little Daddy* often discuss the Hong Kong and Taiwanese stars appearing in them. This reflects the fact that the Hong Kong and Taiwanese TV industries are successfully promoting their dramas and their stars in SEA which they seem to regard as an important market.

Preferences among genres

In contrast to previous research results indicating that the audiences in SEA countries prefer Chinese historical dramas (Guo, 2012:47), 38.8% of our respondents showed equal interest in both historical and modern dramas being produced in Mainland China. Another 23% preferred historical dramas while 19.1% sided with modern dramas (Table 2). Since the majority of the respondents were young students, this result suggests that the younger generation are also attracted to Chinese modern dramas.

1 This genre includes dramas that use young, attractive stars as a main attraction for the audience.

Table 2: Preference among drama genres from Mainland China

Preference	Share (%)
Historical dramas	23.0
Modern dramas	19.1
Both	38.8
Does not matter	14.8

Source: Authors' survey

The most popular *modern* Chinese drama categories are youth idol dramas, family dramas and melodramas, reflecting the efforts Chinese producers have put forth to improve the quality and diversity of their products. As the cultural proximity theory suggests, a common structure and humor allows TV series to be sold across very diverse cultures (La Pastina & Straubhaar, 2005:275-276). Sitcoms such as *Home with Kids* and *iPartment* and melodramas such as *Little Daddy* are well-received among diverse populations of the Chinese diasporas living in SEA because people are familiarized with the structure and laughing points of such TV series. Fairy dramas, martial arts dramas, court dramas and historical orthodox dramas are also very popular among SEA audiences, such as fairy dramas *Journey to the West* and historical orthodox dramas *Three Kingdoms* adapted from classical novels of Chinese literature, and recently produced court dramas *Scarlet Heart* and *The Legend of Zhen Huan*.

Chinese Culture as a Major Attraction

41% of our respondents believe that Chinese culture is the unique feature of Mainland China's TV series, followed by close to daily-life sceneries (33%), Anti-Japanese aggression during the WWII (22%), and local stars (19%). The survey also indicates that Chinese culture is the major attraction for the audiences of both historical and modern dramas. A number of Chinese historical events and historical figures are commonly renowned by the Chinese diasporas throughout SEA, and Chinese social values are still widely recognized, as 5,000 years of Chinese history and culture have a profound impact on Chinese diasporas in SEA.

Since the majority of Chinese migrants living in SEA emigrated before the People's Republic of China was established, they and their descendants largely identify with the traditional pre-PRC Chinese culture. Nevertheless, since the 1980s, China's rapid economic development has provoked their interest in contemporary China and the lifestyle and values of its inhabitants.

Chinese migrants' interests in and knowledge of Chinese culture was verified during the focus group discussion. The participants discussed the related history and culture while watching *The Legend of Zhen Huan*. They talked about the historical existence of the main characters in this drama from the very beginning of the broadcast, and concluded that Zhen Huan is a fictional character while the Emperor represents a real historical person. They also spoke about the complex appellations and customs in the royal palace. In general, they demonstrated a good knowledge of Chinese history, such that it does not appear that the hierarchy, appellations and customs mentioned in the drama would constitute comprehension barriers.

The group members also spoke highly of the exquisite make-up and costumes used in the film. One of them explained that, historically, the fashion changed from dynasty to dynasty and that hierarchical status determined a person's hairstyle and the color of their clothes. In episode 29 of *The Legend of Zhen Huan*, there is a spectacular scene in which the Emperor and the Empress leave the palace to pray in a temple. The group members compared this scene to those typical of the costume dramas of Hong Kong's Television Broadcasts Limited (TVB) and concluded that Mainland China was spending considerably more money for the production of its dramas. Clothing, props, and overall set design of the scene impressed the focus group members. Some from the audience asked whether the drama was actually filmed in the Forbidden City and were told by the others that it was shot in a film studio located in Hengdian, Zhejiang Province. One Chinese graduate student of literature also mentioned during the broadcast that unlike the Chinese vernacular spoken in this drama, people spoke classical Chinese in ancient times.

While watching the modern drama *Little Daddy*, focus group members demonstrated their understanding of traditional Chinese values and stereotypes. For example, they found it unacceptable that the protagonist fell in love so soon

during his exchange stay in the United States, which is not in accordance with traditional Chinese values. Besides, they thought the child—little daddy's son-- in the drama looks Korean because in their stereotypes, Chinese kids are more plainly dressed. They also showed interest in Chinese people's daily lives. For example, they were surprised when they saw Chinese employees working overtime without pay. When they viewed a scene set in Beijing, they discussed the city's air pollution and haze problems, and some offered their personal experiences. Audience members imitated authentic Beijing dialects and exhibited curiosity regarding the local food shown in the film.

4. Barriers to the exportation of Mainland China TV Series

Dubbing and subtitles

When exporting TV programs, a number of technical requirements are required, including high definition (HD) video format, international sound channels with dynamic effects and music, and original program material. Broadcasting companies generally re-edit, dub, and make subtitles after purchasing a program. However, many Chinese TV programs do not equip themselves for international sound channels during production, making it difficult to export their products to the international market (Yang, 2012:123).

The dubbing and subtitling of Mainland TV series was an important issue in the group discussion. During a viewing of *The Legend of Zhen Huan,* focus group members expressed that they were all familiar with the Hong Kong actress Ada Choi who plays the role of empress, because she is casted in many TV series appearing in SEA countries. Since Ada Choi does not speak Mandarin fluently, she spoke Cantonese during the shooting, and her voice was later dubbed by a professional mandarin voice actor in the revised version. The focus members said they were not accustomed to the mismatch between the voice and the lip movements. Four students in the focus group spoke Cantonese. When they looked at the lip movements, they tried to guess what Ada was saying in Cantonese, which had a negative impact on their viewing experience. In fact, live recording of the actors' voices on the set are widely used in drama productions around the world. Mainland China TV producers, however, recruit professional voice actors for

dubbing purposes mainly for two reasons: firstly, Mainland actors are often unable to recite their lines to the satisfaction of the producers while on the set; secondly, an increasing number of actors from Hong Kong and Taiwan are starting their careers in Mainland China and their Mandarin often lacks fluency. Although professional voice actors can improve the deliverance of the vocal parts by reciting the lines with the right emotion, the imperfect synchronization of the voices and the lip movements is distracting to the audience.

The focus group members said they are more accustomed to listening to dialogues in their original languages with subtitles. Subtitles in the necessary language are added when Mainland China TV series are broadcast on local television networks. However, since more people are watching Mainland China TV series online, the lack of availability of subtitles in English or other languages causes inconveniences for viewers.

Lack of a Cultural Brand

According to the well-known television drama director Zheng Xiaolong, Mainland China TV series lack stable audiences in the global context, i.e. overseas audiences have not become especially loyal to them. As a result, the Chinese TV drama industry has long suffered from a trade deficit since Chinese TV dramas have not been widely demanded by overseas audiences (Li, 2013:86).

In choosing TV series, Chinese diasporas in SEA have alternatives. Focus group members pointed out that Mainland China dramas are still marginalized as compared to Hong Kong, Taiwanese, US-American, British, Japanese, and Korean dramas, and even dramas from India and Arabic countries, which are presumed to be culturally unfamiliar among the Chinese diasporas in SEA are more popular.

To develop “stable” audiences, Mainland China TV series need to build up their own cultural brand. A major shortcoming in this context is that Mainland TV stars are hardly known to the SEA audiences. Besides, as emphasized by focus group members, Taiwanese and Korean idol dramas, Hong Kong family dramas, Thai romance dramas, and US-American science fiction series have developed their own viewing habits corresponding to their attraction to these cultural brands. As shown by our online survey, Mainland China TV series entered the SEA markets relatively late and respondents do not favor them because they lack innovation within the drama genre. Although the Mainland China television industry has developed rapidly in the early 21st century, producers tend to reuse content in order to reduce the risk of losing customers. In addition, some production elements such as visual effects and music are not of the best quality due to limited production funds. All these factors contribute to the difficulties in building a brand for Mainland dramas in overseas markets.

Insufficient attention paid to the SEA Market

In the discussion, focus group members expressed that they did not have the feeling that the Chinese TV drama industry has the ambition to compete on the international market. In fact, Mainland drama producers can profit simply by selling their dramas to domestic television and internet broadcasters. Their products include hardly any technological support such as international sound channels,

corresponding subtitles or dubbings, or other cross-cultural enhancements to reduce their costs.

49.3% of the Chinese migrants in our survey were introduced to Mainland Chinese dramas by their friends. This percentage is significantly higher than for other introductory channels, including television, websites, and newspapers. Thus, interpersonal communication rather than mass media communication have been largely responsible for the promotion of Mainland China's TV series. The focus group members also mentioned that Mainland TV series producers pay insufficient attention to the SEA markets. In contrast, many Hong Kong and Taiwanese actors visit SEA countries to advertise their dramas prior to their broadcast. They also commonly post advertisements on social media platforms such as Facebook. The focus group members said that Mainland China TV series producers do not seem to make any efforts in promoting their series in SEA countries.

The respondents also believed that the social values delivered from Mainland dramas were not universally accepted. For example, 25% of the respondents said they did not like Mainland China TV series because the dramas often show trivial issues concerning Chinese families. Nor did they understand why present-day TV dramas put so much emphasis on the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relationship, because this was not regarded as an important issue in their own countries. Therefore, Mainland producers should be aware that the cultural issues which they portray are less meaningful when their dramas go global. In general, producers seeking to e xport need to pay attention to language, social values, and aesthetic variations.

5 Discussion and Conclusions

Strengthening Cultural Proximity

Chinese diasporas in SEA and Mainland Chinese people share the same cultural roots. This would lead one to believe that TV series produced in Mainland China suffer minimal cultural discount when exported to SEA. However, our study shows that Mainland dramas have not been successfully disseminated in SEA countries. Our results suggest two major reasons. First, Chinese diasporas in SEA countries are well-integrated into the local culture. A 2013 survey of young Chinese migrants

living in SEA countries showed that 98% of the Chinese families have lived there already for more than two generations (Li, 2013: 86). The younger generation has little knowledge of contemporary Chinese culture. For example, our focus group members felt that the ideologies represented in Mainland modern dramas - especially those dealing with the Sino-Japanese War – often contradict those represented in Hong Kong and Taiwanese series. Secondly, although the younger generation generally has a good command of Mandarin, the internet slang heavily used in many modern dramas often makes it difficult for them to fully comprehend.

It is necessary for the producers of Mainland China TV dramas to strengthen cultural proximity for viewers in SEA. Borrowing from the experience of Brazilian telenovelas (La Pastina & Straubhaar, 2005:284), one approach could be to focus on the living conditions of Chinese immigrants in SEA and to produce more TV dramas reflecting the educational, legal, health or other practical problems this group might encounter in their daily lives. By tackling issues relevant to the lives of Chinese immigrants, TV series would more easily arouse the interest of this audience base. In addition, universally accepted values rather than political ideologies should be delivered through Mainland China TV series. Korean and US-American dramas often deal with positive values and humanism, and have acquired a large following worldwide. Mainland historical dramas would likely experience greater worldwide appeal if they emphasized traditional Chinese virtues such as gentleness, kindness, politeness, thrift and humility.

Mainland drama producers need to take the viewing habits of SEA audiences into consideration. International sound channels, dubbing in the local language and subtitles would not only make these dramas more accessible to audiences in SEA but would also aid these audiences in learning Mandarin.

Necessity of Brand Building

Since Mainland-produced dramas are not widely recognized among Chinese diasporas in SEA and do not have stable audiences, it is necessary for the producers to build up their cultural brand. For a long time, audiences in SEA countries have been deeply influenced by Hong Kong and Taiwanese dramas. As latecomers to the market, Mainland China TV series need to be innovators in order to attract more viewers. Our survey revealed that dramas relating to Chinese

history and culture, such as *Kangxi Dynasty* and *Three Kingdoms,* had acquired a high reputation among Chinese diasporas in SEA. Our focus group members also stated that the strong points of these dramas are their superior display of costumes and spectacular settings as well as the large number of actors at their disposal. By watching Mainland historical dramas, audiences not only enjoy pleasant viewing experiences but can also learn much about Chinese history.

In the category of modern dramas, the producers of Mainland idol dramas need to get a clear grasp of their own positioning in the market by analyzing the competition from Hong Kong, Taiwanese, Korean, European, and US-American dramas. Our survey has shown that light comedies are quite popular in SEA countries; humorous dialogues and funny facial expressions in the series were also appreciated by the focus group members. To gain a larger following of Mainland idol dramas, we suggest that the producers explore the lifestyle and social values of Chinese people, and also improve the quality of the scripts, costumes, music and other components accordingly. Furthermore, star effects should not be neglected when promoting dramas in SEA. For that purpose, drama producers could work together with SEA celebrities.

Combining international resources

As emphasized above, the marketing strategies of the Mainland China TV drama industry is in need of further improvement. In addition to utilizing national platforms and organizing large-scale TV drama festivals in SEA countries, producers should cooperate with local institutions to promote their pieces on local TV channels and develop stable audiences abroad.

Currently, the promotion of Mainland TV series relies mainly on Chinese international TV channels, such as CCTV International (CCTV-4) and international channels of provincial TV stations. According to our focus group participants, many of these channels are included in their families' pay-TV packages, although very few have ever watched them because these state-owned channels are presumed to be the propaganda machines of Mainland China. We suggest that major Mainland TV channels cooperate with influential overseas Chinese-language television networks to construct a global platform for the exchange of domestic-

and foreign-produced Chinese-language TV programs. This would facilitate the broadcast of Mainland TV dramas on local channels abroad and would reduce the psychological distance between Mainland TV dramas and audiences abroad. State-owned TV stations could also establish Chinese-language TV channels in collaboration with overseas institutions[2]. Cooperation with overseas institutions would help to reduce the barriers to the exportation[3] of TV programs. In addition, with the rise of new forms of media, it is important for Mainland producers to promote their TV series on widely used social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter as well as popular local video websites. Finally, the starring of Hong Kong, Taiwanese and SEA actors would likely enhance audience ratings.

In conclusion, Mainland TV drama producers need to take into account the viewing habits of Chinese migrants in SEA into their strategies. They need to strengthen the role of cultural proximity in the content of their dramas. Further, they need to make use of overseas resources when exporting their products. These actions would be likely to attract a greater following by local audiences, would help to establish a cultural brand, and would increase the influence of Mainland TV dramas on the global stage.

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2 For example, Jia Yu Channel is co-founded by Guangdong Television and Cosmos Discovery Sdn Bhd. a local production company in Malaysia. This channel was launched in 2005 and has become an important bridge between the government and the local Chinese community in Malaysia.

3 For example, Legend of Southwest Dance and Music is jointly produced by the Chinese and Burmese Administration of Film and TV. When it was broadcast in China, it got the attention of many Burmese audiences.

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